Mitchell
Key Insights
Reversal Rate
100%
Case History
5 Cases
Case Outcomes
Recent Decisions
In re Marriage of Mitchell
**In re Marriage of Mitchell**, 2025 IL App (1st) 240562‑U (1st Dist. Aug. 21, 2025) (Note: filed under Ill. S. Ct. R. 23 — nonprecedential except as allowed by Rule 23(e)(1)) 1) Case citation and parties - In re Marriage of Mitchell, 2025 IL App (1st) 240562‑U. - Petitioner‑Appellee: Rhet Mitchell. Respondent‑Appellant: Burnetta Herron. 2) Key legal issues - Whether the trial court properly granted an in limine order precluding respondent from presenting evidence of reimbursement claims for household/family living expenses incurred before Jan. 1, 2015 under the parties’ prenuptial agreement (PNA). - Admissibility and sufficiency of a forensic accountant’s report quantifying reimbursement. - Allocation of the mortgage on the marital residence. 3) Holding/outcome - Appellate court vacated the in limine order and the portion of the judgment adjudicating respondent’s reimbursement claims (i.e., the pre‑2015 cutoff) and remanded for further proceedings. - The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s allocation of the mortgage. 4) Significant legal reasoning (concise) - The PNA expressly preserved a right to reimbursement for one party’s payment of household/family expenses. The respondent submitted an expert forensic accounting report covering the marriage period (May 2010–Aug 2019) that quantified alleged shortfalls. - The trial court initially entered a pretrial order barring evidence of reimbursement claims predating Jan. 1, 2015; at trial it admitted the expert’s report only for post‑2015 expenses, treating alleged limitations in the report as affecting weight rather than total admissibility. - On appeal the court concluded the preclusive temporal cutoff was improper. The decision reflects the principle that foundational or reliability concerns about expert evidence usually go to weight and cross‑examination at trial, not to a wholesale bar absent pervasive, demonstrable unreliability. A blanket, time‑based exclusion of evidence that is central to a PNA remedy impermissibly curtailed respondent’s opportunity to prove her claim, requiring remand. - The mortgage allocation did not warrant reversal on the record and was therefore affirmed. 5) Practice implications for family lawyers - Do not seek or accept sweeping in limine orders that resolve the merits (e.g., temporal cutoffs) absent firm foundational proof; courts are likely to treat most expert/report limitations as weight issues. - When asserting or defending reimbursement claims under a PNA, plead and preserve the claim clearly and aim to develop a full transactional record (complete bank/credit statements, invoices/receipts). - Forensic accountants should review all available records and document methodologies, assumptions, and efforts to obtain missing data; interview opposing parties where possible to avoid attacks on completeness. - Preserve a complete appellate record (hearing/trial transcripts or agreed statements) when challenging evidentiary rulings. - Expect remand rather than outright reversal when proof problems can be cured by additional fact‑finding.
In re Marriage of Tener
1. Case citation and parties - In re Marriage of Tener, 2024 IL App (1st) 220890 (Apr. 5, 2024). - Petitioner: Joseph Tener. Respondent-Appellant: Veronica Walter. Guardian ad litem-Appellee: Beth McCormack. 2. Key legal issues - Whether the dissolution court’s appointment of a guardian ad litem (GAL) for an adult party was a void order for lack of statutory authority. - Whether orders awarding GAL and counsel fees/costs were final and appealable under Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(a). - Related due-process argument: whether Walter was effectively denied access to counsel (procedural/substantive due process). 3. Holding/outcome - Appeal dismissed for lack of a final, appealable order. - The court held the GAL appointment was not a void order (at most voidable) because the circuit court had subject-matter and personal jurisdiction. - The fee awards were not reviewable pre‑final judgment under Rule 304(a) despite the trial court’s “no just reason” language. 4. Significant legal reasoning - Void vs. voidable: The opinion follows Illinois precedent that civil judgments are void only where there is a “total want of jurisdiction” (subject-matter or personal). A claimed lack of statutory authority to appoint a GAL does not eliminate the circuit court’s constitutional jurisdiction; failure to follow statutory procedures renders an order at most voidable and reviewable only by timely appeal. (citing LVNV Funding v. Trice; Mitchell; Steinbrecher.) - Finality/Rule 304(a): Dissolution actions constitute a single claim (the request to dissolve the marriage); ancillary issues (custody, fees, appointment of GAL) are not separate claims for purposes of Rule 304(a). The rule’s certification cannot convert interlocutory, ancillary rulings in a dissolution into independently appealable final judgments. (citing Leopando and related Supreme Court authority.) - Due-process claim: Because the orders were not final/appealable, the appellate court did not reach a merits determination that Walter’s access-to-counsel/due-process rights were violated. 5. Practice implications - Challenges to a GAL appointment in a dissolution case should be raised by timely appeal from the final divorce judgment (or by immediate attack only where there is a true lack of jurisdiction), not simply by collateral attack asserting statutory noncompliance. - Be cautious relying on a trial court’s Rule 304(a) “no just reason” language to create an immediate appeal in divorce proceedings; appellate courts will examine whether the ruling resolves a separate, final claim or is an ancillary/interlocutory matter. - If immediate review of fees or GAL-related rulings is desired, consider seeking (a) explicit severance of an independent claim where appropriate, or (b) interlocutory relief by other available means; otherwise preserve objections for final-judgment review. - Due-process/access-to-counsel claims tied to interlocutory orders may be forfeited unless the issue can be shown to render a judgment void for lack of jurisdiction.
In re Marriage of Hampton
- Case citation and parties In re Marriage of Hampton, 2022 IL App (4th) 210528-U (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. Aug. 25, 2022). Petitioner: Dusty Hampton. Respondent/Appellee: Bradley Hampton. Intervenor/Appellant: Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services (the Department). - Key legal issues 1) Whether the Department could require continuation of child support beyond the termination date specified in a 2012 support order when that termination date (the youngest child’s 18th birthday) likely preceded the child’s expected high‑school graduation (potentially in 2021), in contravention of 750 ILCS 5/505(g). 2) Whether the trial court could correct the termination date nunc pro tunc or otherwise order continuation absent a direct appeal or statutory modification procedure (e.g., under §§ 510 or 513). - Holding/outcome The appellate court affirmed the Greene County circuit court’s denial of the Department’s petition to continue child support. A support order entered by a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be collaterally attacked; nor could the termination date be altered nunc pro tunc because the record lacked contemporaneous evidence that the court intended a different date. - Significant legal reasoning The court applied Mitchell (In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169) to hold that errors in a final child‑support order are not subject to collateral attack long after entry; relief must be sought by direct appeal or through the statutory modification procedures. The Department’s attempt to relabel its claim as a nunc pro tunc correction failed because such relief requires a contemporaneous memorandum or court record showing the court’s original intent (Hirsch/Pestka principles). The record contained no writing identifying the actual graduation date or indicating the judge intended a later termination date; indeed the Department itself could not identify the date. The court also agreed with the trial court’s reliance on In re Marriage of Waller that continuation past an express termination date is a modification implicating § 510 (change in circumstances) or, for non‑minor educational support, § 513. - Practice implications (concise) - Final support orders are strictly final unless timely appealed or modified under the statute; parties (and enforcement agencies) must timely challenge errors. - Agencies drafting consent or fill‑in orders must ensure statutory compliance (750 ILCS 5/505(g)) and not insert premature termination dates. - If a court intends a different termination date than appears on the face of an order, create contemporaneous written minutes/memoranda to permit nunc pro tunc correction. - To extend support for a post‑majority child, proceed under § 510 (modification) or § 513 (educational expenses) with appropriate factual allegations. - Blaming drafting errors after finality is unlikely to overcome the collateral‑attack and nunc pro tunc standards.
Other 1st District Judges
Frequently Asked Questions
What is Mitchell's overall affirm rate on family law appeals?
Mitchell has an overall affirm rate of 0% across 5 family law cases reviewed.
Which Illinois appellate district does Mitchell serve in?
Mitchell serves in the Illinois 1st District Appellate Court.
How often are Mitchell's decisions reversed on appeal?
Mitchell has a 100% reversal rate, with 5 decisions reversed out of 5 total cases.
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