In re Marriage of Gill, 2025 IL App (5th) 240890-U

1) Case citation and parties
- In re Marriage of Gill, 2025 IL App (5th) 240890-U (Ill. App. Ct., 5th Dist. Jan. 7, 2025).
- Petitioner-Appellant: Jessica A. Gill (mother). Respondent-Appellee: Joseph A. Gill (father).

2) Key legal issues
- Whether the trial court correctly modified (a) parental decision‑making responsibilities (allocation of parental decision‑making) and (b) parenting time under 750 ILCS 5/610.5(a).
- Proper legal standards and timing for motions to modify parental decision‑making vs parenting time (two‑year bar/serious‑endangerment affidavits for decision‑making; "changed circumstances" + best interests for parenting time).

3) Holding/outcome
- Reversed and remanded. The appellate court concluded the trial court applied the wrong legal standard in modifying both parenting responsibility and parenting time and therefore abused its discretion.

4) Significant legal reasoning
- Statutory framework (750 ILCS 5/610.5(a)) draws a clear distinction:
- Motions to modify parental decision‑making (not including parenting time) are barred for two years after entry unless the court permits an earlier motion on the basis of affidavits alleging reason to believe the child’s present environment seriously endangers mental, moral, or physical health or significantly impairs emotional development.
- Parenting time may be modified at any time, but requires a showing of changed circumstances that necessitates modification to serve the child’s best interests.
- The court reviewed statutory language de novo and found the trial court conflated and applied a best‑interests standard to the modification of parental decision‑making (ignoring the two‑year/serious‑endangerment threshold). That misapplication of law constituted an abuse of discretion. The trial court’s oral ruling had awarded residential school‑year custody to father and declared decision‑making "joint" (including education), but did not adhere to the procedural/statutory prerequisites for altering parental decision‑making within two years.
- Appellate guidance stressed the separate analyses required for (1) timing/serious‑endangerment threshold for decision‑making changes and (2) changed‑circumstances + best interests for parenting‑time changes.

5) Practice implications
- Plead and prove the correct statutory threshold: to seek an early modification of parental decision‑making within two years, include and support affidavits alleging the statutory serious‑endangerment grounds; otherwise wait the two‑year period.
- For parenting time modifications, focus on demonstrating changed circumstances and how modification serves the child’s best interests—don’t rely on a generic best‑interests argument to overcome the decision‑making timing rule.
- Object promptly if the opposing party attempts an amended pleading close to trial and preserve statutory‑standard arguments on the record.
- Trial courts must analyze and state findings separately (serious‑endangerment threshold vs changed circumstances/best interests); failure to do so risks reversal.