Reynolds v. Reynolds

Overview

The Illinois Supreme Court resolved a district split over section 610.5 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, holding that a motion seeking to modify parenting time only is governed by section 610.5(a), which requires a showing of changed circumstances that necessitate modification to serve the child's best interests — not the substantial change standard of section 610.5(c). The court affirmed the appellate court, reversed the circuit court's directed finding, and remanded for further proceedings, overruling In re Marriage of Trapkus to the extent inconsistent.

Key Facts

Never-married parents of two daughters (born 2012 and 2014); a 2016 agreed allocation judgment gave petitioner primary parenting time and significant decision-making, with respondent receiving a weekday overnight and alternating weekends, exchanges at a restaurant.

In 2021 respondent moved to modify parental responsibilities; by amended motion (May 2023) he sought only additional parenting time .

Alleged changes: remote work with flexible schedule, larger home with big yard closer to the schools, new baby and half-siblings in the home, children older, and D.R.'s post-judgment autism diagnosis.

Court-ordered evaluator Dr. Goldstein recommended increasing respondent's parenting time and school-based pickups/drop-offs (fewer transitions); he did not support a change in decision-making or majority parenting time. The GAL recommended one additional day but had concerns about E.R.'s commute.

After respondent rested, the circuit court granted petitioner's motion for directed finding, finding a prima facie case of "changes" but no substantial , unanticipated change under section 610.5(c).

Procedural History

McHenry County circuit court granted a directed finding for petitioner; Rule 304(a) finding entered and respondent appealed. The Appellate Court, Second District (2025 IL App (2d) 240028, Birkett, J., dissenting), vacated and remanded, holding section 610.5(a) supplies the standard. The Supreme Court granted leave to appeal under Rule 315(a).

Holdings

Section 610.5(a) governs motions to modify parenting time and requires only a showing of changed circumstances necessitating modification to serve the child's best interests; statutory interpretation and whether the correct legal standard was applied are reviewed de novo .

Section 610.5(c)'s substantial-change (and unanticipated-facts) requirement applies to modification of parenting plans and allocation judgments, but the legislature expressly carved parenting time out of that standard; reading (c) to govern parenting time would render (a) superfluous.

Applying the correct standard, the directed finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence (the court itself found changes were proven); reversed and remanded to determine whether the changes necessitate modification in the children's best interests, with petitioner's case-in-chief to follow if the motion is denied.

In re Marriage of Trapkus is overruled to the extent inconsistent; it improperly consulted legislative history absent ambiguity and relied on Brewer , which construed a prior statutory version.

Legal Principles

750 ILCS 5/610.5(a)-(c) (West 2022); definitions in 750 ILCS 5/600(b), (d), (f); best-interest factors in 750 ILCS 5/602.7; sections 506(a)(2), 604.10(b), (c), 603.10. Directed-finding two-step framework from People ex rel. Sherman v. Cryns , 203 Ill. 2d 264, and In re Estate of Coffman , 2023 IL 128867. Statutory construction: In re Marriage of Dynako , 2021 IL 126835; County of Du Page v. Illinois Labor Relations Board , 231 Ill. 2d 593; Ready v. United/Goedecke Services, Inc. , 232 Ill. 2d 369; In re C.C. , 2011 IL 111795; Mercado v. S&C Electric Co. , 2025 IL 129526; Palm v. Holocker , 2018 IL 123152; Petersen v. Wallach , 198 Ill. 2d 439. Department of Public Aid ex rel. Davis v. Brewer , 183 Ill. 2d 540, does not control the amended statute.

Practical Implications

Plead parenting-time modifications squarely under section 610.5(a): allege changed circumstances plus best interests; do not concede the substantial-change or "unanticipated" elements.

Whether changes were anticipated when the judgment was entered is a consideration under subsection (c), not a requirement under subsection (a) (¶ 46); a movant need not show the changes were unforeseen.

There is no two-year bar and no leave-to-file/affidavit requirement for parenting-time-only motions; those restrictions apply to decision-making allocation.

Opponents should focus on the best-interests prong (section 602.7) and credibility, since the changed-circumstances threshold is now lower; consider arguing that a motion is effectively one to modify decision-making or the allocation judgment in toto, which triggers subsection (c).

Preserve the standard-of-review distinction: legal-standard errors get de novo review even where the trial court completed the second (weighing) step.

Limitations/Caveats

This is a published Illinois Supreme Court opinion — fully precedential and binding statewide; not a Rule 23 order. The discussion of Trapkus's methodological errors and of the cited unpublished appellate decisions is explanatory, but the overruling of Trapkus is binding. The court's application of the manifest-weight standard to reverse the directed finding is holding, but it did not decide the ultimate best-interests question, which remains open on remand.