Modification and Termination of Spousal Maintenance in Illinois Post-Decree (2025)

Modification and Termination of Spousal Maintenance in Illinois Post-Decree Illinois Law on Changing Maintenance: Spousal maintenance (alimony) orders in Illinois can be modified or terminated after a divorce – but only under specific conditions set by statute and interpreted through case law. In this post, we’ll break down the requirements under 750 ILCS 5/510 for modifying or ending maintenance, explain what counts as a “substantial change in circumstances,” and explore common scenarios like job loss (voluntary vs. involuntary), cohabitation by the recipient, remarriage, retirement, health issues, and more. We’ll also highlight recent Illinois appellate cases (2020–2025) that illustrate how these rules are applied, and provide a quick-reference table of statutory law vs. case law guidance. (As always, this is general information and not legal advice – see the disclaimer at the end.)

Statutory Basis: 750 ILCS 5/510 for Maintenance Modification Under Illinois law, an order for spousal maintenance “may be modified or terminated only upon a showing of a substantial change in circumstances.” 1 In other words, the party seeking a change – whether it’s the paying spouse (payor) or the receiving spouse (recipient) – bears the burden of proving that something significant has changed since the last order, making the current maintenance amount or duration unfair or inappropriate 2 . Importantly, only future maintenance payments can be modified – you can’t go back and retroactively change past due amounts before you filed for the modification 3 . This means if your situation changes, you should file a petition to modify right away, because courts can only adjust payments retroactively to the date you give notice of your motion 4 5 . Factors the Court Must Consider: Once a substantial change in circumstances is shown, the court will weigh the same factors used in setting the original maintenance, as listed in 750 ILCS 5/504(a), plus additional factors specific to modifications 6 7 . These include: changes in the employment status of either party and whether any job change was made in good faith 7 ; the efforts of the recipient to become self-supporting and whether those efforts have been reasonable 8 ; any impairment to either party’s present or future earning capacity (for example, due to age, health, or career prospects) 9 ; the tax consequences of maintenance payments (notably, post-2019 maintenance is no longer tax-deductible to the payor or taxable to the payee) 9 ; the duration of maintenance paid so far relative to the length of the marriage 10 ; the property or assets each spouse received in the divorce (including retirement funds) and their current financial status 11 ; any increase or decrease in either party’s income since the prior order 12 ; property acquired after the divorce by each party 13 ; and “any other factor” the court finds just and equitable 14 . In sum, the court takes a fresh look at both ex-spouses’ finances and needs in light of the changed circumstances. Termination by Law – Remarriage or Cohabitation: The statute also specifies certain events that end maintenance automatically (unless the divorce agreement says otherwise). If the maintenance recipient remarries, the obligation to pay future maintenance terminates by operation of law on the date of the remarriage 15 . The same is true if the recipient cohabits with another person on a resident, continuing conjugal basis (essentially a marriage-like relationship, discussed in detail below) – in that case,

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maintenance terminates by law on the date the court finds the cohabitation began 16 . The payor is entitled to reimbursement of any maintenance paid after the termination date (for example, any payments made after the new marriage or after cohabitation began) 17 . Illinois law even requires a recipient to notify their ex-spouse at least 30 days before getting remarried (or within 72 hours after the ceremony if 30 days’ notice isn’t possible) 18 . Agreements for Non-Modifiable Maintenance: It’s worth noting that divorcing parties can agree to make maintenance non-modifiable or to set their own terms for when maintenance will end. Under 750 ILCS 5/502(f), a marital settlement agreement can state that maintenance cannot be changed, or that it will terminate upon a certain event or date 19 20 . If such an agreement is incorporated into the divorce judgment, the court and parties are bound by it. For example, spouses might agree that maintenance will last a fixed number of years with no extension (sometimes called “maintenance in gross” or a fixed-term, non-reviewable maintenance). In that scenario, no modification is allowed – even a substantial change in circumstances would not matter, absent some extreme inequity or unless the agreement itself allows a change. Always check if your divorce judgment labels maintenance as “non-modifiable” or “fixed and barred after [date]” 21 22 . If so, 750 ILCS 5/510’s modification provisions won’t apply (except that by law, death of either party or remarriage of the recipient would still terminate future payments unless the agreement says otherwise 15 ). Foreseeable Changes – The 2019/2022 Reforms: Historically, Illinois courts followed a rule that if a supposed change in circumstances was anticipated or foreseen at the time of the divorce, it couldn’t be used later as a “substantial change” to justify modification. For example, if it was expected that the recipient would get a job in a year, or that the payor might retire at 65, a petition to modify based on those events might be denied on the grounds that it was already contemplated. This “foreseeability” doctrine came from cases like In re Marriage of Bernay (where the husband’s retirement had been anticipated in a prior order) 23 and In re Marriage of Salvatore. However, recent reforms have changed this. Effective January 1, 2022, Public Act 102-823 amended §510 to state that “[c]ontemplation or foreseeability of future events shall not be considered ... unless the future event is expressly specified in the court’s order or the agreement of the parties.” 24 25 In plainer terms, you can seek a modification for a change that was reasonably foreseeable at the time of divorce so long as that specific event wasn’t written into your order as something that wouldn’t count. The law now allows modification in such cases, undoing the older line of cases that barred relief for expected changes 26 27 . Example: If your divorce decree does explicitly say “husband’s retirement at age 65 shall not be deemed a substantial change warranting modification,” then that retirement alone won’t justify a change later. But if it was merely a predictable event and not spelled out in the papers, you’re not automatically precluded from seeking an adjustment when it happens. Below is a comparison table highlighting some key standards from the statute versus how Illinois courts have applied or interpreted them in real cases:

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Issue

Illinois Statutory Law (750 ILCS 5/510)

Illinois Case Law Application

Substantial Change Required

Maintenance can be modified only upon a “substantial change in circumstances.” 1 Future payments only – no retroactivity before the motion notice 4 . Certain events (remarriage, cohabitation, death) terminate maintenance by law 15 .

The party seeking change has the burden of proof 2 . “Substantial change” means a material and unforeseen (now even if foreseen) change in financial ability or needs. Courts require changes that are significant in degree, not trivial. If an event was explicitly contemplated in the divorce order as not affecting maintenance, that will be honored 25 . Otherwise, even anticipated events can justify modification under current law.

Courts must consider any change in employment status and whether it was made in good faith 7 . A deliberate reduction in income to evade support would not qualify as good faith.

Illinois courts distinguish between involuntary income loss (e.g. layoffs, genuine business downturns) and voluntary choices. Voluntary job loss or income cut: If a payor quits or downshifts jobs without a sound reason, courts often impute income or deny relief. E.g., in Smith v. Smith, a husband who resigned a high-paying job because he didn’t want the stress couldn’t get maintenance reduced based on his lower income; the court held that maintenance depends on his capacity to earn, not merely what he chooses to earn 28 . As one court put it, the law looks to the level at which the payor is able to contribute, not just the level he is willing to work 28 .
Involuntary loss: If the payor loses income due to factors beyond their control (layoff, company closure, medical inability to work), and isn’t hiding income, a substantial change is likely met. Courts will examine the payor’s efforts to find new employment and whether they’re living off assets, etc. Temporary unemployment might result in a temporary reduction or suspension rather than a permanent termination 29 30 . The key is good faith – a good faith job loss or pay cut will justify relief, whereas a bad-faith reduction (quitting to reduce support, or getting fired for misconduct) will not.

Voluntary vs. Involuntary Income Reduction (Payor)

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Retirement of the Payor

Not explicitly enumerated in the statute, but treated as a change in employment status and income. It can be a substantial change if it significantly alters the payor’s ability to pay, provided the decision to retire is made in good faith (e.g. at a typical retirement age or due to health).

Whether retirement justifies modifying maintenance “depends upon the circumstances of each case.” 31 Illinois courts consider multiple factors: the payor’s age and health, motives and timing (is it early retirement or at a normal age? was it forced or voluntary?), the payor’s financial ability to continue paying after retirement (pensions, investments), and the recipient’s own financial situation 31 .
Early Retirement: Courts have often been skeptical of payors who retire early (in their 50s or early 60s) while still healthy. For example, a 55-year-old who took early retirement and cut his income in half was denied a reduction – the court noted 55 was “relatively young” for full retirement and that he “must have been prepared to pay the alimony” had no reduction been granted 32 . In In re Marriage of Waller (1st Dist. 1993), a 63-year-old retired and sought to terminate maintenance, but the court refused, finding no substantial change because despite his lower income, he could still meet his needs and continue paying support from pension and savings 33 . Courts impose a “higher burden” on an obligor who retires early in good health – essentially requiring a compelling justification beyond just wanting to stop working 34 .
Good-Faith Retirement: If a payor reaches a typical retirement age after a long career, especially with health considerations, and genuinely cannot earn at the previous level, courts are more receptive. But they will still assess the total financial picture. In In re Marriage of Bernay (2d Dist. 2017), the husband’s income dropped after age 60 and he announced retirement, but he had millions in assets and investments producing income; the trial court ended maintenance, but the appellate court reversed, noting that his retirement had been anticipated and that he still had ample ability to pay the same $3,600/mo maintenance 23 35 . By contrast, if the payor’s postretirement income and assets truly make continued payments untenable relative to a reasonable lifestyle, a reduction might be warranted (especially if the marriage was shorter or the recipient has other resources).
Recent Case: In re Marriage of Folley, 2021 IL App (3d) 180427, illustrates the modern approach. There, a 58-year-old husband was forced into early retirement with a generous severance, and he moved to terminate $20k per month in indefinite maintenance from a 28-year marriage. The trial court cut maintenance to $0 and said the ex-wife could seek review if he got a new job. On appeal, the decision was vacated: even though his salary stopped, the record showed he had $12 million in net worth and hefty pension payments, meaning he “had the present ability to continue to

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Issue

Illinois Statutory Law (750 ILCS 5/510)

Illinois Case Law Application pay maintenance in some amount” 36 . The appellate court held no reasonable person would have reduced his obligation to zero in those circumstances (abuse of discretion) 37 . The case underscores that retirement alone doesn’t guarantee termination – the outcome hinges on the payor’s financial capacity and the fairness to both parties. Often, the result is a downward modification rather than full termination (for example, reducing the amount to reflect reduced income, but not eliminating support if the payor can still pay something and the need remains).

Remarriage of Recipient

“The obligation to pay future maintenance is terminated upon the remarriage of the party receiving maintenance.” 15 Termination is automatic by law on the date of remarriage; the payor doesn’t need a court order to stop paying (though obtaining a confirming order is wise to avoid disputes).

Automatic Termination: Illinois courts enforce this strictly – if the recipient remarries, maintenance ends then and there. The payor should promptly motion to terminate and recoup any overpaid amounts after the remarriage date (the statute entitles the payor to reimbursement of maintenance paid after the remarriage) 17 . The recipient is expected to give advance notice of an upcoming marriage 18 , but even if they don’t, the obligation still ceases by law. There is no consideration of the recipient’s need or the payor’s ability in a remarriage scenario; even if the new spouse is unemployed or the remarriage short-lived, the ex-spouse’s maintenance is permanently ended upon that marriage. The only exception is if the divorce agreement expressly says maintenance will continue despite remarriage (which is rare and would have to be very clearly stated).

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Cohabitation by Recipient (“resident, continuing, conjugal” relationship)

Maintenance terminates if the recipient “cohabits with another person on a resident, continuing conjugal basis” (unless otherwise agreed in writing) 15 . Termination is not truly automatic until a court finds that such cohabitation began, but once proven, it relates back to the cohabitation start date 17 .

De Facto Marriage Test: Illinois courts interpret “resident, continuing conjugal cohabitation” to mean a de facto marriage – a relationship with the permanence and interdependence of a marriage 38 39 . It does not require proving the couple is sexually intimate (the term “conjugal” in this context means akin to marriage, not necessarily that they have intercourse) 40 . Courts look at the totality of circumstances, often using a set of six non-exclusive factors from In re Marriage of Sunday, 354 Ill. App. 3d 184 (2004): (1) the length of the relationship, (2) the amount of time the couple spends together, (3) the nature of their activities (do they function like a couple socially and day-to-day?), (4) the interrelation of their personal affairs (do they combine finances, share bills, jointly own or rent a home?), (5) whether they vacation together, and (6) whether they spend holidays together 41 . No one factor is decisive; it’s a commonsense inquiry into whether the new relationship “functions equivalent to a marriage.”
Financial Interdependence Not Required to Prove: Earlier cases put heavy emphasis on financial support (whether the new partner was supporting the recipient). Modern cases clarify that formal financial commingling is important but not essential. The key is the extent to which the couple’s lives are intertwined as a married couple’s would be 42 . For instance, in In re Marriage of Susan, 367 Ill. App. 3d 926 (2d Dist. 2006), the ex-wife and boyfriend had been together 3+ years and virtually lived together (nearly every night together, frequent trips, all holidays), but they maintained separate residences and bank accounts and the boyfriend did not contribute to her expenses 43 44 . The ex-wife argued she still “needed” support since her boyfriend wasn’t supporting her. The appellate court rejected that argument – under §510(c), the recipient’s need is irrelevant; unlike a normal modification under §510(a), termination for cohabitation doesn’t require showing the recipient no longer needs the money 45 . The question is simply whether a de facto marriage exists, not whether the new partner is financially replacing the ex-spouse. In Susan, despite separate finances, the court found the relationship was essentially conjugal and terminated maintenance, emphasizing that sharing a household or finances is just one indicator, and “[c]ommingling of funds is merely an indicator of a married relationship,” not a strict prerequisite 42 .
Evidence and Burden: The payor must petition the court and prove (by a preponderance of evidence) that the recipient is in a resident, continuing conjugal relationship 46 47 . This often entails hiring a private investigator or gathering evidence of

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the ex’s living situation. Useful evidence can include: documentation that the new partner lives at the recipient’s residence (or vice versa) on an ongoing basis, eyewitness testimony from neighbors or others seeing them together daily, shared addresses on records or mail, proof of joint accounts or bills, photos of them vacationing together, spending major holidays as a family unit, social media posts referring to each other as if married, and any indication they refer to each other as “fiancé/spouse” in the community 48 49 . Courts will see through superficial attempts to mask cohabitation – for example, keeping a nominal separate apartment that one rarely uses while effectively living together 50 . The standard is a commonsense one: are they essentially sharing a life like married people? If yes, the law says the ex-spouse should no longer have to pay support.
Recent Example: In re Marriage of Larsen, 2023 IL App (1st) 230212, is a fresh illustration. An exhusband sought to terminate maintenance, claiming his exwife was cohabiting with her boyfriend. They had been dating two years and took vacations and overnight trips, but each maintained their own home and finances. The trial court found this was more of an “intimate dating relationship” than a de facto marriage, and the First District Appellate Court agreed, affirming that the evidence did not show the permanence or integration of lives required for conjugal cohabitation 51 . Similarly, in In re Marriage of Edson, 2023 IL App (1st) 230236 (another 2023 case with very similar facts), the court held that spending a lot of time together – even most nights – was not enough without proof of true household integration or a mutual commitment on par with marriage 46 47 . These cases demonstrate that Illinois courts won’t terminate maintenance for mere “dating,” even long-term dating, if the couple keeps their lives largely separate.
Practice Note: If you are the payor suspecting your ex is in a conjugal cohabitation, it’s wise to gather substantial evidence (bank records, surveillance, etc.) before bringing a petition. And from the recipient’s perspective, understand that even if you still need support, the court must terminate maintenance if you’re found to be in a conjugal cohabiting relationship – maintenance is not about need in this context 45 . Some exspouses intentionally avoid intermingling finances or avoid truly moving in together to try to keep maintenance; however, this can be a gray area and courts will look at the reality of the relationship. Cohabitation termination, once effective, is permanent (even if the new relationship ends, the maintenance doesn’t resume).

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Issue

Recipient’s Self-Support (Rehabilitative Efforts)

Illinois Statutory Law (750 ILCS 5/510)

Illinois Case Law Application

The court considers “the efforts, if any, made by the party receiving maintenance to become selfsupporting, and the reasonableness of those efforts” 8 . There’s no fixed time limit in the statute, but many maintenance awards are for a fixed or reviewable term to encourage the recipient to become financially independent.

If the recipient was expected to work toward supporting themselves (for example, via job training, education, or career advancement), the court will scrutinize this on a modification petition. Lack of effort or unreasonable delay by the recipient can be grounds to reduce or terminate maintenance. Courts have signaled that the recipient must make good-faith efforts to become self-sufficient where appropriate 8 . For instance, if a recipient was supposed to finish a degree or seek full-time employment but hasn’t even attempted to do so years later, a judge may find a substantial change against the recipient – essentially that maintenance is no longer equitable if the recipient isn’t trying. On the flip side, if the recipient has made diligent efforts but due to age, illness, or the job market still cannot earn enough to support the marital lifestyle or even basic needs, that continued need will weigh in favor of ongoing support. The court will also consider whether the original maintenance term was intended as “rehabilitative” – i.e. a bridge for the recipient to get on their feet. Many divorce judgments explicitly set a review date (see Reviewable Maintenance below) for this reason. At review, the recipient may have to show what steps they took to become self-supporting and whether they have achieved an adequate income. The payor can argue for termination if the recipient is now able to support herself, or if she failed to make reasonable efforts to do so. In sum, Illinois law expects a maintenance recipient to take steps toward independence if they are capable of doing so; failure to make any effort can qualify as a change in circumstances (from the court’s perspective of fairness) – for example, an able-bodied person who simply chooses not to work at all for years post-divorce could risk a reduction in support.

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Issue

Changes in Health or Disability

Illinois Statutory Law (750 ILCS 5/510)

Illinois Case Law Application

Although not listed as a separate factor, health affects earning capacity and needs – thus falling under changes in earning ability and needs. A serious deterioration in health of either party can constitute a substantial change.

Payor’s Health: If the payor becomes seriously ill, disabled, or otherwise unable to maintain the same income, this is a classic substantial change. Courts will consider not only reduced earnings but also increased medical expenses. A payor who incurs a disability might seek a reduction or suspension of maintenance, providing medical evidence and proof of impact on finances. The key again is good faith – a health change is no one’s “fault,” so courts are sympathetic, though they may examine if the payor has disability insurance or other resources to continue payments in some form.
Recipient’s Health: If the recipient’s health worsens, their need for support may increase or at least persist longer than initially expected. For example, if a recipient was supposed to rehabilitate and re-enter the workforce but then suffers a disabling illness, a court could extend the duration of maintenance or even convert a fixedterm award into indefinite maintenance. A significant health setback that impairs the recipient’s ability to be selfsupporting is often cited by recipients seeking to increase or continue maintenance beyond the originally scheduled term. Illinois courts would treat a new disability or serious illness as a substantial change in circumstances on the recipient’s side, warranting re-examination of support. Conversely, improvement in health (e.g., a recipient overcoming an illness and becoming able to work when previously they were not) could reduce their need, potentially favoring a decrease. In all cases, credible medical evidence and a clear connection to financial ability or needs are required.

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Issue

Cost-of-Living Changes (Inflation)

Illinois Statutory Law (750 ILCS 5/510)

Illinois Case Law Application

Illinois law does not automatically adjust maintenance for inflation, but parties can agree to a COLA (Cost of Living Adjustment) clause. Without an agreement, rising cost of living can be a factor under “any other just and equitable factor” and the general review of needs.

Particularly in times of high inflation, the purchasing power of a fixed maintenance amount erodes. If years have passed since the order, the recipient may argue that increased living costs constitute a substantial change – essentially that the original amount no longer covers what it did. This argument alone might not always carry the day (since inflation affects everyone and is somewhat foreseeable), but if inflation is significant and the recipient’s situation is materially harder despite the same income, courts may consider it. It’s more common to address this upfront: some divorce agreements include a COLA clause, saying for example that maintenance will increase 3% annually or adjust according to the Consumer Price Index. Such clauses automatically adjust support to reflect cost of living, avoiding the need for frequent modifications 52 . If no COLA clause exists, the onus is on the recipient to file for a modification and demonstrate that their expenses have risen substantially and perhaps that the payor’s income has kept pace or increased (so they can afford more). On the payor’s side, inflation and cost-of-living can also hit hard – if the payor’s own expenses have increased (e.g. new family, higher costs for themselves), that doesn’t legally reduce the obligation, but it can factor into the court’s equitable considerations. As a practical tip, including a COLA clause in a maintenance order is a way to ensure the amount stays fair over long periods without new litigation 52 . In the absence of that, Illinois courts have discretion to modify for economic shifts, but typically it will be in combination with other changes (such as the payor’s income increasing, etc.).

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Burden of Proof & Procedure

The moving party (petitioning for change) must give due notice and prove the substantial change 2 . Section 510(a-5) directs courts to consider the §504(a) factors (needs, income, etc.), but not to apply the new maintenance guidelines automatically to old orders 45 . Maintenance remains in effect until changed by the court.

As noted, the burden of proof is on whoever wants to modify. A payor asking to reduce or terminate must show why and provide evidence (financial affidavits, tax returns, employment records, medical reports, etc., as applicable). A recipient seeking an increase likewise must show a significant change (often that their expenses increased or the payor’s ability to pay is greater). If neither party files to modify, the terms of the last order stand – do not simply stop paying or change the amount on your own, even if your ex’s circumstances have changed, without a court order. Doing so can lead to contempt of court and accumulation of arrears.
Standard of Proof: It is generally a preponderance of the evidence (more likely than not) that a substantial change has occurred. Courts will make specific findings of fact when granting or denying modifications 53 .
No Automatic Recalculation: One important note from case law – when modifying maintenance, courts do not automatically apply the current statutory guideline formula (the formula of 33⅓% of payor’s net minus 25% of payee’s net, capped at 40% of combined net). Those guidelines (introduced in 2015 and modified in 2018) apply to initial awards, but at modification, the statute says the court considers the §504(a) factors, not necessarily §504(b-1) guideline amounts 45 . Some courts have debated this. In one instance, a trial court on review applied the newer formula to an older case and the appellate court reversed, noting that §510 doesn’t mandate applying guidelines to a modification 54 . The safer view is that guidelines may inform the court’s thinking (as a benchmark of sorts) but are not binding in post-decree modifications unless the parties agreed otherwise. The court’s role is to decide an appropriate amount based on the current facts and the statutory factors, which include ability to pay and needs, but also the prior standard of living, etc.
Filing and Effective Date: A modification is ordinarily effective as of the date the request was filed (or later, as the court may specify) – never earlier 3 . Thus, if your finances change on January 1 but you don’t file a petition until March 1, the court cannot relieve you of full payments for January and February. The lesson: act promptly when a change occurs. Conversely, if you’re a recipient and your ex’s income goes up or your needs go up, file sooner rather than later, since any increase can only be ordered back to the filing date at most. Courts have discretion to set the effective date anywhere from the filing date to the date of the order, depending on fairness and whether retroactive relief would cause hardship, but they cannot go back before the petition.
Attorney Fees:

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Issue

Illinois Statutory Law (750 ILCS 5/510)

Illinois Case Law Application Modification battles can be expensive. Note that Illinois courts can award attorney’s fees to one party in post-decree proceedings based on financial disparity and good faith. In some cases, a payor who unsuccessfully tries to terminate maintenance may be ordered to pay the recipient’s legal fees, or vice versa. This is another reason to carefully evaluate the merits of a modification request with an attorney.

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Reviewable vs. Permanent Maintenance

Maintenance can be “fixed-term,” “indefinite,” or “reviewable” under Illinois law 55

56 . A

reviewable maintenance award means the court sets a future date to review whether maintenance should continue, without requiring a showing of change. Indefinite (permanent) maintenance has no end date but can be modified upon substantial change. Fixed-term (especially in marriages under 10 years) may be non-extendable if the court designates it a “permanent termination” at the end of the term 21 57 .

Reviewable Maintenance: When an order is labeled “reviewable” and a review date is set, the parties do not need to prove a substantial change at the review; the occurrence of the review date is enough to re-open the issue 58 . In an agreed review, the Illinois Supreme Court in Blum v. Koster, 235 Ill. 2d 21 (2009), confirmed that “the parties agreed to a general review of maintenance. Thus, [the payor] did not have the burden of proving a substantial change in circumstances.” 58 At the review hearing, the court essentially treats it like a new maintenance determination – considering current incomes, needs, and the §504(a) factors to decide whether to extend, modify, or terminate maintenance 56 59 . Typically, if the recipient still needs support and has made reasonable efforts, the court might extend maintenance (perhaps at a reduced amount or maybe for another fixed period). If the recipient has become largely self-sufficient or the payor’s situation worsened, the court might terminate or set a date for termination. One critical practical point is who must file the petition for review. Sometimes the judgment says “maintenance shall be reviewable on X date.” In such cases, either party can file to get the matter before the court around that date. If the judgment is silent on whose responsibility it is, local court rules or case law determine what happens if no one files – in some cases, maintenance just continues until someone brings it up. In other cases (or if the order says maintenance will terminate absent a review), failing to seek a review can result in termination by lapse. Always diarize any review date and take action, because missing the deadline could mean losing support or, for payors, overpaying longer than necessary 60 61 .
Permanent (Indefinite) Maintenance: If maintenance was ordered indefinitely (often the case in long marriages where one spouse is unlikely to become fully self-sufficient), there is no automatic review. The payor can still petition to modify if circumstances change, but they carry the burden as discussed. Illinois courts have stated that for permanent maintenance, the payor must show a substantial change to justify termination 2 (e.g. In re Marriage of Culp, 341 Ill. App. 3d 390 (2003)). There is an understanding that permanent maintenance is always subject to potential future modification (it “always remains modifiable or terminable upon substantial change” – as the Appellate Court noted in In re Marriage of Shen, 2015 IL App (1st) 130733 62 63 ). One cannot simply pre-set an end date for permanent maintenance without a review of circumstances when that time comes 64 65 (the Shen court actually struck down a trial court’s attempt to end permanent

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Issue

Illinois Statutory Law (750 ILCS 5/510)

Illinois Case Law Application maintenance at the wife’s projected retirement age, saying the court cannot “gaze into a crystal ball” and must leave it modifiable based on actual circumstances then 66 ). In sum, indefinite maintenance continues until one party proves a substantial change or one of the statutory terminating events happens.
Fixed-Term, Non-Reviewable: For shorter marriages (under 10 years, per statute) a judge can award maintenance for a fixed term and designate it as nonreviewable (meaning it permanently ends at the set date) 21 57 . If that was done, the recipient cannot later ask for more maintenance beyond that term – it’s jurisdictionally barred. Only if some extraordinary equitable power (like vacating a judgment under a narrow law) came into play could that change, which is rare. Thus, if you are a recipient with a fixed termination date, you generally must plan that support will cease then, no matter what (so negotiate carefully at divorce time). If you are a payor with such an arrangement, you have certainty that after that date, you’re free of the obligation (barring some agreement to extend).
Bottom Line: Always understand which type of maintenance was ordered in your case – it dictates whether you need to prove a change or simply come back for review, and whether the support might end automatically at some point.

Recent Illinois Appellate Cases (2020–2025) on Maintenance Modification To see these principles in action, let’s look at a few recent cases from Illinois courts:

• In re Marriage of Watson & Cox, 2022 IL App (2d) 210137: A Second District case reaffirming that

“maintenance is designed to allow the recipient spouse to maintain the standard of living enjoyed during the marriage.” 67 The court in that case (and others like Micheli, 2014 and Brankin, 2012) emphasized that an ex-spouse should not be forced into a lower lifestyle post-divorce if the payor has the financial ability to continue supporting the prior standard 68 69 . This underscores that, in modifications, a key question is whether the original maintenance is still enabling the recipient to live at or near the marital lifestyle. If the payor’s fortunes have improved, a court may increase maintenance to share that benefit; conversely, if the payor’s finances have declined or the recipient’s needs are being met, a court might find the marital standard no longer attainable or necessary.

• In re Marriage of Shen, 2015 IL App (1st) 130733: (A slightly older First District case, but cited with

approval in recent decisions.) The court held that “[a] spouse should not be required to lower the standard of living established in the marriage as long as the payor spouse has sufficient assets to meet his or her needs and the needs of his or her former spouse.” 70 In Shen, the trial court had tried to

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terminate “permanent” maintenance at a future date (the wife’s 66th birthday), assuming she wouldn’t need it after that. The appellate court reversed that part, ruling that such an automatic future cutoff was improper – instead, maintenance should remain modifiable and subject to review when the time comes 66 . The quote above, referencing In re Marriage of Walker, makes clear that as long as the payor can pay, the recipient shouldn’t have to suffer a drastic drop in lifestyle. This sentiment often guides courts when a payor who is very well-off tries to terminate or cut maintenance – absent a good reason, the recipient’s previously established standard of living is a baseline for the court’s decision.

• In re Marriage of Durdov, 2021 IL App (1st) 191811: This First District decision dealt with an

increase in the payor’s income and whether it was contemplated by the original order. Initially, the appellate court (in 2021) held that because the ex-husband’s income increase was to some extent foreseeable (the divorce judgment had an imputed income schedule for him), the increase alone wasn’t a “substantial change.” 71 However, as noted earlier, the 2022 amendment to the law effectively overrode this logic. Under the new statutory language, even if an increase in income was generally expected, unless the judgment explicitly said future income increases don’t count, the recipient can seek more maintenance. Thus, while Durdov may have denied an upward modification under the old rule, such a case might come out differently today. The lesson for payors is that significant income boosts can open the door to higher maintenance (especially if the recipient is still not at marital lifestyle or there was an agreement to revisit when income changes). The lesson for recipients is not to assume you’re stuck with the original amount if your ex’s income doubles – you may have grounds to seek an increase now.

• In re Marriage of Folley, 2021 IL App (3d) 180427: Mentioned above in the retirement context,

Folley is a notable 2021 case addressing early retirement and the ability to pay. The appellate court in Folley reversed a trial court’s decision that had abated (suspended) maintenance entirely after a wealthy payor took early retirement. Two key takeaways: (1) Even a big change like a job loss doesn’t automatically equate to zero support if the payor’s assets and overall financial picture still enable some payment 36 . The court will look holistically at ability to pay. (2) The appellate court criticized the trial court for placing no time limit or framework on the maintenance review – the trial judge had essentially left it open-ended (“maintenance is $0 now, and ex-wife may file for review when exhusband gets a job, whenever that is”). The appellate court called this an abuse of discretion, as it “placed no time limitation for review, essentially reserving its jurisdiction over the issue of maintenance indefinitely.” 72 . On remand, they directed the trial court to set a reasonable timeframe for reviewing maintenance. This is instructive for how emergency or interim modifications should be handled: if a court grants a temporary reduction (like due to sudden unemployment), it should either set a future status date or specific conditions (e.g. quarterly job search updates, as the trial court did, but also a cutoff to revisit the issue) 73 . Courts should not leave maintenance in limbo forever without a check-in, and an aggrieved party should appeal if that happens.

• In re Marriage of Larsen, 2023 IL App (1st) 230212 & In re Marriage of Edson, 2023 IL App (1st)

230236: Both 2023 First District cases dealing with cohabitation allegations, as discussed above. In each, the appellate court upheld the denial of termination because the evidence showed companionship but not true cohabitation in the statutory sense 51 46 . These recent cases confirm that Illinois courts require clear proof of a conjugal, husband-and-wife style relationship before cutting off support. Simply having a boyfriend or girlfriend who stays over a lot is not enough. For payors, these cases show the importance of gathering solid evidence (financial ties, same

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address, etc.), and for recipients, they highlight that maintaining separate finances and residences can help avoid a finding of cohabitation (though it’s not foolproof if the relationship is substantively marriage-like in other ways).

• In re Marriage of Walker, 2020 IL App (2d) 190480-U (unpublished): Cited in Shen and other cases

for the proposition that neither spouse should have to lower their standard of living post-divorce if the payor can help it 70 . While unpublished orders aren’t precedential, the principle resonates in published cases too. Another recent published case, In re Marriage of Hamilton, 2019 IL App (5th) 170295, similarly held that a recipient shouldn’t be forced to exhaust her assets to maintain the marital standard of living if the payor has the capacity to pay support 74 . In modification terms, this means a court is unlikely to terminate maintenance just because a recipient has some savings or investments – if those assets resulted from the divorce and are meant to secure her future, the court won’t force her to spend them down to zero before the payor’s obligation is relieved 74 . The payor’s duty may continue so that those assets (say, retirement accounts) can be preserved for the future, rather than used up for current expenses.

Proving Hidden Income or Cohabitation: Discovery Tactics Uncovering Hidden Income (Payor’s side): If you suspect your ex-spouse (the payor) is underreporting income to dodge maintenance, be prepared to delve into discovery. Illinois courts allow broad financial discovery in post-decree modifications. Tactics include subpoenaing tax returns, W-2s/1099s, and bank account records to see cash flow. If the payor owns a business or is self-employed, you may need business financial statements, general ledgers, and perhaps a forensic accountant to identify actual earnings (for example, distinguishing personal expenses run through the business). You can request the payor’s credit card statements and examine their lifestyle: Are they spending or investing in a way that’s inconsistent with the income they claim? Large purchases, expensive vacations, or lavish living can be used as circumstantial evidence that the payor’s income is higher than stated. In some cases, hiring a private investigator or conducting surveillance might reveal under-the-table work or employment the payor failed to disclose. Illinois courts can impute income to a payor who is deliberately hiding or reducing income in bad faith 75 . For instance, if a payor quits a job and claims zero income but is living off a hefty investment portfolio or working side gigs for cash, the court can attribute income to them based on those assets or earning capacity. The key is gathering proof of those sources. Use formal discovery tools (interrogatories, document requests, subpoenas) to leave no stone unturned. Payors should also be aware that if you are caught concealing income, you not only risk an unfavorable ruling but potentially sanctions and damage to your credibility in the eyes of the court. Proving Cohabitation (Payor’s side): To build a case that your ex is in a conjugal cohabitation, you will similarly engage in creative fact-gathering. Key evidence includes: Surveillance and Photos – showing the romantic partner coming and going from the ex-spouse’s residence consistently (e.g., car in the driveway overnight on most nights, essentially living there). Neighbors’ or friends’ testimony – perhaps they can confirm the couple presents themselves as a household or is always together. Financial records – look for your ex’s bank statements or credit card bills for commingled expenses (purchases by the partner, or payments for that person’s bills). If you can lawfully obtain it, evidence of a shared lease or mortgage is a smoking gun (many cohabitation cases hinge on proving the couple signed a lease for an apartment or bought a house together). Mail – something as simple as seeing that the partner’s mail is delivered to the ex-spouse’s address can be persuasive. Also, check public records: has the partner changed their address on their driver’s license to your ex’s address? Are they listed together in any public capacity? Social media is

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another treasure trove – posts or photos of the couple referring to anniversaries, wearing rings, calling each other “wife/hubby,” etc., can be powerful admissions. Courts have explicitly noted factors like whether the couple refers to each other as spouses in public and whether they plan to marry 76 . If they’ve gotten engaged (even if not married yet), that bolsters the argument that the relationship is marriage-like. All this evidence can be obtained through a combination of formal discovery and informal sleuthing. You may subpoena the new partner for a deposition or for documents (expect a fight, but it’s possible with court leave). Privacy laws and strategy considerations may limit how far you can dig into the partner’s finances, but you can ask the court to infer cohabitation from circumstantial evidence even without direct proof of shared bank accounts. Defending Against False Claims (Recipient’s side): If you’re a maintenance recipient and your ex is alleging cohabitation or hidden income, you’ll want to document your separation of finances and households carefully. To rebut cohabitation, show things like you maintain separate residences (distinct addresses, separate utility bills), you do not pool money (no joint accounts, each pays their own way when traveling), and perhaps affidavits from friends or family that you and your partner do not portray yourselves as married. Evidence that the new relationship is more casual or that you each retain independence helps. For hidden income allegations, keep clear financial records of your earnings and any changes. Transparency is key – if you did get a new higher-paying job or some windfall, disclose it; courts don’t like when a recipient tries to hide improvements in their own income either. But remember, a recipient is generally not obligated to self-disclose increases in income (unlike child support, there’s often no automatic update requirement for maintenance in IL, unless your order says so). Still, if dragged into court, have proof of your actual income and that you haven’t misrepresented anything.

Emergency Motions and Temporary Relief for Sudden Changes Life doesn’t always wait for a regularly noticed motion and months of litigation – sometimes you experience a sudden, drastic change that makes continued payment (or non-payment) of maintenance untenable in the short term. In such cases, Illinois courts allow you to seek expedited or emergency relief. For example, if you’re a payor who just lost your job yesterday and you have a big maintenance payment due next week, you can file an emergency motion to temporarily modify or suspend maintenance. You’ll need to show irreparable harm if no immediate action is taken. Judges in these scenarios might grant a temporary order reducing payments or even pausing them pending a full hearing – especially if you can show that paying the full amount would cause you to default on other critical obligations or run through assets that won’t be replaced. Often, courts will not outright cancel maintenance on an emergency basis, but they might enter an interim order like, “Payments are reduced by 50% for the next 60 days, and the matter is set for status” or “Maintenance is reserved (temporarily stopped), and the payor must provide biweekly job search updates to the court and counsel.” 77 78 This is similar to what happened in the Folley trial court (though, as noted, that court erred by not setting a clear review date 72 ). The proper approach is to give the payor breathing room but also ensure the issue comes back before the judge soon. If you’re the payor, don’t abuse emergency motions – claiming an emergency without truly dire circumstances can hurt your credibility. But genuine emergencies (like a sudden disability or layoff) are what this relief is for. Make sure to attach proof (termination letter, doctor’s note, etc.) to show the court it’s not a fabricated crisis. From the recipient’s perspective, if your ex pulls an emergency motion, try to negotiate an interim solution. Perhaps you agree to a temporary reduction with the condition that if they don’t find a job in X months, they’ll liquidate some assets to pay a lump sum, or that they’ll resume full payments after a short period or notify you immediately upon new employment. If the court does grant a suspension, request that the order

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include a fixed review date or specific conditions (as the appellate court in Folley mandated) so that you’re not left in limbo 73 . Also, consider asking the court to require the payor to seek employment actively. Courts can and do include job search requirements and status hearings to monitor the payor’s efforts 79 73 . If the payor isn’t really trying to get back on their feet, the court can take that into account and perhaps reinstate maintenance at the prior level. Bottom line: Maintenance obligations remain in full force unless and until a court changes them. If you truly cannot pay, do something – file for relief – rather than willfully default. Illinois courts have authority to find you in contempt for non-payment, which could result in judgments, liens, or even jail time in extreme cases. By proactively seeking a modification and explaining the emergency, you protect yourself legally and show good faith. And for recipients, stay alert to changes in your ex’s situation and assert your rights quickly if an emergency order is entered – they are meant to be temporary, and you are entitled to a prompt fuller hearing.

Conclusion Navigating post-divorce maintenance issues in Illinois can be complex – it requires balancing statutory rules with evolving case law and the nuanced facts of each situation. Both payors and recipients should keep detailed financial records and remain aware of each other’s life changes. If you’re a payor, know that you must act in good faith and come to court with clean hands (don’t try to game the system by hiding income or retiring unreasonably early to thwart support). If you’re a recipient, be mindful that entering into a new marriage-like relationship will end your support, and that you’re expected to make reasonable efforts toward independence if you’re able. Illinois courts strive to be fair: they won’t impoverish a payor to enrich a recipient, but they also won’t allow a recipient to fall into poverty (or a drastically lower standard of living) if the payor has the ability to prevent that and a promise was made in the divorce to maintain support. The law provides tools – modification, termination, review, enforcement – to adjust maintenance orders as life unfolds. Because the stakes (and burdens of proof) are high, it’s wise to consult with an experienced family law attorney when considering a post-decree modification. Each case truly is unique, and recent changes in Illinois law (like the 2019 maintenance formula changes and 2022 foreseeability amendments) mean that even lawyers must stay up-to-date on the latest developments. Disclaimer: This article is for general informational purposes and does not constitute legal advice. Reading this post does not create an attorney-client relationship with the author or Steele Family Law. Maintenance modifications are highly fact-specific; you should consult a qualified Illinois family law attorney about your particular circumstances. Past results in cited cases do not guarantee similar outcomes in your case.

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Retirement of Maintenance Obligor-A Survey of Illinois

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From Bernay and Salvatore to Public Act 102-823: Modification of Support and Maintenance / Substantial Changes in Circumstances | The Gitlin Law Firm 26

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In re Marriage of Edson, 2023 IL App (1st) 230236

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How Does Cohabitation Affect Spousal Maintenance Or Alimony In Illinois?

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In re Marriage of Larsen | Illinois State Bar Association

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Written by Jonathan D. Steele

Chicago divorce attorney with cybersecurity certifications (Security+, ISC2 CC, Google Cybersecurity Professional Certificate). Illinois Super Lawyers Rising Star 2016-2025.

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