In re Parentage of AM. P.

Overview

In re Parentage of Am. P. and Au. P., 2026 IL App (1st) 251607-U, affirmed the trial court's grant of a mother's petition to relocate with two minor children from Illinois to Florida. The appellate court held that the pro se father's failure to provide a report of proceedings or acceptable substitute required the court to presume the trial court acted in conformity with the law. The father's brief also suffered from multiple Rule 341 deficiencies warranting independent affirmance.

Key Facts

• Parents had two children (born 2013 and 2016) and shared alternating one-week parenting time under a 2018 mediation agreement
• Mother married Khalil Daniels in 2018; the couple had four additional children together
• In November 2024, mother's husband was required to relocate to Florida for employment; mother was simultaneously experiencing a high-risk pregnancy and medical complications
• Mother relocated to Florida with the children before the school term began, then filed a pro se motion for court approval in January 2025
• Mother did not comply with the 60-day statutory written notice requirement under 750 ILCS 5/609.2
• Father initially agreed to the move but revoked consent, allegedly demanding $5,000 per child
• The GAL testified that father repeatedly prevented her from speaking with the children alone and failed to meet at scheduled times
• Trial court found mother proved by a preponderance of the evidence that relocation was in the children's best interests and that her move was made in good faith despite the notice deficiency

Procedural History

Cook County Circuit Court, No. 2014 D6 79009, Judge H. Yvonne Coleman presiding. Father obtained two emergency orders in February 2025 preventing removal and requiring return of the children. Mother filed a second amended petition for relocation in May 2025. Following an evidentiary hearing on August 15, 2025, the court granted relocation. Father appealed pro se. Mother filed an appearance but no appellee's brief; the court reviewed the case under First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp., 63 Ill. 2d 128 (1976). First District, Second Division.

Holdings

1. Primary holding: Affirmed. Under Foutch v. O'Bryant, 99 Ill. 2d 389 (1984), the absence of a report of proceedings compelled the presumption that the trial court's relocation order conformed with the law and had a sufficient factual basis. No standard of review on the merits was reached.
2. Secondary holding: Father's arguments were independently forfeited for failure to comply with Illinois Supreme Court Rule 341(h)(7)—arguments lacked citations to relevant authority and meaningful analysis.
3. On the notice issue: Failure to comply with the 60-day notice requirement of Section 609.2 is not an automatic bar to relocation; it is merely a factor the court "may consider" in assessing good faith, citing Kenney v. Strang, 2023 IL App (1st) 221558, ¶ 55.

Legal Principles

• 750 ILCS 5/609.2(d) — Noncompliance with the 60-day relocation notice is not dispositive; it is one factor in the good-faith analysis.
• Foutch v. O'Bryant — Appellant bears the burden of providing a complete record; absence creates a presumption favoring the trial court.
• Ill. S. Ct. Rules 321, 323, 324 — Requirements for transcripts and acceptable substitutes.
• Ill. S. Ct. Rule 341(h)(7) — Arguments without citation to authority are forfeited.
• Pro se litigants are held to the same procedural standards as represented parties (In re Marriage of Winters).

Practical Implications

• Always secure the transcript: Practitioners opposing relocation must ensure a report of proceedings is filed; without it, the appeal is effectively unwinnable.
• Notice deficiency is not fatal: A relocating parent's failure to provide 60-day notice under § 609.2 can be overcome if the court finds the move was in good faith under the totality of the circumstances—useful authority for petitioners who relocated before obtaining court approval.
• For respondents opposing relocation: Cite this case to argue that § 609.2 notice failures are merely one factor, not a basis for automatic denial, neutralizing a common objection.
• Counterargument: Because the merits were never reached due to the inadequate record, the court's discussion of § 609.2 notice and good faith is arguably dicta and not a binding merits ruling on relocation standards.

Limitations/Caveats

This is a Rule 23 order with limited precedential value—it may not be cited except under the narrow circumstances of Rule 23(e)(1). The court never conducted a merits review of the relocation factors; the affirmance rests entirely on the inadequate appellate record and briefing deficiencies. The discussion of § 609.2 notice requirements, while instructive, constitutes dicta since it was not necessary to the disposition. The cited precedent Kenney v. Strang (2023) is the binding authority on the notice-as-factor principle.