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Jul 29, 2025 Read Opinion

In re Marriage of Taylor C.

# In re Marriage of Taylor C., 2025 IL App (4th) 250061‑U 1) Case citation and parties - In re Marriage of Taylor C., No. 4‑25‑0061 (Ill. App. Ct., 4th Dist., July 29, 2025) (Rule 23 order; non‑precedential). - Petitioner‑Appellant: Taylor C. (mother); Respondent‑Appellee: Joel V. (father). 2) Key legal issues - Whether the trial court’s denial of mother’s petition to relocate the parties’ two children from Macomb, IL, to Greenville, SC comported with the best‑interest analysis and statutory factors in 750 ILCS 5/609.2(g). - Whether the trial court’s factual findings on the 609.2(g) factors were against the manifest weight of the evidence. 3) Holding/outcome - The Fourth District affirmed. The appellate court held the trial court did not err in denying the relocation; its findings and ultimate best‑interest determination were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. 4) Significant legal reasoning (concise) - Standard of review: appellate deference to the trial court’s factual findings and credibility determinations under the manifest‑weight standard. - The trial court conducted the multi‑factor 609.2(g) analysis (children’s needs, parent‑child relationships, motives, proposed parenting plan, distance and travel burdens, stability/supports at proposed site, etc.) and found relocation not in the children’s best interests. - The record supported conclusions that: the children were generally doing well and had a strong, close relationship with father and paternal family in central Illinois; remote contact could not substitute for regular in‑person contact; mother had unilaterally changed schooling (homeschooling) without court modification; proposed parenting schedule would materially change the regularity and character of father‑child contact (longer, less frequent visits); and questions about the new household’s stability and the relocating family’s motives and logistics were relevant. - The appellate court emphasized that the trial court was entitled to weigh competing testimony (including credibility of mother, stepfather’s employment history and family background) and to conclude the relocation’s asserted benefits did not outweigh the harm to established parent‑child contact. 5) Practice implications for family law practitioners - Relocation petitions must comprehensively address every 609.2(g) factor with admissible, specific evidence: objective comparative school data, concrete community supports, housing/employment stability, travel logistics and costs, and a parenting plan that preserves frequent, meaningful in‑person contact (not merely extended but infrequent summer visits). - Anticipate and rebut credibility attacks: document cooperation history, prior notice/compliance with parenting‑plan modification obligations (e.g., prior homeschooling decisions), and contemporaneous communications about children’s welfare. - Where relocation will reduce regular contact, propose realistic, detailed transport/expense arrangements and a transitional plan to mitigate harm. Trial courts’ credibility findings are difficult to overturn on appeal.

Jun 3, 2025 Read Opinion

In re Marriage of Lamb

- Case citation and parties In re Marriage of Lamb, 2025 IL App (4th) 241134‑U. Petitioner‑Appellee: Rachel L. Lamb. Respondent‑Appellant: Thad A. Lamb. Appeal from Greene County Circuit Court (No. 16D39). - Key legal issues 1) Whether a trial court may modify an agreed divorce decree that waived child support to establish child support under 750 ILCS 5/510(a)(1) without a showing of a substantial change in circumstances. 2) What proof is required to establish the requisite “substantial change” when the parties previously agreed to waive support and executed a marital settlement agreement (MSA) that included a waiver of further discovery. - Holding/outcome The appellate court reversed the trial court’s August 2024 order establishing child support, holding the modification was against the manifest weight of the evidence because Petitioner failed to prove a substantial change in circumstances since entry of the 2017 decree. - Significant legal reasoning - Statutory standard: Modification/establishment of child support after a decree that addressed support requires a showing of a substantial change in circumstances under section 510(a)(1). - Burden of proof: The party seeking modification bears the burden to demonstrate the change. - Evidentiary deficiency: Rachel relied on more recent payroll/W‑2 records and Thad’s testimony about bonuses and deposits (including a substantial 2023 bonus), but she did not introduce or elicit evidence of Thad’s income at or before the 2017 decree (pre‑2019 income was absent). Without a baseline showing what Thad earned when the waiver was agreed, the court could not determine whether later earnings constituted a substantial change. - Waiver/Discovery context: The MSA contained a waiver of further discovery; Rachel had previously obtained employer records via Rule 204 subpoena and later obtained 2019–2024 records. Nevertheless, the appellate court emphasized that the record lacked evidence comparing present income to the income at the time of the divorce, and the trial court’s factual finding was not supported by the record. - Practice implications (concise) - To seek modification of a child‑support waiver, lawyers must establish a clear baseline of the parties’ financial circumstances at the time of the decree (W‑2s, tax returns, payroll, employer confirmations). - When alleging substantial change from bonuses or intermittent payments, present multi‑year documentation showing the pattern pre‑ and post‑decree and explain treatment of one‑time deposits (rebates, refunds) vs. recurring income. - If the MSA contains discovery waivers, preserve or secure pre‑decree evidence before prove‑up; use Rule 204 subpoenas early and ensure responsive documents are in the record. - Obtain a complete transcript/record of the prove‑up hearing and base modification proof on admissible, comparative financial evidence—failure to do so risks reversal as against manifest weight.

Dec 27, 2024 Read Opinion

In re Marriage of Alpert Knight

1. Case citation and parties - In re Marriage of Alpert Knight, 2024 IL App (1st) 230629. - Petitioner‑Appellant: Amanda Alpert Knight. Respondent‑Appellee: Robert Greenwell Knight III. 2. Key legal issues - Whether a child‑support modification is warranted where the noncustodial parent’s income/net worth substantially increased after entry of a marital settlement agreement (MSA), producing a materially higher standard of living for the children with that parent. - Scope of discovery and admissibility of evidence (trust documents and experts’ opinions about home repairs/expenses) relevant to a modification motion. - Effect of contractual MSA provisions (income ranges, deviation clause and annual income confirmations) on later modification. 3. Holding/outcome - Judgment: Affirmed in part, reversed in part; remanded. - The appellate court held the circuit court erred in finding no substantial change in circumstances and remanded for further proceedings consistent with the opinion. 4. Significant legal reasoning (concise) - Facts: The 2015 MSA set child support at $10,000/month and listed Robert’s gross income range ($600K–$1.6M) and large nonmarital family trusts (≈$37M+). Amanda later moved (2021) to increase support to $25,000/month, alleging Robert’s income/net worth grew substantially and the children enjoy a significantly higher standard of living with him. Discovery disputes arose over trust documents; the trial court limited trust discovery to trusts naming the children as beneficiaries and excluded Amanda’s experts’ testimony about necessary home repairs/expenses. Robert admitted he could pay any reasonable increased needs and did not intend to assert inability to pay. - The appellate court found the circuit court’s dismissal of a “substantial change” showing was error given the record evidence of Robert’s enhanced resources and the resulting divergent standards of living for the children. The opinion emphasizes that a parent’s post‑judgment wealth and lifestyle may be relevant to child support modification even where assets are characterized as nonmarital, because modification focuses on children’s needs, parental ability to pay, and maintained standard of living. 5. Practice implications for family lawyers - MSAs that state income ranges or contain deviation waivers do not necessarily foreclose future modification—use clear, specific waivers (e.g., express permanent waiver of modification) if that is intended. - When post‑judgment wealth increases materially (especially via trusts), litigants should aggressively pursue discovery into trust assets when relevance to support/ability to pay is plausibly alleged; courts may need to balance trust characterization vs. child‑support relevance. - Preserve and proffer evidence showing children’s comparative standard of living (expenses, necessary repairs, expert estimates); exclusion of such evidence can be reversible error. - Consider tactical admissions (or pretrial rulings) regarding inability to pay—such admissions limit defenses but may streamline relief if documented. - On remand, prepare for recalculation of support and further fact‑finding on the appropriate amount and allocation of child‑related expenses.

Mar 13, 2024 Read Opinion

In re Marriage of Likar

1. Case citation and parties - In re Marriage of Likar, 2024 IL App (3d) 240103. - Petitioner-Appellee: Dale A. Likar. Respondent-Appellant: Christina M. Likar. 2. Key legal issues - Was the appellate court permitted to exercise jurisdiction under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(4) to review the circuit court’s denial of a transfer of venue request? - Does filing a motion to reconsider toll the 30-day Rule 306(c)(1) deadline for filing a petition for leave to appeal a venue-transfer order? 3. Holding/outcome - Appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The respondent’s petition for leave to appeal (filed Feb. 8, 2024) was untimely under Rule 306(c)(1) because it was due within 30 days of the November 27, 2023 denial of her transfer motion (deadline Dec. 27, 2023). A subsequent motion to reconsider did not toll the deadline. 4. Significant legal reasoning (summary) - The court emphasized its independent duty to examine jurisdiction and noted that orders denying transfer of venue are interlocutory and reviewable only under the rule. Rule 306(c)(1)’s 30-day filing requirement is jurisdictional (citing Kemner). - The respondent filed a motion to reconsider after the November 27 denial; Illinois precedent establishes that such a motion does not toll Rule 306’s 30-day period (National Seal Co. v. Greenblatt and collected cases). - The Kemner exception (where a later motion is effectively a new, original motion because it presents new facts or authorities) can restart the deadline, but here Christina’s reconsideration motion did not present new facts or law. Accordingly, the timing remained jurisdictional and her belated petition could not be considered. 5. Practice implications (for family-law practitioners) - Treat Rule 306(a)(4)/(c)(1) deadlines as jurisdictional: if you intend to seek leave to appeal a venue-transfer order based on defendant nonresidence/no legitimate venue, file the petition within 30 days of the circuit court’s order. - Do not assume a motion to reconsider will toll the Rule 306 deadline. If you need more time, either (a) ensure a true “new original” motion (with new facts/evidence) is presented if you want to argue the Kemner exception, or (b) file the Rule 306 petition within 30 days and separately pursue reconsideration. - Preserve a clear record on venue/residence facts, and be proactive about appellate timing; coordinate trial and appellate strategy early when venue is contested.

Aug 25, 2022 Read Opinion

In re Marriage of Hampton

- Case citation and parties In re Marriage of Hampton, 2022 IL App (4th) 210528-U (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. Aug. 25, 2022). Petitioner: Dusty Hampton. Respondent/Appellee: Bradley Hampton. Intervenor/Appellant: Illinois Department of Healthcare and Family Services (the Department). - Key legal issues 1) Whether the Department could require continuation of child support beyond the termination date specified in a 2012 support order when that termination date (the youngest child’s 18th birthday) likely preceded the child’s expected high‑school graduation (potentially in 2021), in contravention of 750 ILCS 5/505(g). 2) Whether the trial court could correct the termination date nunc pro tunc or otherwise order continuation absent a direct appeal or statutory modification procedure (e.g., under §§ 510 or 513). - Holding/outcome The appellate court affirmed the Greene County circuit court’s denial of the Department’s petition to continue child support. A support order entered by a court of competent jurisdiction cannot be collaterally attacked; nor could the termination date be altered nunc pro tunc because the record lacked contemporaneous evidence that the court intended a different date. - Significant legal reasoning The court applied Mitchell (In re Marriage of Mitchell, 181 Ill. 2d 169) to hold that errors in a final child‑support order are not subject to collateral attack long after entry; relief must be sought by direct appeal or through the statutory modification procedures. The Department’s attempt to relabel its claim as a nunc pro tunc correction failed because such relief requires a contemporaneous memorandum or court record showing the court’s original intent (Hirsch/Pestka principles). The record contained no writing identifying the actual graduation date or indicating the judge intended a later termination date; indeed the Department itself could not identify the date. The court also agreed with the trial court’s reliance on In re Marriage of Waller that continuation past an express termination date is a modification implicating § 510 (change in circumstances) or, for non‑minor educational support, § 513. - Practice implications (concise) - Final support orders are strictly final unless timely appealed or modified under the statute; parties (and enforcement agencies) must timely challenge errors. - Agencies drafting consent or fill‑in orders must ensure statutory compliance (750 ILCS 5/505(g)) and not insert premature termination dates. - If a court intends a different termination date than appears on the face of an order, create contemporaneous written minutes/memoranda to permit nunc pro tunc correction. - To extend support for a post‑majority child, proceed under § 510 (modification) or § 513 (educational expenses) with appropriate factual allegations. - Blaming drafting errors after finality is unlikely to overcome the collateral‑attack and nunc pro tunc standards.

Sep 10, 2021 Read Opinion

In re Marriage of Greenberg

In re Marriage of Greenberg, No. 1-21-0325-U (Ill. App. Ct., 1st Dist. Sept. 10, 2021) (Rule 23 order) 1) Case citation and parties - In re Marriage of Greenberg, 2021 IL App (1st) 210325-U (6th Div.). Order filed under Ill. Sup. Ct. R. 23 (non‑precedential). Petitioner-Appellee: Antoinette R. Greenberg. Respondent-Appellant: Ronald I. Greenberg. 2) Key legal issues - Whether the trial court properly dismissed a motion to compel arbitration where the original written arbitration agreement allegedly signed at the parties’ Orthodox Jewish wedding could not be produced and the movant offered secondary evidence (affidavits, a filled‑in facsimile and a video of the husband signing). - Whether secondary evidence of a lost contract is admissible under Illinois Rule of Evidence 1004 and whether the court must make substantive arbitrability findings (threshold issues) before denying arbitration. 3) Holding/outcome - Reversed and remanded. The appellate court concluded the trial court erred by dismissing the motion to compel arbitration without making substantive rulings on arbitrability and on the admissibility of the proffered secondary evidence under Rule 1004. 4) Significant legal reasoning - Jurisdiction: the denial of a motion to compel arbitration is appealable interlocutorily under Ill. S. Ct. R. 307(a)(1) because the order functions injunctively. - The court criticized the trial court’s departure into procedural dismissal under section 2‑615 and its wholesale exclusion of secondary evidence under Rule 1004 without addressing substantive issues. Rule 1004 permits secondary evidence when the original is lost or destroyed, provided the absence is accounted for; the appellant presented affidavits from the officiating rabbi and witnesses, plus a video of the husband signing, and alleged diligent search and loss by a third party. - The appellate panel emphasized that threshold arbitrability questions and evidentiary disputes about the existence/terms of the purported arbitration agreement required adjudication (including an evidentiary hearing), not summary dismissal. 5) Practice implications (for family law attorneys) - Preserve and attach original arbitration/prenuptial documents to motions to compel; if originals are unavailable, document and prove diligent search and the reason for loss to invoke Rule 1004. - Where arbitrability depends on existence/terms of a written agreement, request an evidentiary hearing on both admissibility of secondary evidence and the threshold arbitrability issues rather than relying on procedural dismissal. - When religious/pre‑marital instruments (Ketubah, Beth Din forms) are involved, be prepared to address form provenance, customary practice, who retained copies, and specific clauses (e.g., scope over GET, monetary, custody matters). Anticipate interlocutory appeal under Rule 307 if a court denies arbitration. - Note risk: child‑custody/support issues may require explicit consent to arbitrate; tailor pleadings to show parties’ intent as to scope.

Sep 4, 2019 Read Opinion

In re Marriage of Green

1. Case citation and parties - In re Marriage of Green, No. 4-19-0088, 2019 IL App (4th) 190088-U (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. Sept. 4, 2019) (Rule 23 order — non‑precedential). - Petitioner-Appellee: Kathleen E. Green. Respondent-Appellant: Christopher Green. 2. Key legal issues - How to calculate the health‑insurance component of a child‑support award under 750 ILCS 5/505(a)(4)(D)–(E). - Whether the trial court must divide the total premium by the number of persons covered when the actual premium "attributable to the child" is available and verifiable. - Application of statutory credit/deduction rules when the obligor pays the premium. 3. Holding/outcome - The Fourth District reversed and remanded, holding the trial court erred in its child‑support calculation related to health‑insurance costs. The court concluded the trial court misapplied section 505(a)(4)(D) and (E) when it divided the family premium among persons covered rather than using the actual attributable amount (which was available and did not vary with the number covered). The matter was remanded for further proceedings consistent with that interpretation. 4. Significant legal reasoning - Statutory interpretation reviewed de novo. Section 505(a)(4)(D) directs that the amount added to basic support "shall be the actual amount of the total health insurance premium that is attributable to the child" and only if that amount "is not available or cannot be verified" should the court divide the total premium by the number of persons covered. - Parties agreed the family premium ($867.49/month) was verifiable and would be the same whether one or four persons were covered. Under the statute the court therefore should have used the actual (verifiable) amount attributable to the child rather than the per‑person division. - Section 505(a)(4)(E) then governs credit/deduction: if the obligor pays the premium, the obligee's share is deducted from the obligor's support obligation. The court relied also on In re Aaliyah L.H., 2013 IL App (2d) 120414, for the proposition that a premium deduction may be allowed even if the premium does not increase when the child is added. - The court noted appellee did not file a brief but proceeded because the record and issues were straightforward. 5. Practice implications - Carefully document who pays premiums, the exact dollar premium, and whether the premium varies with the number covered. If the premium attributable to the child is verifiable, do not default to a per‑person division. - When obligor pays the premium, ensure the trial court applies §505(a)(4)(E) to deduct the obligee’s share from the obligor’s obligation. - Preserve statutory‑interpretation arguments and submit authority (e.g., Aaliyah L.H.) showing that a flat family premium can still support a deduction/credit. - Remember this decision is a Rule 23 (nonprecedential) disposition — persuasive but not binding precedent.