Thomas

Dec 12, 2025 Read Opinion

In re Marriage of Spencer

1) Case citation and parties - In re Marriage of Spencer, 2025 IL App (4th) 250712-U (Dec. 12, 2025) (Rule 23 order; non‑precedential). - Petitioner‑Appellant: Aaron Justice Spencer. Respondent‑Appellee: Jessica Judith Diaz Lopez. 2) Key legal issues - Whether the trial court abused its discretion by incorporating an agreed provision in the marital settlement agreement (MSA) requiring petitioner to pay $3,500 of respondent’s attorney fees without a contemporaneous fee affidavit/time records. - Whether petitioner adequately challenged or preserved a postjudgment attack on the fee clause (including an allegation that respondent’s counsel actually represented respondent pro bono via a legal aid agency). - Procedural issue arising from appellee’s failure to file a brief (Talandis/First Capitol principles). 3) Holding/outcome - Affirmed. The appellate court held petitioner failed to show cause to vacate his acknowledged in‑court stipulation obligating him to pay $3,500 of respondent’s fees, and failed to effectively present a postjudgment motion challenging the MSA. 4) Significant legal reasoning - Agreed orders: The court emphasized that agreed orders incorporated into judgments are contractual in nature and generally binding on the parties; petitioner had expressly agreed in open court to the fee term, so authority requiring evidentiary support for fee awards (fee petitions/time records) was inapplicable. (Citing Draper & Kramer/Rolseth principles.) - Procedural default: Petitioner’s postjudgment packet began with a “request for leave” but he never brought the motion to the court’s attention or obtained a hearing date; mere filing with the clerk is not an effective application (People v. Newman). Because the motion was not effectively made, the trial court had no duty to rule on it. - Even if considered, petitioner’s speculative inference (PSLS declined to represent him → respondent’s counsel was actually pro bono via PSLS) lacked evidentiary support and would not justify vacatur. - Appellate disposition followed Talandis/Thomas approach given absence of an appellee brief; record simple, issues decidable without appellee’s brief. 5) Practice implications - Parties should understand agreed fee provisions incorporated into an MSA are binding; courts need not independently verify fee time entries when fees are contractually stipulated. - To challenge an agreed order postjudgment, promptly file and properly present a motion (e.g., under 735 ILCS 5/2‑1301(e)) — mere filing with the clerk is insufficient; secure a hearing and bring it to the court’s attention. - Allegations that counsel misrepresented fee arrangements require admissible evidence; speculative inferences (e.g., third‑party declination of representation) will not carry the motion. - When settling, clients and counsel should memorialize retainer/funding arrangements on the record to avoid later collateral attacks.

Oct 20, 2025 Read Opinion

In re Marriage of Neal

1. Case citation and parties In re Marriage of Neal, 2025 IL App (3d) 250101‑U (Ill. App. Ct. Oct. 20, 2025) (Rule 23 order). Petitioner‑appellee: Thomas Neal. Respondent‑appellant: Mario Neal. 2. Key legal issues - Whether the trial court properly ordered a mental health examination under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 215 where respondent’s mental condition was “in controversy.” - Whether the trial court abused its discretion by suspending/restricting respondent’s parenting time (including emergency relief under 750 ILCS 5/603.10) because his conduct allegedly “seriously endangered” the children. - Whether the court’s findings were against the manifest weight of the evidence. 3. Holding/outcome The appellate court affirmed. It held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ordering a Rule 215 psychological examination, its finding that respondent’s conduct seriously endangered the children was not against the manifest weight of the evidence, and suspension/restriction of parenting time until compliance was within the court’s discretion. 4. Significant legal reasoning (concise) - Rule 215: The court found respondent’s mental state was squarely “in controversy” given his persistent conspiracy allegations, communications with school/GAL, threats, refusal to cooperate with court‑appointed evaluators, and behavior affecting the children. A clinical assessment would materially assist resolution of parenting/time issues; therefore Rule 215 was proper. - Emergency parenting‑time relief (603.10): The court applied the preponderance standard and concluded respondent’s documented conduct (escalating accusatory emails to school personnel, publishing allegations online, distributing a photograph of a child, threats to evaluators, and noncooperation) created a substantial risk to the children’s emotional/physical welfare. Limiting parenting time to supervised visits pending evaluation was a proportional exercise of discretion. - Standards of review: fact‑finding was not against the manifest weight of the evidence (deference to trial court credibility assessments); parenting time modifications reviewed for abuse of discretion. 5. Practice implications - Where a parent’s mental health/behavior is central to parenting disputes, Rule 215 and a 604.10 evaluator can be appropriate — courts will order evaluations when the mental condition is “in controversy.” - Persistent, threatening, or disruptive communications (to schools, evaluators, GALs) and refusal to comply with court orders can justify immediate restrictions on parenting time under 603.10. - Preserve and document communications, threats, evaluator opinions, and school actions to support emergency relief; move promptly to seal sensitive exhibits (e.g., images of children). - Counsel clients (especially self‑represented litigants) on consequences of noncompliance with court‑ordered evaluations; evaluators may withdraw if threatened, which can impact scheduling and sanctions. - Be aware this is a Rule 23 non‑precedential disposition; nevertheless, it underscores tolerances courts will afford to protect children and to require psychological assessment when behavior raises safety/fitness concerns.

Jun 20, 2025 Read Opinion

Marriage of Kalebic

# Marriage of Kalebic, 2025 IL App (2d) 230272-U — Attorney Summary 1) Case citation and parties - Marriage of Kalebic, 2025 IL App (2d) 230272-U (Order filed June 20, 2025). - Petitioner-Appellant: Charlene Kalebic (now Charlene Quint). Respondent-Appellee: Thomas Kalebic. Appeal from Lake County. 2) Key legal issues - Whether a collections-division judge erred or abdicated enforcement duties by declining to issue a turnover (garnishment) order to the Social Security Administration (SSA). - Whether payments labeled as “cash payments” in the parties’ Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA) constitute maintenance/alimony (domestic support obligations) subject to garnishment of Social Security benefits. - Whether appellant forfeited entitlement to judicial determination of how much of a prior contempt/judgment related to maintenance. 3) Holding / outcome - Affirmed. The collections judge did not abdicate enforcement duties. The “cash payments” were property-settlement obligations, not maintenance in the nature of alimony, and therefore were not subject to garnishment of respondent’s Social Security benefits. Appellant forfeited the argument that the collections court erred in refusing to calculate the dollar amount of unpaid maintenance. 4) Significant legal reasoning - The MSA separately identified (a) Article III “Maintenance” (non-modifiable monthly payments totaling $450,000) and (b) Article VIII “Property Settlement for Wife” including sizable “Cash Payments” (characterized in the MSA as a non-taxable division under §503(e)). The court relied on the contractual labels, the MSA’s tax/characterization language, and the structure of the agreement to conclude the cash payments were a property division, not obligations “in the nature of alimony.” - Social Security benefits are not generally subject to execution for property-settlement judgments; garnishment for federal benefits requires a domestic support obligation. Because the contempt/judgment did not clearly and separately allocate a maintenance portion enforceable against SSA payments, the collections judge correctly denied turnover. - Procedural shortcomings (absence of a transcript of the contempt hearing and failure to obtain a divorcer-court allocation earlier) led to forfeiture of appellant’s argument that the collections court should have calculated unpaid maintenance. 5) Practice implications - Draft MSAs with clear, express allocations between maintenance/support and property division (include separate line-item amounts and cross-reference enforcement remedies). - When seeking garnishment of federal benefits, obtain a clear, separate court finding that the obligation is a domestic support obligation and enter enforceable support orders. - Preserve the record: obtain transcripts of hearings that result in contempt/judgment. Lack of a transcript can preclude appellate review. - If a judgment mixes support and property obligations, move promptly in the dissolution court to allocate amounts before collection proceedings.

Nov 15, 2024 Read Opinion

In re Adoption of G.B.C.

1) Case citation and parties - In re Adoption of G.B.C., 2024 IL App (3d) 240428-U (Ill. App. Ct., 3d Dist. Nov. 15, 2024) (non‑precedential, Rule 23). - Petitioners/Appellees: Hope McMurry‑Schoon & Thomas Schoon (guardians seeking adoption). - Respondent/Appellant: Justin Cox (biological father). 2) Key legal issues - Whether appointed appellate counsel may withdraw under Anders after concluding no arguable merit (Anders v. California; In re S.M.). - Whether the trial court’s unfitness findings under the Adoption Act (750 ILCS 50/1(D)) were supported by clear and convincing evidence: specifically habitual drunkenness (§1(D)(k)) and multiple other statutory grounds (abandonment, depravity §1(D)(i), failure to demonstrate interest §1(D)(l), failure to provide §1(D)(o)). - Whether trial counsel was ineffective for not calling a witness at the unfitness stage. 3) Holding / outcome - Affirmed trial court’s judgment terminating respondent’s parental rights and granting the adoption. - Allowed appellate counsel to withdraw under Anders as there were no non‑frivolous issues to pursue. 4) Significant legal reasoning (concise) - Standard: unfitness must be proved by clear and convincing evidence; appellate review is highly deferential (manifest‑weight standard). The court follows the two‑step Adoption Act analysis (unfitness first, then best interests). - The appellate court found the habitual drunkenness finding (§1(D)(k)) to be against the manifest weight because the relevant one‑year window (Oct 7, 2021–Oct 7, 2022) included >8 months of incarceration during which respondent could not drink, and testimony did not establish the required “fixed habit” or loss of control during that year (In re J.J.). - Nevertheless, reversal was unnecessary because other statutory grounds were established by clear and convincing evidence (notably multiple felony convictions—judicially noticed—and abandonment/failed involvement/support), and proof of any one ground suffices to terminate parental rights (In re Gwynne P.). - The Anders procedure was properly followed (counsel filed memorandum, served respondent, no response). The court admonished counsel for not fully explaining why remaining unfitness grounds lacked merit, but still concluded no arguable issues merited appeal. 5) Practice implications for family lawyers - When defending unfitness claims, focus on disproving any single statutory ground—because proof of any one suffices. Challenge timing windows (e.g., the one‑year period for habitual drunkenness), and be prepared to present or dispute incarceration records and habit evidence. - Expect courts to take judicial notice of convictions and DOC status; these records can be dispositive on depravity/unfitness and are difficult to overcome. - For appellate counsel pursuing Anders withdrawal, include a clear sketch of why each potential issue is frivolous (follow S.M.); failing to do so may draw criticism even where withdrawal is allowed. - Preserve ineffective‑assistance claims with specific prejudice and record support; mere failure to call a witness is unlikely to succeed without a developed record showing harm.

Feb 14, 2024 Read Opinion

In re Marriage of Rednour

- Case citation and parties In re Marriage of Rednour, 2024 IL App (5th) 230349-U — Petitioner-Appellant: Thomas Rednour; Respondent-Appellee: Tammy Rednour. - Key legal issues 1. Whether the appellate court had jurisdiction over an appeal from a dissolution judgment that expressly reserved disposition of several marital assets (Thomas’s pension; Tammy’s workers’ compensation and Social Security disability benefits). 2. Whether a trial-court motion to apportion a lump-sum Social Security disability award qualified as a postjudgment motion under Ill. S. Ct. Rule 303(a) and/or otherwise affected appeal timing (i.e., whether a prematurely filed notice of appeal became effective upon disposition). - Holding/outcome The Fifth District dismissed Thomas’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction. The court concluded the dissolution judgment was not final because the trial court had reserved distribution of several assets, leaving those claims unresolved at the time of the notice of appeal. - Significant legal reasoning - Finality and reserved claims: The trial court’s memorandum and judgment expressly reserved distribution of speculative assets (pension, workers’ compensation permanency, SSD/benefit proceeds), directing the recipient to give notice and permitting either party to file a later petition to distribute proceeds. Because those separate claims remained pending and dispositive relief as to them was reserved, the judgment was not final for appellate purposes. No Rule 304(a) certification was entered to make the order immediately appealable. - Rule 303 timing analysis: The court reviewed Supreme Court Rule 303(a) (notice of appeal timing). It rejected the respondent’s contention that the movant’s postjudgment apportionment motion (re: the lump-sum SSD award) altered jurisdiction here — the opinion first observed that the apportionment motion did not request statutorily authorized relief directed against the judgment (and thus was not a Rule 303(a)(2) postjudgment motion), so it did not toll the appeal period. The court further noted that even if that motion had been a postjudgment motion, Rule 303(a)(2) would have rendered Thomas’s premature notice effective upon the trial court’s later entry of the apportionment order, so no second notice would have been required. Nonetheless, that procedural point did not salvage the appeal because unresolved reserved assets rendered the overall judgment nonfinal. - Practice implications (concise) - To secure immediate appellate jurisdiction in a dissolution, either resolve/distribute all marital assets or obtain a Rule 304(a) certification that there is no just reason to delay enforcement/appeal. - Avoid open-ended reservations of claims (pension, workers’ comp, SSD) if you intend to appeal; if reservation is necessary, expect final-judgment challenges. - Premature notices of appeal generally become effective under Rule 303(a)(2) when the last postjudgment motion or separate claim is disposed of — but that doctrine does not cure a lack of finality caused by unresolved reserved assets.

Nov 1, 2023 Read Opinion

In re Marriage of Portegys

1. Case citation and parties - In re Marriage of Portegys, 2023 IL App (3d) 230049-U (Ill. App. Ct., 3d Dist., Nov. 1, 2023) (Rule 23 order; non‑precedential). - Petitioner‑Appellee: Mary Beth Portegys. Respondent‑Appellant: Thomas E. Portegys. 2. Key legal issues - Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying respondent’s petition to terminate maintenance by (a) misapplying the statutory factors in 750 ILCS 5/510(a‑5) and (b) refusing to appoint a “fact‑finding agent” to investigate the former spouse’s alleged Medicaid/assisted‑living funding. 3. Holding/outcome - Affirmed. The appellate court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Thomas’s petition to terminate maintenance. 4. Significant legal reasoning (concise) - Standard: modification/termination of maintenance requires movant to prove a “substantial change in circumstances” (750 ILCS 5/510(a‑5)); trial court’s decision reviewed for abuse of discretion. - Procedural/background highlights: original dissolution (2001) incorporated MSA providing permanent maintenance ($2,100); a 2018 agreed order reduced payments to $984; Thomas filed for termination in 2018 (denied) and again in 2022 after partial retirement/return to work. At the 2023 hearing Thomas testified he now earned gross monthly income of $5,860.50 and speculated (without reliable evidence) that his ex‑spouse was receiving Medicaid/assisted‑living funds. Wife remained medically unable to work. - The trial court analyzed the nine factors in 510(a‑5) and found three factors weighed against Thomas (his change in employment status and return to work, his increased income, and wife’s continued inability to be self‑supporting); remaining factors were neutral or unsupported by evidence. The court concluded the totality did not establish a substantial change. - On the requested fact‑finder, the court correctly placed the investigative burden on the movant. The appellant offered only speculation and hearsay about Medicaid; he failed to produce admissible proof that public benefits materially increased the spouse’s income or would render maintenance a de facto reimbursement to Medicaid. The appellate court found no error. 5. Practice implications for family law attorneys - Movants seeking modification/termination must develop admissible, concrete proof of a substantial change and address each 510(a‑5) factor; mere speculation or third‑party rumor about public benefits is insufficient. - Courts are not required to appoint investigators to discover facts for a litigant; discovery and fact‑gathering are the movant’s responsibility. - Be precise about public benefits (Medicaid v. Medicare) and their effect on “income” and maintenance — obtain documentary proof (eligibility determinations, facility billing, Medicaid notices) before seeking termination.

May 9, 2023 Read Opinion

In re Marriage of Valus

# In re Marriage of Valus, 2023 IL App (3d) 220247‑U 1) Case citation and parties - In re Marriage of Thomas L. Valus and Elena Valus (n/k/a Elena Lyons), No. 3‑22‑0247, Ill. App. Ct., 3d Dist., Order filed May 9, 2023 (Rule 23; non‑precedential). 2) Key legal issues - Whether the trial court erred in modifying the allocation judgment to require that the parties’ minor children receive school‑required vaccinations. - Whether the trial court erred in denying respondent’s motion for a directed finding at the close of petitioner’s case‑in‑chief. - Whether the trial court abused its discretion by admitting and relying on certain testimony (including the guardian ad litem’s) and by denying a rehearing request. 3) Holding/outcome - Affirmed. The appellate court held the trial court did not err in granting the modification, denying the directed finding, or denying the rehearing portion of the motion to reconsider. 4) Significant legal reasoning (condensed) - Facts: parties’ December 2017 allocation judgment required consultation on major decisions (education, health, religion) and designated the father’s residence for school enrollment. Father sought modification to require school‑required vaccinations; mother asserted religious objections and argued the parties must agree under the allocation judgment. Evidence showed the daughter had previously received vaccinations; the son had only newborn doses. Guardian ad litem (GAL) testified he reviewed Bible passages and medical literature (AMA, Pediatrics) and concluded vaccinations were in the children’s best interests; he had no formal medical training. Mother testified to religious objections (citing Leviticus and concerns about fetal‑cell origins). Mother presented no additional evidence. - Directed finding: the appellate court agreed the trial court properly found a prima facie case existed from the evidence (GAL testimony and parents’ admissions) and thus denial of a directed finding was not error. - Modification and admission of testimony: the trial court applied its discretion to weigh credibility and best‑interests considerations, noting (i) prior vaccinations and pediatric care, (ii) absence of an allocation provision prohibiting vaccinations, (iii) unresolved dispute after mediation, and (iv) GAL’s conclusion supporting vaccination. The appellate court found no abuse in admitting or relying on the GAL’s testimony despite his lack of medical credentials. 5) Practice implications (for family lawyers) - Courts will modify allocation terms to require vaccinations when evidence supports the children’s best interests; allocation language that merely requires consultation may not block such modifications. - GAL reports and testimony—particularly where they reference credible medical literature or longstanding pediatric care—can be highly persuasive even absent formal medical credentials. Consider engaging or subpoenaing a pediatrician or medical expert to strengthen or rebut medical claims. - Preserve evidentiary objections and develop documentary proof (vaccination records, pediatrician records, expert affidavits). If seeking a directed finding, be prepared to show the movant met no prima facie burden. - Note: this is a Rule 23 order (non‑precedential) but useful for persuasive guidance on how courts balance parental religious objections against public‑health and best‑interest findings.

Nov 30, 2022 Read Opinion

In re Marriage of Palarz

1. Case citation and parties - In re Marriage of Palarz, 2022 IL App (1st) 210618 (1st Dist., 3d Div., Nov. 30, 2022). - Petitioner-Appellant: Thomas Palarz. Respondent-Appellee: Jolanta Palarz. Child: G.P. 2. Key legal issues - Whether the appellate court had jurisdiction to review trial-court extensions of an emergency order of protection issued under the Illinois Domestic Violence Act. - Whether the trial court abused its discretion or entered a decision against the manifest weight of the evidence in allocating parental responsibilities by ordering supervised visitation for the father. 3. Holding/outcome - The appellate court held it lacked jurisdiction to review Thomas’s challenges to the successive extensions of the emergency order of protection and dismissed that portion of the appeal. - The court affirmed the allocation judgment: the trial court’s restriction of Thomas’s parenting time to supervised visitation was affirmed. 4. Significant legal reasoning - Jurisdiction: The court concluded it could not entertain the appellant’s attack on the multiple extensions of the emergency protective order. Those orders were not properly reviewable on the record presented (they were interlocutory/procedural in nature and the appellant failed to pursue the appropriate extraordinary or expedited appellate remedy), so the appellate court dismissed that remit for lack of jurisdiction. - Allocation decision: The court reviewed the parenting-time determination for abuse of discretion and against the manifest-weight standard. The record contained testimony and guardian ad litem recommendations documenting (a) a history of erratic/ threatening behavior by Thomas, (b) mental-health issues and inconsistent medication compliance, (c) alcohol-related incident(s) (DUI citation), (d) supervised-visitation supervisor’s unwillingness to continue, and (e) the guardian ad litem’s recommendation for supervised parenting (pending evidence of stable treatment). Given these facts, the trial court’s decision to limit parenting time to supervised visits was within its discretion and supported by the evidence. 5. Practice implications - When protective-orders intersect with dissolution matters, litigants must use the correct appellate vehicle and preserve issues (timely appeals or extraordinary relief) if challenging interlocutory protective orders. - In custody contests involving mental-health or substance-use concerns, courts give weight to guardian ad litem reports, supervisor testimony, treatment compliance, and DUI/other credibility-impacting incidents; lack of corroborating treating-provider testimony or failure to subpoena timely is risky. - Counsel should: promptly secure and disclose treating-provider evidence, address supervision logistics in the record, seek expedited hearings on protective-order extensions, and be prepared to rebut guardian ad litem recommendations with contemporaneous objective proof of stable treatment and sobriety.

May 20, 2022 Read Opinion

In re Marriage of Cervenka

# In re Marriage of Cervenka, 2022 IL App (2d) 210268-U 1) Case citation and parties - In re Marriage of Cervenka, No. 2-21-0268 (Ill. App. Ct., 2d Dist., May 20, 2022) (Rule 23(b) order). - Petitioner-Appellee: Lisa Cervenka. Respondent-Appellant: Thomas Cervenka. 2) Key legal issues - Whether a post‑dissolution, handwritten agreement (Sept. 28, 2018) modifying maintenance to continue “despite the cohabitation w/ Jason Seiden,” signed/initialed by Thomas, validly modified the parties’ Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA) incorporated into the dissolution judgment. - Whether that agreement was supported by consideration or barred by the “pre‑existing duty” rule, and whether estoppel barred Thomas from terminating maintenance under the MSA’s cohabitation termination provision. - Interaction with 750 ILCS 5/502(b) (court’s role in reviewing marital agreements incorporated into judgment). 3) Holding / Outcome - Affirmed. The trial court did not err in denying Thomas’s petition to terminate maintenance. The appellate court held the Sept. 28, 2018 document was a valid modification supported by consideration, and Thomas was estopped from terminating maintenance on cohabitation grounds. 4) Significant legal reasoning (summary) - The MSA (Nov. 7, 2016) was incorporated into the dissolution judgment and included a cohabitation clause terminating maintenance. Thomas initially prepared the Sept. 28, 2018 writing; Lisa added “despite the cohabitation w/ Jason Seiden”; Thomas initialed/signed. Contemporaneously, Thomas (as landlord) and Jason entered a lease (Oct. 1, 2018) in which Jason paid $1,500/month and took on upkeep of the marital home where Lisa and the children remained. - The trial court found—and the appellate court accepted—that the parties’ conduct and the rent/occupancy arrangement supplied consideration for the modification (not merely a pre‑existing duty), and that Lisa reasonably relied on the modification (she curtailed employment and relied on maintenance). Under these facts, estoppel barred Thomas from invoking the cohabitation termination. - The appellate decision acknowledges 750 ILCS 5/502(b) but enforces the private modification where supported by consideration and corroborated by contemporaneous acts. 5) Practice implications (concise) - Post‑judgment modifications to maintenance can be enforceable without a formal court order if there is a clear, signed agreement plus consideration and corroborating conduct—especially where the nonmoving party detrimentally relies. - Best practice: obtain an express written modification and enter a court order to avoid dispute; clearly document consideration (payments, lease, relinquished rights) and contemporaneous acts. - Counsel should anticipate estoppel arguments where a payor treats a cohabitation situation permissively and the payee relies. - Note: this is a Rule 23(b) non‑precedential order—persuasive but limited.

Mar 7, 2022 Read Opinion

In re The Parentage of Z.T.

- Case citation and parties In re the Parentage of Z.T., No. 1-21-1042, 2022 IL App (1st) 211042‑U (Ill. App. Ct. Mar. 7, 2022; Rule 23 order). Petitioner‑Appellee: Kenneth Thomas. Respondent‑Appellant: Jasmine Escobedo (mother). - Key legal issues 1. Whether the trial court’s order directing enrollment of the child in the University of Chicago Laboratory School constituted a ruling on Escobedo’s request to temporarily/permanently relocate the child to Texas. 2. Whether the trial court applied the IMDMA relocation factors (750 ILCS 5/609.2) when resolving the dispute. 3. Whether the appeal was properly preserved and whether the appellate court had jurisdiction to address relocation. - Holding / outcome Appeal dismissed. The appellate court concluded the sole issue decided by the trial court was school enrollment for Fall 2021; the court did not rule on temporary or permanent relocation and therefore the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to decide the relocation issues raised on appeal. Escobedo also forfeited any challenge to the enrollment order by failing to argue its merits under Rule 341(h)(7). - Significant legal reasoning - Jurisdictional limitation: A Rule 306 interlocutory appeal permits review only of matters actually decided by the trial court. Here the court’s hearing and order addressed school placement; it expressly declined to treat the Lab School as the “status quo” for permanent relocation and noted the enrollment order was “without prejudice” to future relocation adjudication. Because the trial court never adjudicated relocation or applied §609.2, the appellate court lacked authority to rule on that subject. - Forfeiture: Escobedo did not argue on appeal that the trial court erred in ordering enrollment at the Lab School; under Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7) that issue was forfeited. - Procedural posture: The emergency temporary relocation motion was denied below; later school‑enrollment hearing did not convert into an adjudication on relocation. - Practice implications (concise) - Preserve issues: If seeking interlocutory review of relocation, ensure the trial court expressly rules on relocation and applies §609.2 factors on the record. If you want appellate review, obtain written findings and a transcript showing the court decided that specific issue. - Plead and argue alternative relief separately: Distinguish school‑placement hearings from relocation adjudications—seek explicit relief and findings if relief on relocation is requested. - Appellate briefing: Challenge the actual trial court ruling; failure to brief the merits of the order appealed leads to forfeiture. - Draft orders carefully: If a temporary school placement is ordered “without prejudice,” consider whether you need immediate interlocutory review or a preservation strategy for the underlying relocation claim.