concluded

Dec 5, 2025 Read Opinion

In re Marriage of Calcagno

# In re Marriage of Calcagno, 2025 IL App (3d) 250299 1) Case citation and parties - In re Marriage of Calcagno, 2025 IL App (3d) 250299 (Opinion filed Dec. 5, 2025). - Petitioner–Appellee: Michael Calcagno. Respondent–Appellant: Dawn Calcagno. 2) Key legal issues - Does the appellate court have jurisdiction to hear an interlocutory appeal from a trial court order granting exclusive possession of the marital residence? (Rule 307(a)(1)) - Was the trial court’s admission/use of a section 604.10(b) evaluator’s report (Dr. Shapiro) erroneous where the evaluator did not testify and the report was objected to as hearsay? - Was the trial court’s award of temporary exclusive possession against the manifest weight of the evidence? 3) Holding/outcome - The appellate court denied the husband’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction and affirmed the trial court’s grant of exclusive possession to Michael. The court rejected the appellant’s challenges to admissibility and the manifest-weight claim. 4) Significant legal reasoning (concise) - Appellate jurisdiction: The court held Rule 307(a)(1) permits interlocutory appeals from exclusive-possession orders. Although the statutory text changed (old §701 expressly referenced injunctions; current §501(c‑2) does not), the nature of an exclusive‑possession order—depriving a spouse of possession and altering the status quo—retains an injunctive character and thus is appealable under Rule 307(a)(1). - Admissibility of 604.10(b) report: The court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion by considering the evaluator’s report. The report was treated as the court’s witness report under local practice, and the guardian ad litem (GAL) testified and tied the evaluator’s conclusions to the record. The absence of the evaluator for cross‑examination did not render the report outcome‑determinative or so prejudicial as to require reversal. - Manifest weight: Exclusive possession is an extraordinary remedy, but the record supported the trial court’s factual findings: prolonged estrangement between mother and children, unsuccessful therapeutic interventions, the evaluator’s recommendation of separation, and the court’s balancing of hardships. The trial court’s credibility determinations and conclusion that separation would better protect the children’s mental well‑being were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 5) Practice implications (short) - Exclusive‑possession orders are appealable under Rule 307(a)(1); counsel should treat such orders as immediately reviewable. - If relying on a §604.10(b) evaluator’s report, make the evaluator available for testimony or ensure admissibility through stipulation/local rules; use the GAL to introduce and corroborate evaluator findings where necessary. - When seeking exclusive possession, develop a record showing how cohabitation jeopardizes physical or mental well‑being and document efforts/failed therapies and the balancing of hardships—trial courts will rely on credibility and holistic assessment.

Nov 19, 2025 Read Opinion

In re Marriage of Julin

- Case citation and parties In re Marriage of Julin, 2025 IL App (1st) 241855-U. Petitioner-Appellant: Lisa Julin; Respondent-Appellee: Jonathon Siegel. - Key legal issues 1) Whether the trial court properly awarded respondent attorney fees under section 508(b) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/508(b) (West 2022)) for (a) noncompliance with court orders/judgments without justification and/or (b) litigation precipitated or conducted for an improper purpose. 2) Whether the trial court properly allocated guardian ad litem (GAL) fees under section 506 of the Marriage Act. - Holding / outcome The appellate court vacated the trial court’s award of respondent’s attorney fees under section 508(b) and remanded for a new attorney-fee hearing. The court affirmed the trial court’s allocation of GAL fees (petitioner ordered to pay 55% of GAL fees). - Significant legal reasoning (concise) - The decree and marital settlement agreement: the parties negotiated a marital settlement that waived routine fee claims under section 503(j) but expressly preserved claims under section 508(b); therefore section 508(b) relief remained available. - Inadequate factual findings/record for 508(b) award: the appellate court concluded the trial court’s award under section 508(b) lacked adequate, specific findings required to demonstrate (i) noncompliance without compelling cause or (ii) that hearings were precipitated or conducted for an improper purpose. The record contained significant gaps (missing hearing transcripts and unclear evidentiary support for the trial court’s percentages and time period), preventing meaningful appellate review. Accordingly the attorney-fee award was vacated and remanded for a properly supported hearing and written findings. - GAL fees sustained: by contrast, the GAL’s petition and the trial court’s prior orders supplied sufficient evidentiary support for apportioning GAL fees under section 506 (court found petitioner precipitated much of the parenting-time litigation and the fee allocation was justified). - Practice implications for family law practitioners - When seeking (or opposing) a 508(b) fee award, litigants must develop a clear evidentiary record and obtain specific, written trial-court findings tying misconduct/noncompliance or improper-purpose litigation to fee liability and quantifying the fee allocation. - Preserve transcripts and rulings: missing transcripts and fragmented records risk vacatur; order and preserve hearings on fee petitions and obtain written findings. - In settlement agreements, carefully draft fee-waiver/reservation clauses to state whether section 508(b) claims are preserved and the procedures for seeking those fees. - For GAL-fee petitions under §506, submit contemporaneous billing, itemized statements, and evidence of which party precipitated GAL involvement and each party’s ability to pay to support allocation.

Oct 30, 2025 Read Opinion

In re Marriage of Kinsella

- Case citation and parties In re Marriage of Kinsella, 2025 IL App (3d) 240144-U (Ill. App. Ct., 3d Dist. Oct. 30, 2025) (Rule 23 order). Petitioner-Appellee: Donielle Kinsella. Respondent-Appellant: Michael Kinsella. - Key legal issues 1) Whether the trial court erred in denying respondent’s motion to modify child support (750 ILCS 5/510). 2) Whether the trial court properly granted petitioner’s request to “set” children’s expenses after the dissolution judgment omitted an expense allocation (relationship between section 505 set-expenses relief and section 510 modification). 3) Whether the trial court abused its discretion in awarding attorney fees. - Holding/outcome The appellate court: (1) affirmed the denial of Michael’s motion to modify child support; (2) held the trial court abused its discretion in granting Donielle’s request to set the children’s expenses and vacated that portion of the order; and (3) affirmed the trial court’s award of attorney fees to Michael. - Significant legal reasoning (concise) - Modification: The trial court’s factual determination that there was no substantial change in circumstances to justify modifying child support was supported by the record. The court credited documentary evidence (tax returns, accountant testimony) and discredited respondent’s testimony on income; the appellate court deferred to those credibility findings and the trial court’s exercise of discretion. - Expenses: Although the trial court stated it had intended to allocate children’s future expenses in the dissolution judgment, it omitted that provision and later treated petitioner’s post-judgment request as a section 505 “set expenses” matter rather than a section 510 modification. The appellate court concluded the trial court abused its discretion in the way it granted relief to set expenses (and therefore vacated that portion), signaling that the statutory/practical distinction between setting expenses and modifying a final judgment matters and cannot be skirted by recharacterization. - Fees: The fee award was within the trial court’s equitable discretion and was affirmed. - Practice implications for family law attorneys - Preserve clarity in final judgments: explicitly allocate child-related expenses at entry to avoid later disputes over proper post-judgment procedure. - Choose the correct statutory vehicle: relief to alter a final judgment typically requires section 510 modification (showing substantial change); ad hoc “set expense” requests may be vulnerable if they functionally modify the decree. - Prove changes to income with documentary support (tax returns, P&L, ledgers); credibility and complete financial disclosure are critical. - Fee awards remain discretionary—document litigation conduct and reasonableness. - Note: decision is a Rule 23 order (nonprecedential except as allowed by Rule 23(e)(1)).

Oct 21, 2025 Read Opinion

In re Marriage of Pond

- Case citation and parties In re Marriage of Pond, 2025 IL App (3d) 240696-U (Ill. App. Ct., 3d Dist. Oct. 21, 2025) (Rule 23 order). Petitioner-Appellant: Michael D. Canulli (attorney). Respondent-Appellee: Michelle R. Pond. - Key legal issues 1) Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying a second petition for a rule to show cause and indirect civil contempt for alleged unpaid attorney fees under a 2008 agreed order; 2) whether dismissal of the second petition on res judicata grounds was appropriate when the second petition alleged post‑judgment violations occurring after the first petition was decided; and 3) what proof is required to reduce disputed contractual fee obligations to judgment or to obtain contempt relief. - Holding/outcome The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s denial of the second petition for a rule to show cause. (The panel had earlier reversed a prior res judicata dismissal and remanded for further proceedings; on remand the trial court again denied relief and that denial was upheld.) - Significant legal reasoning - Contempt requires proof that the respondent willfully and contumaciously violated a court order; a mere unpaid balance is insufficient without proof of willfulness and a clear enforcement mechanism. - The appellate court previously held that res judicata was improperly applied to dismiss the second petition because the second petition alleged violations occurring after the court’s September 8, 2022 order (different time period/claim). However, on remand the trial court examined the record (including the December 8, 2022 proceeding) and found the petitioner had not carried his burden to prove an ascertainable unpaid balance or willful noncompliance. The court emphasized credibility findings, confusing and contradictory invoicing, and that the court never made a definitive finding of a specific balance due in its earlier orders. - The appellate court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying contempt relief where (1) the amount allegedly owed was not definitively established and (2) there was no finding of willful violation. - Practice implications - If seeking contempt for unpaid fees, prove both (a) a clear, enforceable monetary obligation and (b) willful noncompliance after entry of the order. - When a fee dispute exists, reduce the debt to a money judgment (with supporting accounting) rather than relying solely on contempt remedies. - Preserve a complete record (transcripts of hearings) and obtain explicit judicial findings on amounts owed to avoid ambiguity on appeal. - Beware of relying on res judicata to bar successive petitions when alleged violations occur after prior rulings; conversely, expect courts to deny contempt where the amount or willfulness is not proven. - Note: Rule 23 order — nonprecedential except in limited circumstances.

Oct 20, 2025 Read Opinion

In re Marriage of Neal

1. Case citation and parties In re Marriage of Neal, 2025 IL App (3d) 250101‑U (Ill. App. Ct. Oct. 20, 2025) (Rule 23 order). Petitioner‑appellee: Thomas Neal. Respondent‑appellant: Mario Neal. 2. Key legal issues - Whether the trial court properly ordered a mental health examination under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 215 where respondent’s mental condition was “in controversy.” - Whether the trial court abused its discretion by suspending/restricting respondent’s parenting time (including emergency relief under 750 ILCS 5/603.10) because his conduct allegedly “seriously endangered” the children. - Whether the court’s findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence. 3. Holding/outcome The appellate court affirmed. It held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a Rule 215 psychological examination, its finding that respondent’s conduct seriously endangered the children was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and suspension/restriction of parenting time until compliance was within the court’s discretion. 4. Significant legal reasoning (concise) - Rule 215: The court found respondent’s mental state was squarely “in controversy” given his persistent conspiracy allegations, communications with school/GAL, threats, refusal to cooperate with court‑appointed evaluators, and behavior affecting the children. A clinical assessment would materially assist resolution of parenting/time issues; therefore Rule 215 was proper. - Emergency parenting‑time relief (603.10): The court applied the preponderance standard and concluded respondent’s documented conduct (escalating accusatory emails to school personnel, publishing allegations online, distributing a photograph of a child, threats to evaluators, and noncooperation) created a substantial risk to the children’s emotional/physical welfare. Limiting parenting time to supervised visits pending evaluation was a proportional exercise of discretion. - Standards of review: fact‑finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence (deference to trial court credibility assessments); parenting time modifications reviewed for abuse of discretion. 5. Practice implications - Where a parent’s mental health/behavior is central to parenting disputes, Rule 215 and a 604.10 evaluator can be appropriate — courts will order evaluations when the mental condition is “in controversy.” - Persistent, threatening, or disruptive communications (to schools, evaluators, GALs) and refusal to comply with court orders can justify immediate restrictions on parenting time under 603.10. - Preserve and document communications, threats, evaluator opinions, and school actions to support emergency relief; move promptly to seal sensitive exhibits (e.g., images of children). - Counsel clients (especially self‑represented litigants) on consequences of noncompliance with court‑ordered evaluations; evaluators may withdraw if threatened, which can impact scheduling and sanctions. - Be aware this is a Rule 23 non‑precedential disposition; nevertheless, it underscores tolerances courts will afford to protect children and to require psychological assessment when behavior raises safety/fitness concerns.

Oct 15, 2025 Read Opinion

In re parentage of D.O.

- Case citation and parties In re Parentage of D.O., 2025 IL App (3d) 240645‑U (Oct. 15, 2025) (Rule 23 order; not precedent). Petitioner‑Appellee: Christie Capalety. Respondent‑Appellant: Dominic O’Neill. (Du Page County Cir. Ct., No. 22 FA 549; Judge Robert E. Douglas.) - Key legal issues 1) Whether the trial court abused its discretion in calculating O’Neill’s income for child support/arrearage when he failed to produce tax returns, P&Ls, or complete records. 2) Whether the trial court abused its discretion in allocating payment responsibility for significant educational/extracurricular (hockey) expenses. - Holding/outcome Affirmed. The appellate court concluded the trial court did not abuse its discretion in (a) determining O’Neill’s income based on bank deposits and his admitted hourly wage and (b) allocating half of the hockey expenses to O’Neill. O’Neill’s motion to reconsider was denied. - Significant legal reasoning (concise) - Standard of review: findings on child support and arrearages are reviewed for abuse of discretion. - Trial court credibility: O’Neill’s income testimony was inconsistent and not credible; he commingled accounts, failed to produce records, and charged personal expenses to business accounts. - Permissible inference: where a party fails to produce evidence within their control, courts may presume the evidence would be adverse. Given the lack of credible, complete documentation, the trial court reasonably relied on bank deposits and O’Neill’s admitted hourly rate to extrapolate annual income ($173,150.02). - Record deficiencies on appeal: O’Neill’s appellate brief omitted trial exhibits (notably the bank statements). The panel noted Rule 341/342 requirements and that pro se litigants are held to the same rules, but nevertheless reviewed for abuse of discretion and applied the Foutch presumption in favor of the trial court where the appellate record was incomplete. - Extracurricular expenses: the record did not show the court failed to account for payments O’Neill allegedly made; his inconsistent testimony defeated his challenge. - Practice implications for family law practitioners - Preserve and produce complete financial records (tax returns, P&L, balance sheets, bank statements). Failure permits adverse inferences and court extrapolation of income. - Avoid commingling business/personal funds; maintain contemporaneous documentation of reimbursements, barter arrangements, and fringe benefits. - When appealing, ensure compliance with Ill. S. Ct. Rules 341/342: include all trial exhibits and supporting pleadings or risk waiver or unfavorable presumptions. - For clients paying extracurricular/education costs, keep clear receipts and contemporaneous proof of payments to avoid allocation disputes. - Anticipate trial courts will use bank deposits and lifestyle evidence to calculate support when formal records are missing.

Oct 8, 2025 Read Opinion

In re Marriage of Kreid

- Case citation and parties In re Marriage of Kreid, 2025 IL App (5th) 250187-U (Ill. App. Ct., 5th Dist. Oct. 8, 2025). Petitioner-Appellee: Zelpha Kreid. Respondent-Appellant: Kaleb Kreid. - Key legal issues 1. Whether the trial court’s contempt order for violating a parenting-plan provision (failing to mediate before changing the child’s school placement) was civil or criminal in nature. 2. Whether the trial court denied respondent the procedural due-process protections required for criminal contempt by entering the order without providing criminal-contempt procedural safeguards. - Holding / outcome The Fifth District reversed. The appellate court concluded the trial court’s order, though labeled civil contempt and containing a “purge” condition, was in substance an order for indirect criminal contempt. Because respondent was not afforded the procedural protections required for criminal contempt, the circuit court abused its discretion and the contempt order was reversed. - Significant legal reasoning (concise) The court reviewed the established distinction: civil contempt seeks to coerce future compliance and must provide an attainable purge mechanism; criminal contempt punishes past conduct and is retrospective. Civil contempt must (1) allow the contemnor to take the action sought to be coerced and (2) terminate sanctions upon compliance. If a purported purge provision exceeds those limits (e.g., imposes punitive, non-purgable obligations or conditions beyond contemnor’s control), it effectively transforms into criminal contempt. Here, the trial court found respondent violated the parenting plan by changing the child’s school without mediation and ordered him to pay the private mediator’s full costs and, if mediation failed, the guardian ad litem retainer within 14 days to “purge” contempt. The appellate court determined those conditions functioned punitively and were not the sort of immediate, within-contemnor-control remedial acts that characterize civil contempt. Because the contempt was indirect and criminal in effect, respondent was entitled to criminal-contempt procedural protections, which were not provided. - Practice implications for family law practitioners - Draft and litigate contempt remedies carefully: ensure purge conditions are strictly coercive, within the contemnor’s control, and capable of terminating sanctions on compliance. - Avoid imposing monetary or third-party payment conditions as purported “purges” when those conditions function as punishment or are impracticable to undo. - If the court seeks to punish past noncompliance, counsel should demand appropriate criminal-contempt procedures (notice of charges, opportunity to defend, and other due-process protections). - When seeking enforcement of parenting-plan provisions (e.g., school placement changes), consider mediation, declaratory relief, or modified parenting-plan petitions rather than contempt that risks being recharacterized on appeal.

Sep 30, 2025 Read Opinion

In re Marriage of Brosh

1. Case citation and parties - In re Marriage of Brosh, No. 5-23-0114, 2025 IL App (5th) 230114-U (5th Dist. Sept. 30, 2025) (Rule 23 order). Petitioner-Appellee: Donna Brosh. Respondent-Appellant: Kenneth Brosh. 2. Key legal issues - Whether the circuit court’s entry of a two‑year plenary order of protection under the Illinois Domestic Violence Act (harassment/stalking by a family member) was against the manifest weight of the evidence. - Procedural: appellate consideration after an initial summary order was withdrawn to include appellant’s omitted brief arguments (electronic filing issue). 3. Holding/outcome - Affirmed. The Fifth District held the circuit court’s findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence and upheld the two‑year plenary order of protection. The decision is a Rule 23 non‑precedential disposition. 4. Significant legal reasoning - Standard of review: factual findings are reviewed for manifest weight; credibility determinations are for the trial court. - The court credited the trial judge’s assessment that Donna proved harassment and a likelihood of continued harassment absent prohibition. Key facts supporting that finding: - Repeated, proximate surveillance photographs of Donna’s residence and properties (some showing the respondent’s hand/reflection), taken frequently and within 500 feet of her home. - Additional indicia of targeting: razor blades embedded in vehicle tires and a cracked windshield during the same timeframe. - Prior orders of protection and the respondent’s litigation conduct (bringing voluminous photos and pressuring the petitioner to “verify” them in court) increased petitioner’s fear and supported reasonableness of her concerns. - Appellant’s credibility was damaged by inconsistent testimony and failure to produce alleged third‑party photographers to corroborate his account. - The trial court reasonably concluded the photographs were not necessary for the asserted legitimate litigation purpose and could support an inference of stalking/harassment. - Because credibility and reasonableness were resolved against appellant, reversal on manifest‑weight grounds was not warranted. 5. Practice implications - Challenging orders of protection on appeal is difficult where the trial court makes credibility determinations and there is corroborative circumstantial evidence (surveillance, property tampering, prior OPs). - Defense strategies: timely present corroborating witnesses/exculpatory evidence at trial; avoid inconsistent testimony; counter inferences of surveillance with concrete alternative explanations or forensic proof; contest proximity/timing relevance. - Petitioners: preserve and present physical/circumstantial evidence (photos, repair records, police reports), and testify to subjective fear and reasonableness. - Appellate practice note: verify e‑filing and receipt of briefs; filing glitches can delay appellate resolution. Also, Rule 23 dispositions remain non‑precedential; consider petition for rehearing or further review if broader precedent is sought.

Sep 29, 2025 Read Opinion

In re Marriage of May

1. Case citation and parties In re Marriage of May, 2025 IL App (5th) 241179-U. Petitioner-Appellee: William D. May Jr.; Respondent-Appellant: Amy May. 2. Key legal issues - Whether the appellate court may review the trial court’s post-dissolution pension allocation order. - Whether the trial court erred by (a) failing to specify the method/period for pension apportionment in light of the marital settlement agreement (MSA) and (b) issuing the order without an evidentiary hearing on valuation/QDRO matters. 3. Holding/outcome Appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The Fifth District concluded the trial court’s docket entry resolving the pension issue did not dispose of Amy’s pending petition for rule to show cause, so no final, appealable order existed (and no Rule 304(a) certification was entered). 4. Significant legal reasoning - Finality requirement: The court applied Illinois appellate jurisdiction principles—only final orders (or orders meeting the narrow Rule 304 exceptions) are appealable (citing Illinois Supreme Court rules and related precedent). - Procedural posture controlled: Although the trial court’s August 29, 2024 entry decided the pension period (award limited to marriage date through dissolution), the record contained an unresolved petition for rule to show cause (filed April 2, 2024). Because that petition was not expressly granted or denied, the court declined jurisdiction. The panel relied on Supreme Court precedent (In re Marriage of Gutman and other authority) holding that an unresolved contempt/rule-to-show-cause petition prevents a final appealable order absent Rule 304(a) language. - Appellate courts must consider jurisdiction sua sponte; dismissal is mandatory where finality is lacking. 5. Practice implications (concise, for counsel) - Ensure finality before appealing: obtain an order that explicitly disposes of all pending post‑judgment motions/claims (including rule-to-show-cause/contempt petitions), or request Rule 304(a) written findings permitting an immediate appeal. - When litigating pension/QDRO issues post-dissolution, secure a clear, signed order specifying (a) the marital portion, (b) valuation period/method, and (c) whether the petition for rule to show cause is granted/denied. - If the trial court issues a docket entry or interim ruling, move for a clarifying written order or rehearing to preserve appellate jurisdiction. - Where the valuation or entitlement is disputed, request an evidentiary hearing and make a record on contested factual issues (contributions, post-dissolution enhancements, QDRO specifics).

Sep 29, 2025 Read Opinion

In re Marriage of Sanfilippo

- Case citation and parties In re Marriage of Sanfilippo, No. 1-24-1794, 2025 IL App (1st) 241794-U (1st Dist. Sept. 29, 2025) (Rule 23 order; non-precedential). Petitioner–Appellee: Linda Sanfilippo. Respondent–Appellant: David Sanfilippo. - Key legal issues 1) Whether a marital settlement agreement (MSA) incorporated into a dissolution judgment could be set aside for respondent’s alleged mental incompetence at the time of agreement; 2) Whether the trial court violated the dissolution/statutory requirements (e.g., findings on values/classification of property) when entering judgment; 3) Whether the MSA was unconscionable or procured by fraud/coercion; and 4) Whether respondent was denied his right to present his case on appeal (procedural/preservation issues including absence of a court reporter). - Holding / Outcome The appellate court affirmed the Cook County circuit court: the dissolution judgment incorporating the MSA was upheld. Respondent failed to prove incompetence or other grounds (fraud/coercion/unconscionability) to invalidate the agreement, and there was no reversible procedural error. - Significant legal reasoning (concise) - Settlement-vacatur standard: an agreement incorporated by the court can be set aside only on grounds such as fraudulent misrepresentation, coercion, incompetence, gross disparity in bargaining power, or newly discovered evidence. The trial court’s finding that the MSA was fair, reasonable, not unconscionable, and voluntarily entered controls unless overturned. - Factual record: at the April 25 prove-up the parties were examined on the record, both testified they entered the agreement freely, denied impairment, and signed a written Certification/Stipulation confirming no contested issues. The trial court expressly found voluntariness. - Timing and preservation: respondent’s later change of counsel and post-judgment motions (including psychiatric evidence) did not overcome the original record and court findings. The appellate court concluded respondent did not meet his burden to show clinical incompetence sufficient to void the agreement. Challenges to alleged statutory deficiency (values/classification) and the absence of a reporter/bystander issues did not show reversible error. - Practice implications for family law attorneys - Secure a robust on-the-record prove-up: have the parties sworn, question them on voluntariness, capacity, and full disclosure; obtain signed written certifications; and ensure a court reporter is present or an agreed written record is filed. - If attacking an MSA, press timely pre-judgment objections or immediately move to vacate; post-judgment attacks face a high burden and require persuasive evidence (clinical proof of incapacity, fraud, coercion, or unconscionability). - Draft MSAs to expressly state valuations, classification of assets, and consideration to minimize later statutory/valuation challenges. - Be cautious about substitution of counsel and last‑minute recantations—late objections after a formal on-the-record acceptance are difficult to sustain.