In re Marriage of Armstrong, 2016 IL App (2d) 150815

In re Marriage of Armstrong, 2016 IL App (2d) 150815

1) Case citation and parties
- In re Marriage of Armstrong, 2016 IL App (2d) 150815 (Dec. 29, 2016).
- Petitioner-Appellee: Luanne Armstrong. Respondent-Appellant: Mark Armstrong.

2) Key legal issues
- Whether an Illinois circuit court’s July 23, 2003 modification of a Connecticut-issued spousal-support (maintenance) order was void for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction under section 211 of Illinois’s Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA) (750 ILCS 22/211).
- Whether statutory limits in UIFSA can divest an Illinois court of constitutional subject‑matter jurisdiction so as to permit relief under section 2‑1401 (void judgment).

3) Holding/outcome
- Affirmed. The appellate court held the trial court did not lack subject‑matter jurisdiction and properly denied Mark’s section 2‑1401 motion to vacate the 2003 modification as void.

4) Significant legal reasoning
- The court applied Illinois precedent (McCormick v. Robertson and other Illinois Supreme Court decisions) holding that subject‑matter jurisdiction is conferred by the state constitution and is not divested by failure to meet statutory prerequisites. A statute cannot strip a court of its constitutional power to hear a justiciable controversy.
- Section 211’s use of “jurisdiction” in UIFSA was characterized as a procedural/choice‑of‑forum limitation governing when a tribunal of this State may modify an out‑of‑state spousal‑support order, not as a precondition that removes the circuit court’s constitutional subject‑matter jurisdiction.
- The court distinguished defects in statutory procedure (which may affect the validity of a modification under UIFSA or raise defenses) from lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction, which must be constitutional.
- The appellate review was limited to the denial of the 2‑1401 petition (appealable under Ill. S. Ct. R. 304(b)(3)).

5) Practice implications
- Challenges to a court’s action under UIFSA should focus on statutory/UFISA remedies (transfer, continuing‑exclusive jurisdiction rules, enforcement procedures) or timely objections and direct appeal, not on collateral 2‑1401 attacks asserting constitutional lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction.
- A trial court’s modification or enforcement of an enrolled foreign support order will generally not be void for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction merely because UIFSA might allocate modification authority to the issuing state.
- Practitioners should preserve procedural UIFSA objections early (prior to enrollment/modification), consider invoking transfer/communication mechanisms under UIFSA, and recognize that statutory noncompliance is usually a procedural defect, not a jurisdictional nullity.