In re Marriage of Janev, 2024 IL App (1st) 230998-U

1) Case citation and parties
- In re Marriage of Janev, No. 1-23-0998, 2024 IL App (1st) 230998-U (Ill. App. Ct. May 14, 2024) (Rule 23 order).
- Petitioner-Appellee: Robert P. Janev. Respondent-Appellant: Sabrina N. Lloyd. Beermann LLP (Karen Paige, Joseph Napoli) was counsel for respondent; Paige had served as mediator in the parties’ prior mediation.

2) Key legal issues
- Whether a law firm is disqualified where a former mediator (Paige) who participated personally and substantially in mediation later associates with the firm representing one party.
- Whether the firm timely screened the disqualified lawyer under Illinois Rule of Professional Conduct 1.12(c) so that the conflict is not imputed to the firm.
- Proper standard and rule to govern disqualification (Rule 1.12 v. other conflict rules).

3) Holding/outcome
- Reversed. The appellate court held petitioner failed to carry his heavy burden to justify disqualification; the trial court applied an incorrect standard (focused on general “significant risk” language) instead of Rule 1.12’s screening framework.

4) Significant legal reasoning (concise)
- The court interpreted the Rules of Professional Conduct de novo and emphasized that disqualification is a drastic remedy that must rest on actual conflicts, not merely appearance; the movant bears a heavy burden.
- Rule 1.12 governs conflicts arising from former mediators/third‑party neutrals and also governs imputation to the firm (Rule 1.10 defers to Rule 1.12 in this context). Under Rule 1.12(c), imputation is avoided if (1) the disqualified lawyer is timely screened and apportions no fee and (2) written notice is given.
- “Screening” is defined by Rule 1.0(k) as timely internal procedures reasonably adequate to protect confidential information. The trial court relied instead on the “significant risk” language from Rule 1.7 (inapplicable here) and made no factual finding of actual disclosure. Given Beermann’s screening memo and notice, petitioner’s speculative “watercooler” concerns and temporal complaints did not meet his burden to show untimely/inadequate screening.

5) Practice implications for attorneys
- When handling matters involving former mediators/neutrals, invoke Rule 1.12; imputation is judged under Rule 1.12, not Rule 1.7/1.10.
- To avoid firm disqualification: promptly implement clear, documented screening procedures (isolation of personnel, access controls), avoid fee sharing with screened lawyer, and provide prompt written notice to parties/tribunal as required by Rule 1.12(c).
- A movant should present admissible evidence (not speculation) that screening was ineffective or information was shared before a court will disqualify; courts should not substitute general “appearance” tests where Rule 1.12 provides a specific remedy.
- Consider seeking an evidentiary hearing on factual disputes over screening/timeliness before seeking disqualification; be prepared for interlocutory appeal under Rule 306(a)(7).