In re Marriage of Paris, 2019 IL App (1st) 181116-U

- Case citation and parties
In re Marriage of Paris, No. 1-18-1116, 2019 IL App (1st) 181116-U (Ill. App. Ct. Dec. 19, 2019) (Rule 23 order; non-precedential). Petitioner-Appellee: Kerry Paris (represented by Stein & Stein, Ltd.). Respondent-Appellant: Frank Martin Paris, Jr. (represented by Rosenfeld Hafron Shapiro & Farmer).

- Key legal issues
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in finding husband had the ability to pay a $550,000 interim-fee purge.
2. Whether the court properly allocated interim fees to the husband’s own attorney and expert (i.e., whether the award to the husband’s counsel/expert was authorized).
3. Whether the contempt finding (indirect civil contempt and jail-until-purge commitment) was against the manifest weight of the evidence.

- Holding / outcome
The appellate court: (1) affirmed the trial court’s finding that husband had the ability to pay the $550,000 interim-fee requirement and affirmed the contempt finding and civil-contempt remedy (commitment until purge payment); (2) affirmed that husband must fund interim fees for wife’s counsel, wife’s expert, and the children’s representative; (3) reversed the portion of the interim-fee order that allocated interim fees and costs to the husband’s own attorney and expert. (Note: Rule 23 — not binding precedent except in limited circumstances.)

- Significant legal reasoning (concise)
- Abuse-of-discretion standard: interim-fee and sanction decisions rest with the trial court and are reviewed deferentially. The trial court may consider tax returns, financial statements, business records, lines of credit, prior payments, and expert testimony bearing on liquidity and borrowing capacity.
- The court reasonably relied on evidence (tax returns showing significant income, marketable securities, expert testimony about borrowing capacity and increases in asset values, extensions of credit) to conclude husband had ability to pay despite his assertions of encumbrances and illiquidity.
- Civil contempt requires willful disobedience; the record (refusal to pay as ordered, attempts to shift liability via loan documents, discovery failures) supported a finding of contumacious conduct and the coercive purge condition was permissible.
- However, awarding interim fees to a party’s own counsel/expert is not statutorily authorized; the appellate court reversed that portion as outside the court’s authority.

- Practice implications
- Trial courts have broad but not unlimited discretion to order interim fee contributions based on realistic assessments of ability to pay (including borrowing capacity and business cashflow). Ensure a robust, admissible record on liquidity and funding alternatives.
- Courts may use civil contempt and purge conditions to coerce payment, but parties should document good-faith inability to pay to defend against willfulness findings.
- Do not assume a court can require an opposing party to fund that party’s own counsel or experts — such allocations may be reversed as unauthorized. Draft fee petitions to seek funding for opposing counsel/experts under statutory authority and tailor requests and evidence accordingly.
- Reminder: this decision is Rule 23 (non-precedential); treat accordingly in litigation strategy.