In re Marriage of Amaya

Overview

The Third District reversed in part the circuit court's postdissolution allocation of marital home sale proceeds in In re Marriage of Amaya , 2026 IL App (3d) 250429-U. The court held that the trial court's method of dividing diminished sale proceeds effectively forced Ashraf to absorb half of Faye's mortgage delinquency costs, constituting an impermissible modification of property disposition under 750 ILCS 5/510(b) . The appellate court recalculated the division and modified the judgment under Rule 366(a)(5).

Key Facts

The 2021 dissolution judgment ordered the marital home sold with equal division of proceeds and required Faye to pay the mortgage, HELOC, insurance, and maintenance until sale.

Faye remained in possession and obstructed the sale for approximately 3.5 years—declining showings, rejecting offers, and allowing the property to enter pre-foreclosure .

The court ultimately forced acceptance of a cash offer; the sale netted $157,564.40.

Faye's delinquencies caused $38,589.95 in additional costs (unpaid principal loan, HELOC, foreclosure attorney fees, and related costs).

Both parties were self-represented at trial, in postjudgment proceedings, and on appeal.

Procedural History

Circuit Court of Will County (12th Judicial Circuit), Judge Gabriel G. Orenic presiding. Dissolution judgment entered September 17, 2021. Multiple postjudgment enforcement motions filed by Ashraf. The court's August 8, 2025, order allocated remaining escrowed sale proceeds. Ashraf appealed; Faye did not cross-appeal, precluding appellate review of her claims regarding an alleged mortgage-sharing agreement.

Holdings

Primary holding: The circuit court's allocation of sale proceeds impermissibly modified the property disposition in the dissolution judgment by using Ashraf's share to absorb costs attributable to Faye's noncompliance, violating 750 ILCS 5/510(b) . The court applied a de novo/jurisdictional standard, treating the modification as beyond the court's jurisdiction.

Secondary holding: Exercising authority under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 366(a)(5) , the court recalculated the division: Ashraf receives $97,325.18 and Faye receives $60,239.22 of total proceeds ($157,564.40).

Faye's arguments regarding an alleged agreement to share mortgage payments were not reviewable absent a cross-appeal.

Legal Principles

750 ILCS 5/510(b) : Property disposition provisions in dissolution judgments cannot be modified absent conditions justifying reopening under Illinois law.

750 ILCS 5/503(i) : Court's authority to force sale of marital property.

In re Marriage of Davis , 292 Ill. App. 3d 802 (1997): Property disposition provisions confer vested rights not subject to subsequent modification.

Waggoner v. Waggoner , 78 Ill. 2d 50 (1979): Impermissible modification occurs when new obligations are engrafted onto a party .

In re Marriage of Pitts , 169 Ill. App. 3d 200 (1988): Shifting mortgage obligations assigned to one party constitutes impermissible modification.

Practical Implications

Draft dissolution judgments with specificity: Include sale deadlines, mechanics, consequences for non-compliance, and explicit remedies for obstruction to avoid prolonged enforcement litigation.

Enforcement vs. modification distinction is critical: When a party fails to comply with property obligations, practitioners must frame relief as enforcement (contempt, cost-shifting to the non-compliant party) rather than reallocation that could be deemed modification.

The full cost of noncompliance must be borne by the noncompliant party —courts cannot split the difference by reducing both parties' shares proportionally.

Cross-appeals are essential: Faye's failure to cross-appeal barred review of her mortgage-sharing claim.

Counterargument: A court might distinguish this case where the judgment itself is ambiguous about cost allocation or where equitable considerations justify reopening under section 510(b).

Limitations/Caveats

This is a Rule 23 order —not precedent except in the limited circumstances under Rule 23(e)(1). Both parties were self-represented, which may limit the sophistication of the arguments presented. The court's detailed recalculation methodology is binding as to these parties but serves only as persuasive authority in other cases. The opinion's discussion of the vested-rights doctrine and impermissible modification framework applies established law rather than announcing new principles.