Griffin v. Taylor

Overview

Father, proceeding pro se, appealed the denial of his postjudgment motion to vacate a judgment awarding Mother all parenting time and decision-making authority over the parties' two minor children. The Fifth District, analyzing the motion under section 2-1301(e) of the Code of Civil Procedure, held the circuit court did not abuse its discretion because Father showed neither a meritorious defense nor due diligence, and affirmed.

Key Facts

Unmarried parents of two children (born 2008 and 2010); Father initiated the action in St. Clair County in January 2023 by filing a petition to establish a parent-child relationship, alleging Illinois had jurisdiction.

Mother counterpetitioned for sole decision-making and parenting time, alleging Father had been a non-participant since 2013 and belonged to an extremist sect, and that gradual integration plus a GAL were needed.

Two mediation sessions produced no agreement; a GAL was appointed in January 2024; the case was continued repeatedly, with Father's counsel withdrawing twice.

Father filed multiple pro se pleadings purporting to revoke "power of attorney" and challenging the court's jurisdiction despite having initiated the suit.

Father failed to appear at the August 15, 2025, hearing, claiming COVID-19, but filed a different motion that same day and never moved to continue.

The August 20, 2025, order (labeled a "Default Judgment," later described by the court as a trial in absentia) gave Mother all parenting time and decision-making authority, preserved Father's electronic/telephonic contact subject to restrictions, and reserved support.

No transcript or Rule 323(c)/(d) substitute from the August 15, 2025, hearing was included in the record on appeal.

At the March 26, 2026, hearing (Father appearing by Zoom), Father repeatedly reargued jurisdiction and called the judge "emotionally unstable."

Procedural History

St. Clair County circuit court (Judge Leah A. Captain), No. 23-FA-8. Final allocation judgment entered August 20, 2025; Father's September 15, 2025, motion to vacate and successive motions were denied March 26, 2026. Appeal expedited under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 311(a); Mother filed no appellee brief, so the case was decided on the record and Father's brief under First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp.

Holdings

Because the judgment was labeled a default and the vacatur motion was filed within 30 days, the motion was reviewed under section 2-1301(e) ; the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying it, as Father showed no meritorious defense and no due diligence and did not establish that substantial justice was denied.

Father waived any personal jurisdiction challenge by filing the initial petition invoking the court's jurisdiction ( Owens v. Snyder ).

Absent a transcript or Rule 323 substitute from the evidentiary hearing, the reviewing court presumes the circuit court acted in conformity with the law and had a sufficient factual basis ( Foutch v. O'Bryant ).

Legal Principles

735 ILCS 5/2-1301(e) (West 2024) (setting aside defaults before final judgment or within 30 days after); 735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2024) (raised by Mother but inapplicable). In re Adoption of D. , 317 Ill. App. 3d 155 (2000) (abuse of discretion review; substantial justice; factors of meritorious defense, due diligence, residence of nonmovant, severity of penalty, hardship). Godfrey Healthcare & Rehabilitation Center, LLC v. Toigo , 2019 IL App (5th) 170473, ¶ 39 (court considers all events leading to judgment). Foutch v. O'Bryant , 99 Ill. 2d 389 (1984). Owens v. Snyder , 349 Ill. App. 3d 35 (2004). Ill. S. Ct. R. 323(c), (d); R. 311(a).

Practical Implications

Identify the correct vehicle: a vacatur motion filed within 30 days of a default judgment is governed by section 2-1301(e), not section 2-1401, even if the parties brief it otherwise.

Illness alone will not excuse nonappearance where the party demonstrably filed other pleadings that day but no motion to continue—document and file a continuance request contemporaneously.

Always secure a transcript, bystander's report, or agreed statement of facts from the evidentiary hearing; without it, the appellate court presumes the allocation ruling was supported.

A petitioner who files the initiating pleading cannot later contest personal jurisdiction; such arguments can undermine credibility on substantial-justice factors.

Counterargument to anticipate: the "substantial justice" standard is liberal, but a movant must still articulate a meritorious defense on the best-interests merits.

Limitations/Caveats

This is a Rule 23 order and is not precedent except under Rule 23(e)(1). The discussion of Mother's allegations about Father's religious affiliation (¶ 44) is recitation of pleadings, not a finding. The court's observation that the August 15, 2025, hearing was better characterized as a trial in absentia is noted but not the basis of decision; the holding rests on section 2-1301(e) analysis.