In re Marriage of Mark O., 2024 IL App (4th) 230875-U
Case Analysis
1. Case citation and parties
- In re Marriage of Mark O., No. 4-23-0875, 2024 IL App (4th) 230875-U (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. May 21, 2024) (Rule 23 order; nonprecedential).
- Petitioner-Appellee: Mark O. | Respondent-Appellant: Lana O.
2. Key legal issues
- Whether the trial court erred by modifying allocation of parental decision-making responsibilities less than two years after the original order without making findings of “serious endangerment” as required by 750 ILCS 5/610.5(a).
- Whether subsequent agreed or administrative modifications to a parenting plan toll the two-year waiting period for modifying decision-making.
3. Holding/outcome
- Affirmed. The appellate court held the trial court did not err in awarding Mark sole parental decision-making authority (education, extracurriculars, religion; medical decisions to be discussed but final decisions by Mark), because Mark’s motion was filed more than two years after the original January 30, 2020 allocation. No statutory serious-endangerment finding was required.
4. Significant legal reasoning
- Standard of review: de novo (statutory interpretation).
- The court relied on the plain language of 750 ILCS 5/610.5(a): motions to modify parental decision-making (distinct from parenting time) are barred for two years from the original order unless affidavits show the child’s present environment may seriously endanger health/development. Parenting time may be modified at any time on changed circumstances without showing serious endangerment.
- Because the original joint-decision-making allocation was entered January 30, 2020, Mark’s June 14, 2023 petition came after the two-year bar expired, so the serious-endangerment exception was inapplicable.
- The court treated interim agreed modifications (primarily to parenting time and purge conditions, and an agreed November 2022 order) as not “material changes” that would restart/toll the two-year period (citing In re Marriage of Wendy L.D. as support).
5. Practice implications
- Distinguish clearly between “parental decision-making” and “parenting time” in pleadings—statutory bars and standards differ.
- The two-year waiting period for modifying decision-making runs from the original allocation; routine or non-material amendments to parenting time generally will not toll it. If seeking modification within two years, plead and prove the serious-endangerment exception.
- Use contempt findings, admonitions, and agreed orders to build a factual record supporting future modification once the statutory period expires.
- Counsel should draft agreed orders carefully: stipulated modifications can alter rights/timing (a stipulation may waive the two-year bar), and language about future consequences (warnings) can be persuasive later.
- Note: this is a Rule 23 order (nonprecedential); treat as persuasive but not binding authority.
- In re Marriage of Mark O., No. 4-23-0875, 2024 IL App (4th) 230875-U (Ill. App. Ct. 4th Dist. May 21, 2024) (Rule 23 order; nonprecedential).
- Petitioner-Appellee: Mark O. | Respondent-Appellant: Lana O.
2. Key legal issues
- Whether the trial court erred by modifying allocation of parental decision-making responsibilities less than two years after the original order without making findings of “serious endangerment” as required by 750 ILCS 5/610.5(a).
- Whether subsequent agreed or administrative modifications to a parenting plan toll the two-year waiting period for modifying decision-making.
3. Holding/outcome
- Affirmed. The appellate court held the trial court did not err in awarding Mark sole parental decision-making authority (education, extracurriculars, religion; medical decisions to be discussed but final decisions by Mark), because Mark’s motion was filed more than two years after the original January 30, 2020 allocation. No statutory serious-endangerment finding was required.
4. Significant legal reasoning
- Standard of review: de novo (statutory interpretation).
- The court relied on the plain language of 750 ILCS 5/610.5(a): motions to modify parental decision-making (distinct from parenting time) are barred for two years from the original order unless affidavits show the child’s present environment may seriously endanger health/development. Parenting time may be modified at any time on changed circumstances without showing serious endangerment.
- Because the original joint-decision-making allocation was entered January 30, 2020, Mark’s June 14, 2023 petition came after the two-year bar expired, so the serious-endangerment exception was inapplicable.
- The court treated interim agreed modifications (primarily to parenting time and purge conditions, and an agreed November 2022 order) as not “material changes” that would restart/toll the two-year period (citing In re Marriage of Wendy L.D. as support).
5. Practice implications
- Distinguish clearly between “parental decision-making” and “parenting time” in pleadings—statutory bars and standards differ.
- The two-year waiting period for modifying decision-making runs from the original allocation; routine or non-material amendments to parenting time generally will not toll it. If seeking modification within two years, plead and prove the serious-endangerment exception.
- Use contempt findings, admonitions, and agreed orders to build a factual record supporting future modification once the statutory period expires.
- Counsel should draft agreed orders carefully: stipulated modifications can alter rights/timing (a stipulation may waive the two-year bar), and language about future consequences (warnings) can be persuasive later.
- Note: this is a Rule 23 order (nonprecedential); treat as persuasive but not binding authority.
Disclaimer: This case summary is for informational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.
No attorney-client relationship is created by reading this content. Always consult with a licensed attorney for specific legal questions.
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