In re Marriage of Aguilar

Overview

In In re Marriage of Aguilar , 2026 IL App (1st) 250495-U, the First District affirmed a Cook County order granting only $2,000 of a wife's $53,290.84 contribution petition under section 508 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act . The court held the trial judge acted within its discretion in limiting fees to work on the successful dissipation claim, denying fees for defending a post-judgment "motion for clarification," and refusing contribution based on relative income. An incomplete appellate record proved fatal under Foutch v. O'Bryant .

Key Facts

Parties married 2006, two children; husband filed for dissolution in March 2020.

Wife claimed dissipation of rental income, gambling income, a $225,000 bank withdrawal, a cashed-out pension, and jewelry/electronics purchases.

The August 2024 judgment granted dissipation only in part (reimbursements of $30,000, $3,190.13, and $5,150) and denied maintenance , finding wife's earning capacity as a licensed real estate broker (including a $57,000 commission on one sale) exceeded husband's.

Wife sought $48,290.84 in incurred fees plus $5,000 prospective fees; her petition attached an affidavit, retainer, and rate sheet, but no billing records (later submitted to the trial court but absent from the appellate record).

No trial transcript, closing statements, proposed findings, or billing records appeared in the record on appeal; husband filed no appellee brief.

Procedural History

Circuit Court of Cook County, Domestic Relations (No. 2020 D 2435, Judge Gregory Ahern). Judgment of dissolution entered August 2024 with fees reserved; husband's motion for clarification/reconsideration granted in part January 6, 2025; renewed fee petition granted in part ($2,000). Appeal taken on appellant's brief only under First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp. , 63 Ill. 2d 128 (1976).

Holdings

Abuse of discretion is the standard ( In re Marriage of Patel and Sines-Patel , 2013 IL App (1st) 112571, ¶ 67; In re Marriage of Schneider , 214 Ill. 2d 152 (2005)). No abuse in awarding only $2,000.

Wife did not "substantially prevail" under section 508(a)(4) where the court granted the opposing post-judgment motion in part and ordered her to amend her tax return; In re Marriage of Murphy , 203 Ill. 2d 212 (2003), construing section 508(a)(3.1) (appeals), is inapposite to defense of a post-judgment motion.

The court adequately explained its calculation; absent billing records, the reviewing court presumes the trial court correctly assessed them ( Foutch v. O'Bryant , 99 Ill. 2d 389 (1984)).

Arguments unsupported by authority are forfeited (Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7)); alternatively, no abuse of discretion where property was divided roughly equally and wife's earning capacity was greater.

Legal Principles

750 ILCS 5/508(a), (a)(3.1), (a)(4), (b); 750 ILCS 5/503(j), 503(d)(5), 503(d)(2). Post-judgment fee awards rest on section 503 property-division criteria plus maintenance criteria. The petitioner must show inability to pay and the other spouse's ability to pay ( Shen v. Shen , 2015 IL App (1st) 130733, ¶ 99); inability exists where payment would strip a party of support or undermine financial stability ( In re Marriage of Streur , 2011 IL App (1st) 082326, ¶ 36). Olsher v. Olsher , 78 Ill. App. 3d 627 (1979), distinguished: it condemned awarding more than counsel requested without explanation.

Practical Implications

Build the record. Include trial transcripts and itemized billing statements in the appellate record; Foutch will otherwise defeat the appeal even where the fee award seems arbitrarily low.

Attach contemporaneous billing to the fee petition itself—affidavits, retainers, and rate sheets alone are insufficient to establish reasonableness or necessity.

Section 508(a)(4)'s "substantially prevails" requirement is measured holistically; partial success by the movant on a post-judgment motion can defeat the respondent's fee claim entirely. Consider framing opposition so relief denied clearly predominates.

Do not import the appellate-fee standard of Murphy (508(a)(3.1)) into trial-level post-judgment fee disputes.

Earning capacity —not just current income—drives both maintenance and contribution analysis; an underemployed licensed professional may be denied both.

Counterargument to preserve: a partially successful dissipation claim can support a targeted fee award even where global contribution is denied—segregate that time in your billing.

Cite Rule 341(h)(7): every fee argument needs supporting authority or it is forfeited.

Limitations/Caveats

This is a Rule 23(b) unpublished order , not precedential except under Rule 23(e)(1). The court's treatment of a "motion for clarification" as functionally a section 2-1401 petition was arguendo reasoning ("even if we consider it as such") and is dicta. Alternative holdings on the property-division argument (reached only "even if this argument were not forfeited") are likewise non-essential. Because the appeal proceeded on appellant's brief only under Talandis , the analysis was not adversarially tested.