In re Marriage of Vasquez

Overview

In In re Marriage of Barrientos De Vasquez v. Vasquez Argueta , 2026 IL App (1st) 251730-U, the First District affirmed the circuit court's dissolution and allocation judgments following a bench trial. The pro se husband's challenges to the unenforceability finding on the parties' prenuptial agreement, the denial of his motion to reconsider a substitution-of-judge ruling, and an alleged service defect all failed—largely because he supplied an inadequate record on appeal.

Key Facts

Parties married in 2015 in El Salvador, later moved to Chicago; one minor child, A.V., born 2017.

Barrientos filed for dissolution in April 2020 (20 D 2649), naming respondent as "Raul Vasquez Argueta"; Vasquez filed his own dissolution petition in September 2020 (20 D 6907), affirmatively alleging a "valid and enforceable Prenuptial Agreement" barring maintenance. The cases were consolidated.

Two successive attorneys withdrew for Vasquez; he was defaulted for missing court dates, but the default was vacated on his motion.

The day before trial, Vasquez filed an "emergency" motion for substitution of judge for cause against Judge Sullivan; a different judge held a hearing (no transcript in record) and denied it.

Vasquez filed multiple motions to reconsider, none requesting a hearing; they were denied in a written order for failure to present new evidence or error of law.

After a multi-day bench trial (no transcript in record; no trial exhibits, including the prenuptial agreement itself), the court found Barrientos credible and Vasquez "not to be a credible witness," with prenuptial testimony "completely unbelievable."

The court found the agreement contained "incomprehensible" paragraphs, lacked the referenced property and income disclosures, and was unconscionable at the time of execution .

Procedural History

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, Domestic Relations (Judge Marita Sullivan), from the allocation judgment/parenting plan and judgment for dissolution entered after a bench trial. Appellee filed no brief; the case was taken on appellant's brief only under First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp. , 63 Ill. 2d 128 (1976). The court found good cause to extend the Rule 311(a) accelerated-disposition deadline given appellant's six months of extensions.

Holdings

The prenuptial agreement was properly found unenforceable . Existence of a valid marital agreement is reviewed de novo ; underlying factual findings are reviewed for whether they are against the manifest weight of the evidence ( Kranzler v. Kranzler , 2018 IL App (1st) 171169, ¶ 39). The circuit court expressly applied the execution-time standard and its findings tracked section 7(a)(2) of the Act.

Denial of the motions to reconsider the substitution-of-judge ruling without a hearing was not an abuse of discretion , where the motions merely reiterated arguments already presented at the initial hearing.

The service/"default judgment" argument was forfeited under Rule 341(h)(7) and, regardless, refuted by the record.

Legal Principles

Illinois Uniform Premarital Agreement Act , 750 ILCS 10/1 et seq. ; specifically 750 ILCS 10/7(a)(2) (unconscionable at execution plus absence of fair and reasonable disclosure, no written waiver of disclosure, and no adequate knowledge of the other party's property/financial obligations).

Foutch v. O'Bryant , 99 Ill. 2d 389, 391-92 (1984): appellant bears the burden of a sufficiently complete record; absent one, the reviewing court presumes the order conformed to law and had a sufficient factual basis, and doubts are resolved against appellant.

Ill. S. Ct. R. 323 (report of proceedings/substitutes); R. 329 (certified supplemental record); R. 341(h)(7) (undeveloped, uncited arguments forfeited), citing Velocity Investments, LLC v. Alston , 397 Ill. App. 3d 296 (2010).

King v. Find-A-Way Shipping, LLC , 2020 IL App (1st) 191307, ¶¶ 29-30: pro se status does not excuse record deficiencies.

People v. Tate , 2016 IL App (1st) 140598, distinguished: it involved a criminal substitution motion denied as untimely and says nothing about hearings on motions to reconsider.

Practical Implications

Order the transcript. Without a report of proceedings or a Rule 323 bystander's report/agreed statement—and without the trial exhibits (here, the prenup itself)—credibility findings and factual bases are presumed correct and the appeal is effectively unwinnable.

Supplementing the record requires a certified supplemental record from the circuit court under Rule 329; uncertified filings will be rejected.

When defending a prenup challenge, build the record on the section 7(a)(2) elements: attach and admit the disclosure schedules, or prove a written, voluntary waiver or independent knowledge. Missing referenced exhibits proved fatal here.

Useful language for opposing a prenup: the court may find unconscionability at execution based on trial testimony about the execution circumstances—arguing the court "used hindsight" fails where the order recites the execution-time standard.

There is no per se right to a hearing on a motion to reconsider; motions that merely rehash prior arguments may be decided on the papers. Conversely, a movant should affirmatively request a hearing and present genuinely new evidence or legal error.

A party who files his own dissolution petition, appears, and tries the case waives service objections; note also the distinction between being defaulted (later vacated) and entry of a default judgment .

Rule 311(a) accelerated deadlines can be extended for good cause where the appellant's own extension requests caused delay.

Limitations/Caveats

This is a Rule 23(b) order and is not precedential except as allowed by Rule 23(e)(1); it may be cited for persuasive purposes subject to that rule. Note the opinion itself relies in part on another unpublished order ( In re County Treasurer of Cook County , 2024 IL App (1st) 230090-U) for the no-hearing-on-reconsideration point—practitioners should locate published authority. The decision rests heavily on record-insufficiency presumptions under Foutch rather than a merits analysis of the prenuptial agreement, so its substantive premarital-agreement discussion is thin and largely confirmatory of existing section 7(a)(2) law. The case was decided on appellant's brief only under Talandis , without adversarial briefing or oral argument.