In re Marriage of O'Brien, 2011 IL 109039
Case Analysis
1) Case citation and parties
- In re Marriage of O’Brien, 2011 IL 109039 (Ill. Aug. 4, 2011).
- John O’Brien (appellant) v. Lisa O’Brien (appellee).
2) Key legal issues
- What standard governs a petition under 735 ILCS 5/2‑1001(a)(3) to substitute a judge for cause — must a movant prove actual prejudice (subjective bias) or is the Judicial Code’s “appearance of impropriety” (an objective test) sufficient?
- Whether the movant’s petition was timely and supported by facts sufficient to establish prejudice.
- (Alternative) whether the trial judge erred in awarding maintenance.
3) Holding / outcome
- The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court: the denial of John O’Brien’s petition to substitute the judge for cause was proper. The court held that §2‑1001(a)(3) must be evaluated under the statutory “actual prejudice” standard, not an appearance‑of‑impropriety standard. John failed to show actual prejudice; the maintenance issue did not change the result.
4) Significant legal reasoning
- Statutory interpretation: the court read §2‑1001(a)(3) as requiring proof of actual prejudice rather than relying on the Judicial Code’s broader “appearance of impropriety” standard. The Code of Judicial Conduct and Canon standards do not replace the statute’s cause requirement.
- Due process/Capterton: the opinion distinguishes extreme Due Process recusal holdings (e.g., Caperton) — those address extraordinary circumstances creating a serious risk of actual bias — from routine substitution‑for‑cause claims governed by the statute. Caperton does not convert §2‑1001 into an appearance‑based standard.
- Facts and timeliness: the record showed only minimal social contact (brief greetings at a gym), an in‑court wave, and prior rulings that were often favorable to John. John delayed nearly a year after becoming aware of the incidents before filing, omitted relevant facts from his affidavit, and offered no persuasive evidence of subjective bias; these factors undercut his claim of actual prejudice.
5) Practice implications for attorneys
- File substitution‑for‑cause petitions promptly upon learning facts you will rely on; delay and omissions weaken the claim.
- Focus proof on actual prejudice or objective evidence that the judge’s capacity to be impartial was compromised; mere social acquaintance or isolated courtroom gestures are ordinarily insufficient.
- Don’t assume Judicial Code standards convert into statutory rights — use the statute’s framework and preserve a full record (affidavit, testimony, contemporaneous objections) to support a recusal claim.
- Reserve Caperton arguments for truly extraordinary circumstances (e.g., significant personal or financial interest creating a serious risk of bias).
- In re Marriage of O’Brien, 2011 IL 109039 (Ill. Aug. 4, 2011).
- John O’Brien (appellant) v. Lisa O’Brien (appellee).
2) Key legal issues
- What standard governs a petition under 735 ILCS 5/2‑1001(a)(3) to substitute a judge for cause — must a movant prove actual prejudice (subjective bias) or is the Judicial Code’s “appearance of impropriety” (an objective test) sufficient?
- Whether the movant’s petition was timely and supported by facts sufficient to establish prejudice.
- (Alternative) whether the trial judge erred in awarding maintenance.
3) Holding / outcome
- The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court: the denial of John O’Brien’s petition to substitute the judge for cause was proper. The court held that §2‑1001(a)(3) must be evaluated under the statutory “actual prejudice” standard, not an appearance‑of‑impropriety standard. John failed to show actual prejudice; the maintenance issue did not change the result.
4) Significant legal reasoning
- Statutory interpretation: the court read §2‑1001(a)(3) as requiring proof of actual prejudice rather than relying on the Judicial Code’s broader “appearance of impropriety” standard. The Code of Judicial Conduct and Canon standards do not replace the statute’s cause requirement.
- Due process/Capterton: the opinion distinguishes extreme Due Process recusal holdings (e.g., Caperton) — those address extraordinary circumstances creating a serious risk of actual bias — from routine substitution‑for‑cause claims governed by the statute. Caperton does not convert §2‑1001 into an appearance‑based standard.
- Facts and timeliness: the record showed only minimal social contact (brief greetings at a gym), an in‑court wave, and prior rulings that were often favorable to John. John delayed nearly a year after becoming aware of the incidents before filing, omitted relevant facts from his affidavit, and offered no persuasive evidence of subjective bias; these factors undercut his claim of actual prejudice.
5) Practice implications for attorneys
- File substitution‑for‑cause petitions promptly upon learning facts you will rely on; delay and omissions weaken the claim.
- Focus proof on actual prejudice or objective evidence that the judge’s capacity to be impartial was compromised; mere social acquaintance or isolated courtroom gestures are ordinarily insufficient.
- Don’t assume Judicial Code standards convert into statutory rights — use the statute’s framework and preserve a full record (affidavit, testimony, contemporaneous objections) to support a recusal claim.
- Reserve Caperton arguments for truly extraordinary circumstances (e.g., significant personal or financial interest creating a serious risk of bias).
Disclaimer: This case summary is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
No attorney-client relationship is created by reading this content. Always consult with a licensed attorney for specific legal questions.
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