issued

Nov 19, 2025 Read Opinion

In re Marriage of Jones

1. Case citation and parties - In re Marriage of Jones, No. 1-25-0259, 2025 IL App (1st) 250259‑U (1st Dist. Nov. 19, 2025) (Rule 23 order; non‑precedential). - Petitioner‑Appellee: Ryan Jonathan Jones. Respondent‑Appellant: Lindsay Thai Le Jones. 2. Key legal issues - Whether the trial court abused its discretion or issued a decision contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence in: (a) allocating parenting time unequally; and (b) awarding husband sole decision‑making authority over child’s education, medical, religious and extracurricular matters. - Whether the trial court properly classified and distributed marital property, considered all marital assets, and adjudicated dissipation claims. - Whether the maintenance award was supported by current income evidence. 3. Holding / outcome - Affirmed in part and reversed in part. - The Appellate Court held the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding unequal parenting time and sole decision‑making to Ryan. - The court reversed and remanded the property/maintenance disposition: trial court erred by failing to consider a marital asset, improperly classifying certain property, and failing to adjudicate dissipation claims—requiring reconsideration of the property award and the related maintenance determination. 4. Significant legal reasoning (condensed) - Custody/decision‑making: The record supported the court’s findings. The GAL and a custody evaluator provided evidence that, although both parents could meet the child’s basic needs, high parental conflict, specific incidents (e.g., respondent’s reported out‑of‑state trip with the child and refusal to cooperate with the GAL), and the child’s special needs (autism spectrum, therapy requirements) justified limiting respondent’s parenting time and vesting decision‑making authority in petitioner. The court applied the statutory best‑interest factors, relied on psychologist and GAL reports, and its credibility findings—reviewed for abuse of discretion—were sustained. - Property/maintenance: The appellate court found procedural and factual deficiencies: the trial court omitted consideration of at least one marital asset, did not adjudicate competing dissipation claims (both parties alleged dissipation, with large sums claimed), and relied on outdated income data for maintenance—necessitating remand so the court can address asset classification, resolve dissipation, and reassess maintenance in light of corrected asset and income findings. 5. Practice implications for family law attorneys - Preserve and document dissipation claims; litigate classification issues and ensure the trial court adjudicates dissipation before final distribution. - Put all marital assets on the record with valuations and traceability; watch for judicial omissions that can trigger remand. - For maintenance, submit current, corroborated income evidence (tax returns, paystubs, expert forecasts) rather than stale data. - In high‑conflict custody cases, contemporaneous documentation of parental conduct, expert custody evaluations, and GAL testimony are critical—particularly where the child has special needs. - Obtain express findings on statutory best‑interest factors and credibility determinations to survive abuse‑of‑discretion review. (Decision is Rule 23, non‑precedential; remand limited to property/maintenance matters.)

Jun 25, 2025 Read Opinion

In re Marriage of Kreps

- Case citation and parties In re Marriage of Kreps, No. 5-25-0053, 2025 IL App (5th) 250053-U (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. June 25, 2025) (Rule 23; nonprecedential). Petitioner-Appellee: Brian A. Kreps. Respondent-Appellant: Ashley B. Kreps (n/k/a Ashley B. Birdwell). - Key legal issues 1) Whether the trial court properly denied respondent’s petition to relocate under 750 ILCS 5/609.2 when it failed to make requisite factual findings. 2) Whether the trial court properly granted petitioner’s petition to modify parental responsibilities (parenting time) without specific findings supporting that modification under the governing best‑interest/ modification standards. - Holding/outcome The Fifth District reversed and remanded. The appellate court concluded the trial court failed to make factual findings to support its denial of the relocation petition and its grant of the modification petition; accordingly both orders were vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings/directions. - Significant legal reasoning (concise) The parties had entered an agreed dissolution judgment and parenting plan that included a relocation-notice provision. Respondent sought to relocate to Indiana for marriage and employment; petitioner opposed and sought modification of parenting time. The GAL’s reports recommended maintaining the existing schedule, and evidence showed the child was doing well in school, had improved speech with therapy, and that a DCFS investigation into alleged abuse by petitioner’s father was unfounded. The appellate court’s reversal turned on procedural/administrative error: the trial court issued dispositive rulings (denying relocation and changing parental responsibilities) but did not articulate factual findings tying the evidence to statutory and best‑interest factors required to support those results. The opinion emphasizes that appellate review requires an adequate factual basis and reasoned findings addressing the relocation statute’s considerations and the factors supporting modification. - Practice implications for family law attorneys - When litigating relocation or modification, obtain and tender written proposed findings or request specific oral findings addressing statutory relocation factors and best‑interest/modification criteria. - Build the record on each statutory factor (child’s adjustment, reasons for move, effect on parenting time/relationships, school stability, GAL/therapist testimony). - Preserve objections to inadequate findings and move for findings under applicable rules before final disposition to aid appellate review. - Use GAL and documentary school/therapy records to counter or support claims of harm from relocation. - Expect appellate courts to remand rather than affirm where trial courts fail to make explicit fact-based findings connecting evidence to legal standards.

Mar 28, 2025 Read Opinion

In re Marriage of Ibrahim

- Case citation and parties In re Marriage of Ibrahim, 2025 IL App (1st) 230146-U (Ill. App. Ct., 1st Dist., Mar. 28, 2025) (Rule 23 order). Petitioner-Appellant/Defendant-Appellant: Wasif Ibrahim. Respondent-Appellee/Plaintiff-Appellee: Ayna Mantyyeva; Goldentree Properties, LLC; third‑party defendant: Enejan Mantyyeva. - Key legal issues 1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by ordering discovery sanctions (precluding evidence of undisclosed business interests) and excluding tax returns. 2. Whether the court properly imputed income to the father/husband for child‑support calculations. 3. Whether funds Ayna used to capital‑contribute to two LLCs were marital or non‑marital (gift characterization). 4. Whether Wasif was a member of Goldentree and whether he must reimburse Goldentree for a $40,000 unauthorized withdrawal. 5. Whether counts of Wasif’s third‑party complaint against Enejan (derivative/member claims) should be dismissed. - Holding / outcome (concise) The appellate court affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in (a) granting the in limine discovery sanction, (b) imputing $7,500/month to Wasif for child‑support purposes, (c) treating Ayna’s interests in Lux and her 25% interest in Goldentree as non‑marital (funded by gifts from her father), and (d) ordering Wasif to reimburse Goldentree $40,000. The appellate court also affirmed dismissal of Wasif’s third‑party membership/derivative claims. - Significant legal reasoning (summary) - Discovery sanction: Trial court acted within its discretion to bar evidence that Wasif failed to produce in discovery about numerous business entities; exclusion was appropriate where Wasif offered evasive, undocumented testimony about “shell” businesses and failed to authenticate tax returns. - Imputation of income: Because Wasif’s testimony about business income was inconsistent, unsupported by records, and he failed to account for company transactions, the trial court reasonably imputed income for child‑support and expense calculations. - Characterization of property: The record established that Ayna received monetary gifts from her father and used those funds to make capital contributions to Lux and Goldentree; gifts kept their non‑marital character and were properly allocated to her. - Corporate formality/membership: Although Wasif filed articles listing himself, credible evidence (operating agreement, parties’ intent, testimony) showed he made no capital contribution and was not a Goldentree member; his unilateral withdrawals were unauthorized, requiring restitution. - Practice implications (takeaways for counsel) - Fully disclose and document business interests in family litigation; discovery failures risk exclusion and imputed income. - Preserve bank records, operating agreements, K‑1s, and proof of source of funds (gifts) to support characterization claims. - Filing organizational forms (or being listed as agent) is not dispositive of membership—substance (capital contribution, operating agreement, parties’ intent) matters. - Unauthorized withdrawals from LLC accounts can trigger restitution claims even in concurrent dissolution litigation. - Note: opinion issued under Rule 23 (not precedent except limited circumstances).

Mar 10, 2025 Read Opinion

In re Marriage of Andrea M.R.

1) Case citation and parties - In re Marriage of Andrea M.R., No. 5-23-1280, 2025 IL App (5th) 231280-U (Ill. App. Ct. Mar. 10, 2025) (Rule 23 order). - Petitioner-Appellee: Andrea M.R. (Mother). Respondent-Appellant: David R.S. (Father). 2) Key legal issues - Whether the trial court’s modification of parental decision-making responsibilities and parenting time (and attendant child-support adjustment) was against the manifest weight of the evidence. - Whether the evidence supported restricting Father’s parenting time and allocating greater decision-making authority to Mother based on health, safety, and co-parenting concerns. - Appellate standard of review for parenting modifications (manifest weight; deference to credibility findings). 3) Holding/outcome - Affirmed. The Fifth District held the trial court’s modification of parenting time and parental responsibilities (and consistent child-support order) was not contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. 4) Significant legal reasoning (concise) - The appellate court emphasized deference to the trial court’s credibility determinations and factual findings in a lengthy factual context. The record contained extensive evidence of ongoing disputes: unilateral decisions by Father (returning children to in‑person school against Mother’s objections tied to medical concerns), alleged failures to follow medical treatment recommendations (e.g., medication, a prescribed device), repeated direct contact outside an ordered communication platform, contested school pick‑ups, police involvement, and an emergency order of protection that temporarily curtailed Father’s parenting time. - The trial court had previously ordered adherence to medical providers’ recommendations, mandated mediation, restricted exchanges to a police‑department lot, and issued temporary health decision‑making to Mother in part. At the final three‑day hearing, the evidence supported changes to parenting time and allocation of responsibilities; the appellate court found that the trial court did not err in weighing the testimony and documentary evidence and applying the best‑interest standard. Manifest‑weight review requires that the appellate court will overturn only when the opposite conclusion is clearly evident — which was not the case. 5) Practice implications (what attorneys should do) - For movants: build a detailed factual record (medical records, physician testimony, school reports, police logs, communications via court‑authorized platforms) showing a substantial change affecting the child’s welfare and the best‑interest rationale for modification. - For respondents: comply strictly with court‑ordered communication and exchange protocols, document compliance with medical orders, timely reimbursements, and extracurricular decisions to avoid credibility harms. - Procedural: obtain and preserve transcripts for all emergency and temporary hearings; appellate review hinges on the trial record and credibility findings. - Tactical: use clear, contemporaneous documentary evidence (emails, OFW entries, medical releases) when litigating parenting modifications tied to health/safety.

May 3, 2024 Read Opinion

In re Marriage of Cholach

- Case citation and parties In re Marriage of Cholach, 2024 IL App (1st) 230618-U (1st Dist. May 3, 2024) (Rule 23 order). Petitioner-Appellee: Yaryna Cholach. Respondent-Appellant: Nazar Cholach. - Key legal issues 1) Whether the trial court abused its discretion by imposing sanctions (including a default dissolution judgment) under Supreme Court Rule 219 for repeated discovery and court-order noncompliance. 2) Whether entry of default judgment under those circumstances violated respondent’s constitutional due‑process rights. - Holding/outcome The appellate court affirmed. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in imposing sanctions for persistent discovery and court-order violations, and entry of the default dissolution was not a due‑process violation. (Note: decision is non‑precedential under Rule 23.) - Significant legal reasoning - The record showed a long history of discovery failures and disobedience of court orders by respondent (failure to produce bank and business records, failure to update financial affidavits, unpaid GAL fees, etc.), despite repeated deadlines and multiple status hearings. - The trial court issued discrete orders compelling production and warned of consequences; respondent had opportunities to comply and to be heard (responses, hearings, counsel appearances, and chances to cure noncompliance). - Supreme Court Rule 219 (eff. July 1, 2022) authorizes serious sanctions for discovery abuse. The court applied the familiar abuse‑of‑discretion standard to uphold the sanction (dispositive sanction justified by a continuing pattern of noncompliance and prior warnings). - On due‑process review, the appellate court found adequate notice and procedural opportunities; sanctions were not imposed unexpectedly or without opportunity to comply or contest. - Practice implications (concise) - Treat Rule 219 sanctions as real and potentially dispositive — persistent discovery noncompliance in dissolution cases can lead to default. - Preserve a clear record of orders, warnings, and opportunities to comply; trial courts focus on patterns of conduct over time. - Counsel’s withdrawal or client assertions of hardship are not substitutes for compliance; seek extensions or emergency relief early and document efforts. - Use motions to compel, move for sanctions promptly, and enforce GAL fee orders; interlocutory appeals rarely salvage a party who has repeatedly flouted discovery directives.

Jan 22, 2024 Read Opinion

In re Parentage of B.S.

1) Case citation and parties - In re Parentage of B.S., 2024 IL App (5th) 220681‑U (Ill. App. Ct., 5th Dist., Jan. 22, 2024). - Petitioner‑Appellant: Melissa Schmitt (mother). Respondent‑Appellee: Christopher Heeb (father). Intervening Petitioner‑Appellee: Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services (DHFS). Attorney disqualified: Christine Kovach. 2) Key legal issues - Whether the trial court erred in disqualifying petitioner’s counsel for conflict of interest (Rule 306 interlocutory appeal by permission). - Whether the trial court erred in quashing a witness subpoena issued to a DHFS employee. - Whether the petitioner was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on disqualification. 3) Holding / outcome - Judgment affirmed. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s order disqualifying Kovach. - The appeal as to the subpoena was not reviewable on the merits because the subpoenaed witness (Marilyn “Lyn” Kuttin) died, rendering that issue moot. - The court denied petitioner’s motion to strike portions of appellees’ briefs. 4) Significant legal reasoning - Jurisdiction: Appeal was taken under Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(7) (interlocutory permission to appeal an order disqualifying counsel). Orders not enumerated in Rule 306 (e.g., subpoena quash) generally fall outside the interlocutory appeal; they may be reviewed only if sufficiently related to the Rule 306 order. Here the subpoena issue became moot because the targeted witness died; mootness prevents appellate relief. - Forfeiture under Rule 341(h)(7): the petitioner elected to have her Rule 306 petition stand as her brief but provided no legal argument or authority on why disqualification or denial of an evidentiary hearing was erroneous. The court held those issues forfeited because points must be argued in the initial brief (reply briefing cannot cure the omission). - Basis of disqualification (record facts): Kovach previously worked for the Madison County State’s Attorney’s Office and had represented DHFS in this matter (2008–2010); DHFS did not provide informed consent to her later private representation of the petitioner. 5) Practice implications - If seeking interlocutory review of counsel disqualification, comply strictly with Rule 306 procedural requirements and prepare a Rule 341‑compliant brief with developed argument, authorities, and record cites—failure to do so forfeits appellate review. - Counsel transitioning from government employment must clear potential conflicts: obtain informed, documented consent when prior governmental representation overlaps with contemplated private representation to avoid disqualification. - When issuing subpoenas to government agencies, specify alternatives or organizational custodians if testimony is institutional; targeting a single individual risks mootness if that person becomes unavailable. - Preserve requests for evidentiary hearings in the trial court with clear record entries; appellate review may be lost if not briefed properly.

Oct 16, 2023 Read Opinion

In re Marriage of Erickson

1) Case citation and parties - In re Marriage of Erickson, 2023 IL App (3d) 230269‑U (Order filed Oct. 16, 2023) (Sup. Ct. R. 23 non‑precedential). - Petitioner‑Appellant: Darlena Gomez (n/k/a Darlena Erickson). Respondent‑Appellee: Cody Erickson. Appeal from Kankakee County (21st Judicial Circuit), Circuit No. 16‑D‑194. 2) Key legal issues - Whether the trial court abused its discretion or made a decision against the manifest weight of the evidence in denying petitioner’s request for leave to relocate the children ~75 miles (Bourbonnais → St. Charles). - Whether the trial court properly applied the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act’s relocation/best‑interest factors (750 ILCS 5/609.2(g))—i.e., whether it evaluated those factors in the context of the children’s best interests rather than attempting to preserve the preexisting equal parenting time arrangement. 3) Holding/outcome - Appellate court vacated and remanded. It held the trial court failed to consider the statutory factors within the proper paradigm (the children’s best interests) and therefore the relocation decision must be reconsidered in light of those factors using the existing evidentiary record. 4) Significant legal reasoning - The parties had an original allocation providing joint decisionmaking and equal parenting time; petitioner sought leave to relocate and educational‑primary residency designation; petitioner moved and children continued attending private school, producing lengthy commutes. - The trial court issued a seven‑page memorandum analyzing the 11 statutory factors but did so with a presumption toward keeping the existing equal parenting schedule. The appellate court found that focus improper because the geographic move made the status‑quo schedule infeasible and the central inquiry must be the children’s best interests, not preservation of equal time. - The court misapplied statutory language—evaluating feasibility of keeping equal time rather than whether a “reasonable allocation of parental responsibilities” (609.2(g)(7)) best served the children—so the analysis was arbitrary and legally deficient. - Appellate court reiterated applicable standards: relocation decisions are inherently best‑interest inquiries reviewed for manifest weight of the evidence; trial court findings are afforded deference but must employ correct statutory standard. 5) Practice implications - Trial courts must analyze relocation requests by applying the 609.2(g) factors expressly and in the context of the child’s best interests; avoiding a reflexive effort to preserve the pre‑move parenting time. - When relocation makes prior schedules impracticable, courts should shift focus to crafting a reasonable allocation that minimizes impairment to parent‑child relationships rather than insisting on equal time. - Record the court’s specific best‑interest analysis tied to each statutory factor; failure to do so risks reversal/remand even where evidence supports a change of custody or schedule. - Practitioners should develop the record on alternative parenting schedules, educational impacts, extended family supports, and reasonable allocation proposals in relocation cases.

Aug 9, 2023 Read Opinion

In re Marriage of Bastian

In re Marriage of Bastian, 2023 IL App (3d) 220163‑U 1) Case citation and parties - In re Marriage of Bastian, 2023 IL App (3d) 220163‑U (Ill. App. Ct., 3d Dist., Aug. 9, 2023). Petitioner‑Appellant: Katie Bastian (mother). Respondent‑Appellee: Richard Bastian (father). 2) Key legal issues - Whether the father’s verified petition to modify parenting time under 750 ILCS 5/610.5(a) and (e)(2) stated a claim (challenged by a 735 ILCS 5/2‑615 motion). - Whether the trial court abused its discretion or issued a decision against the manifest weight of the evidence when it increased the father’s parenting time (midweek and holiday/winter‑break allocations) in light of the parties’ Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA) and the children’s extracurricular schedules. 3) Holding / outcome - Affirmed. The appellate court held the trial court did not err in denying mother’s motion to dismiss, did not abuse its discretion in modifying parenting time, and the modification was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 4) Significant legal reasoning - Pleading sufficiency: The appellate court concluded the father’s petition — which alleged that COVID‑era restrictions and the mother’s scheduling of children’s extracurricular activities during his court‑ordered parenting time prevented him from exercising meaningful midweek time, and that winter‑break allocations were disproportionate — sufficiently alleged a change in circumstances (the court characterized it as “barely” sufficient) to survive a 2‑615 dismissal. - Standard of review: The appellate court applied the appropriate deference to the trial court’s fact‑finding and best‑interests determinations, reviewing modification rulings for abuse of discretion and factual findings for manifest weight. It found the trial court reasonably credited testimony that (1) the father’s work‑from‑home status made increased midweek time feasible, (2) many extracurricular activities were scheduled during his parenting time and the mother sometimes prevented his participation or make‑up time, and (3) the winter‑break allocation favored the mother. - Contractual context: The MSA’s provisions about extracurricular activities and the parties’ duty of “good faith flexibility” informed the court’s view that modification could be warranted when one parent’s scheduling effectively deprives the other parent of meaningful time. 5) Practice implications - Pleading: When seeking modification, plead concrete factual changes (scheduling conflicts, work‑status changes, inability to exercise time) and connect them to the children’s best interests — even narrowly pleaded changes can survive a 2‑615 challenge. - Evidence: Develop testimony/documentation showing how extracurricular scheduling, pandemic restrictions, or work‑from‑home status affect the practical exercise of parenting time and whether make‑up opportunities were denied. - MSAs: Courts will consider operative MSA language (mediation clauses, extracurricular and make‑up provisions) and expect parties to attempt negotiated solutions; but if one party’s scheduling effectively nullifies the other’s time, courts may reallocate time. - Appeal posture: Modification orders receive substantial deference; absent clear abuse of discretion or a decision against the manifest weight of the evidence, modifications are likely to be affirmed.

Mar 6, 2023 Read Opinion

In re Marriage of Krilich

1) Case citation and parties - In re Marriage of Krilich, 2023 IL App (1st) 221198 (1st Dist., First Div.), No. 1‑22‑1198 (filed Mar. 6, 2023; modified Apr. 24, 2023). Judgment affirmed. - Petitioners/Appellees: Sandra Schnakenburg (executor of Lillian Krilich’s estate) and the Krilich children. Respondents/Appellants: Donna J. Krilich and Walter L. Morgan (named co‑personal representatives of decedent Robert R. Krilich’s estate). 2) Key legal issues - Whether an Illinois circuit court has subject‑matter jurisdiction to enforce a 1985 Illinois dissolution judgment (which retained jurisdiction) against the estate of a deceased former spouse domiciled in Florida. - Whether Illinois courts have personal jurisdiction over non‑resident estate representatives (appellants) named in a Cook County enforcement action. - Interaction between enforcement of a domestic‑relations judgment and parallel probate/estate administration in a foreign state. 3) Holding/outcome - The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s denial of respondents’ motion to dismiss. Illinois courts retain jurisdiction to enforce their dissolution judgments even after the obligor’s death and despite the obligor’s foreign domicile; dismissal for lack of personal or subject‑matter jurisdiction was improper on the record before the court. 4) Significant legal reasoning - The court relied principally on Smithberg v. Illinois Municipal Retirement Fund, 192 Ill. 2d 291 (2000): where a dissolution judgment expressly retains jurisdiction, the domestic court has inherent equitable power to enforce its orders (including against an estate) and death does not render the remedy unavailable. - The court distinguished Keats v. Cates (1968) — which limited interstate interference with foreign probate where jurisdiction rested only on a contract to make a will — because here the relief is enforcement of a court judgment (not merely contract) that expressly preserved the court’s power. - Petitioners alleged specific Illinois contacts (Illinois corporations/LLCs and Illinois real property tied to the decedent) sufficient to raise factual issues about the situs of estate assets and to support proceeding in Illinois; the action was brought against the estate (through its Illinois‑named representatives), not the individuals in their private capacities. - Because the trial court retained jurisdiction and factual disputes existed, dismissal at the pleading stage was inappropriate. 5) Practice implications - Enforcement: Practitioners seeking post‑death enforcement of marital settlement provisions should invoke the dissolution judgment’s retained‑jurisdiction language and Smithberg’s equitable authority. - Defense: Estate representatives should promptly develop the factual record on situs of assets and move for a stay or coordinate with foreign probate courts; Keats remains relevant where the claim is purely contractual/probate‑based without a preserved judicial enforcement right. - Drafting: Divorce decrees should explicitly retain jurisdiction and describe testator obligations; wills/estate planners should be mindful that noncompliant wills may be challenged in the forum that issued the divorce judgment. - Procedure: Use Rule 306 interlocutory review carefully — denial of a jurisdictional dismissal is appealable, but appellate courts focus on whether factual allegations raise triable jurisdictional issues.

Feb 24, 2023 Read Opinion

In re Marriage of Hyman

- Case citation and parties In re Marriage of Hyman, 2023 IL App (2d) 220041. Petitioner-Appellant: Jeffrey R. Hyman; Respondent-Appellee: Rachel D. Hyman. - Key legal issues 1) Whether stock options issued to husband during the marriage but held in his individual name were “disclosed” or otherwise excluded from the Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA) allocation scheme. 2) Whether the MSA’s undisclosed-asset provision permitted equal division of those options after dissolution where wife did not pursue further discovery before settlement. 3) Proper characterization (marital vs. separate) of vested and unvested options and the remedy for nondisclosure. - Holding / outcome The Second District affirmed the trial court. All 500 stock options awarded to Jeffrey during the marriage were marital assets subject to the MSA’s undisclosed-asset provision and 50% were awarded to Rachel. The trial court’s allocation (Rachel’s 50% valued at $246,597; payment to Rachel of $130,196 after taxes/expenses) was affirmed. - Significant legal reasoning - The appellate court treated the MSA as a contract (interpretation de novo) and reviewed factual findings for manifest-weight review. - The court rejected husband’s argument that the options were Strong Suit LLC’s nominal assets, concluding the option grants and agreements named Jeffrey individually (not Strong Suit), so the assets were his. - Husband repeatedly failed to disclose the existence of the options despite interrogatories, a court-ordered reporting obligation, and express MSA representations that he had “fully disclosed all of [his] assets.” His testimony at prove-up that he had disclosed all assets bolstered the trial court’s finding. - The court found no requirement to demonstrate bad faith; nondisclosure in the face of express representations and discovery duties triggered the undisclosed-asset clause and equal division, irrespective of whether some options were unvested at judgment. - Practice implications (concise) - Counsel must aggressively pursue discovery pre-settlement; failure to do so does not prevent later relief where the other spouse knowingly failed to disclose assets. - Draft MSAs to define “assets” (including contingent/unvested interests), specify valuation date(s), allocate tax consequences, and state remedies for nondisclosure. - When clients hold or receive equity/option grants, confirm whether grants were made to the individual or an entity, and require full documentary disclosure (grant notices, option agreements, vesting schedules). - Advise clients that holding assets in a personal name to “avoid disclosure/tax issues” may not insulate them from being characterized as marital property. - Preserve prove-up record of disclosure representations and consider express carve-outs or escrow mechanisms for contingent postjudgment assets.