In re Marriage of Marshall, 2019 IL App (2d) 190049-U

- Case citation and parties
In re Marriage of Marshall, No. 2-19-0049, 2019 IL App (2d) 190049-U (Ill. App. Ct., 2d Dist., May 21, 2019) (Rule 23 non-precedential). Petitioner-Appellee: Sarah Marshall. Respondent-Appellant: Gregory Marshall.

- Key legal issues
1) Whether Gregory’s emergency petition adequately pleaded a claim for indirect civil contempt based on alleged interference with his parenting time.
2) Whether the trial court’s ruling (which struck the contempt count but expressly did not rule on a separate claim under 750 ILCS 5/607.5 for abuse of allocated parenting time) was appealable or otherwise final. Procedural: whether portions of appellant’s brief should be stricken.

- Holding / outcome
The appellate court: affirmed the trial court’s dismissal (grant of a 2-615 motion) of the indirect civil contempt claim; refused to strike Gregory’s brief in full (but disregarded argumentative or unsupported factual portions); dismissed the appeal as to the unresolved 607.5 claim (not a final order on that count) and remanded for further proceedings on the unresolved claim.

- Significant legal reasoning (condensed)
- Standard: A 2-615 motion tests legal sufficiency; courts accept well-pleaded facts as true and disregard conclusions. Indirect civil contempt requires a court order and proof of willful disobedience. The petitioner initially bears the burden to prove violation by a preponderance; then the respondent must show nonwillful noncompliance or excuse.
- The appellate court agreed that Gregory’s petition, even accepting pleaded facts, failed to state a cognizable contempt claim. His allegations—that Sarah encouraged the child’s application to an out‑of‑state boarding school and that a resulting “rift” caused the child to refuse visitation—did not sufficiently allege that Sarah willfully disobeyed a court order or directly prevented Gregory’s parenting time. Conclusory assertions that Sarah “failed to facilitate” parenting time were insufficient under 2-615.
- Because the trial court expressly did not rule on the statutory 607.5 abuse-of-parenting-time claim, that portion of the judgment was not final and thus not ripe for appellate review despite inclusion of Rule 304(a) language.

- Practice implications for family law attorneys
- When seeking contempt for interference with parenting time, plead specific, nonconclusory facts: the precise court order allegedly violated, particular acts by the other parent that directly and willfully prevented access, dates/times, communications, and efforts taken to enforce the order.
- Consider alleging §607.5 claims (abuse of allocated parenting time) distinctly and ensure the trial court rules on them if appealability is important. A partial ruling that leaves statutory claims undecided is not final even if Rule 304(a) language is included.
- Preserve a clear factual record and evidence of willfulness; avoid relying on claims of parental “encouragement” or emotional estrangement without factual underpinning.
- Ensure appellate briefs comply with Rule 341 to avoid portions being disregarded.