In re The Marriage of Weiss

The opposing counsel in In re The Marriage of Weiss just handed every family law practitioner in Illinois a masterclass in how not to prosecute a Section 513 petition. And if you're sitting on the other side of a college-contribution dispute right now—whether you're the petitioner who needs to build the case or the respondent looking to dismantle one—this opinion from the Second District is a loaded weapon. The only question is which direction you're pointing it.

The Judge Already Knows You Can't Wing a 513 Petition

Section 513 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (750 ILCS 5/513) is deceptively straightforward. It authorizes courts to order either or both parents to contribute to a child's postsecondary educational expenses. But authorization is not entitlement. The statute enumerates specific factors the court must consider, and the petitioner carries the burden of putting evidence on each one into the record. Period.

Those factors include:

• The financial resources of both parents
• The financial resources of the child
• The standard of living the child would have enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved
• The child's academic performance

Miss one, and you've handed your opponent a directed finding. That's exactly what happened in Weiss.

What Petitioner Did Wrong—and Why It Was Fatal

Let me be surgically precise about the evidentiary failures here, because they are instructive for every practitioner handling these cases in DuPage, DeKalb, Cook, or anywhere else in this state.

1. No Evidence of What Was Actually Paid

Petitioner introduced tuition statements and receipts for incidental purchases. Statements showing what was billed. Not what was paid. Not what was paid by petitioner specifically. The court drew the obvious distinction: a bill is not proof of payment, and proof of payment by an institution is not proof of payment by the party seeking contribution. If you can't connect the dollar to your bank account, you haven't proven damages. This is Evidence 101, and the Second District was unmoved by the attempt to blur the line.

2. Zero Evidence of the Children's Financial Resources

This is where the case collapsed entirely. One daughter testified she worked part-time but offered no specifics—no income figures, no hours, no documentation. The other daughter didn't testify at all. Section 513 explicitly requires the court to evaluate the child's financial resources. Petitioner presented nothing. You cannot ask a court to weigh a factor when you've placed nothing on the scale.

3. No Distinction Between Pre-Petition and Post-Petition Expenses

The petition was filed in January 2023. Expenses incurred before that date require different treatment than those incurred after. Petitioner made no effort to segregate the timeline. When you're asking a court to order prospective contribution—or reimbursement for past expenditures—temporal precision matters. Lumping everything together is not a litigation strategy. It's a surrender.

The Directed Finding: Why Respondent's Motion Was a Kill Shot

After petitioner rested, respondent moved for a directed finding under . For the uninitiated: this is a motion that says, "Even viewing everything in the light most favorable to the petitioner, she hasn't made a prima facie case." The trial court agreed. The Second District affirmed.

The standard of review here is critical. A directed finding is reviewed to determine whether the plaintiff presented at least some evidence on every element of the cause of action. Not overwhelming evidence. Not even good evidence. Some evidence. Petitioner couldn't clear even that bar on the children's financial resources or on actual payment of the expenses for which contribution was sought.

That's not a close call. That's a case that was dead on arrival at the evidence phase.

The MSA Trap: "Reserved for Future Determination" ≠ [outcome varies by case] Contribution

One of the more strategically significant aspects of Weiss is the treatment of the 2006 Marital Settlement Agreement. The MSA stated that college contribution would be reserved for future judicial determination "using the appropriate statutory standard." Petitioner apparently believed this language created some form of presumptive obligation. It did not.

The court correctly read this provision as doing exactly what it says: reserving the issue for adjudication under Section 513's statutory framework. That means the petitioner still has to prove the case. The MSA opened the courthouse door. It didn't walk petitioner through it.

If you're drafting MSAs and you want to create a stronger framework for future college contribution, you need affirmative language—contribution percentages, caps, conditions, defined obligations. Vague reservation clauses preserve jurisdiction. They do not preserve your client's case.

The Financial Asymmetry That Didn't Matter

Here's the detail that should make every high-net-worth petitioner sit up straight: Petitioner's gross monthly income was approximately $15,000—roughly 2.5 to 3 times respondent's approximately $6,000. Petitioner had significantly more home equity and retirement assets. On paper, this looks like a case where contribution from the lower-earning respondent might be modest or even nominal.

But none of that mattered. Because the court never reached the merits. When you fail to establish a prima facie case, the court doesn't get to weigh the Section 513 factors. Financial disparity is irrelevant if you can't prove what you paid and what your children have.

This is the brutal arithmetic of litigation: the strongest equitable argument in the world is worthless without evidentiary foundation.

Strategic Takeaways for Illinois Practitioners

If You're the Petitioner:

• Document actual payments. Bank statements, canceled checks, wire transfer confirmations, credit card statements showing payments to the institution. Tuition bills alone are insufficient.
• Establish the child's financial resources with specificity. If the child works, subpoena pay records or have the child testify with documentation. If the child has savings, scholarships, or financial aid, put it in the record. If the child has nothing, prove that too.
• Segregate your timeline. Know your petition date. Organize every expense as pre-petition or post-petition. Present them separately.
• Put the child on the stand. If a child's financial resources are a statutory factor and you present no testimony from or about that child, you are inviting a directed finding. In Weiss, one child didn't testify at all. That silence was deafening.

If You're the Respondent:

• Scrutinize the evidentiary record element by element. Section 513 has multiple factors. If petitioner fails to introduce evidence on even one, you have grounds for a directed finding. Don't wait for closing argument to raise this—move under 2-1110 the moment petitioner rests.
• Challenge the characterization of MSA language. Reservation clauses are jurisdictional, not substantive. Make the court hold petitioner to the full statutory burden.
• Don't concede the narrative. In Weiss, respondent testified he hadn't contributed and that the universities denied his requests for billing information. That testimony reframed the dynamic: respondent wasn't hiding from obligation; he was locked out of information. Narrative matters even in a directed-finding posture.

The Cyber-Discovery Angle You're Not Thinking About

Here's where my practice lens widens. In cases involving postsecondary expenses, financial records increasingly live in digital ecosystems—university portals, financial aid platforms, Venmo and Zelle transaction histories, 529 plan dashboards. If you're litigating a 513 petition and the other side claims they "can't access" billing information, you need to be issuing targeted subpoenas to the institutions and third-party payment platforms. Digital forensics isn't just for custody disputes involving parental fitness. It's for any case where someone claims financial opacity while sitting on a smartphone that logs every transaction.

If your opposing party is claiming they were denied access to university billing portals, demand the denial correspondence. Subpoena the university's FERPA-compliant records directly. The information exists. The question is whether you're aggressive enough to go get it—and whether the other side's claimed ignorance survives scrutiny.

The Bottom Line

In re The Marriage of Weiss is not a case about a court denying college contribution on the merits. It's a case about a petitioner who never got to the merits because the evidentiary foundation was nonexistent. The Second District didn't rule that respondent shouldn't contribute. It ruled that petitioner never proved respondent should.

That distinction is everything. And if you're on either side of a Section 513 dispute right now, this opinion is either your roadmap or your warning.

Your opposition just blinked. The question is whether you're prepared to capitalize—or whether you're about to make the same mistakes petitioner made in Weiss.

If you're facing a college-contribution dispute in Illinois—or any high-stakes family law matter where the financial picture is complex and the evidentiary burden is unforgiving—book a consult with our team now. The other side is already preparing. You should be ahead of them.