In re Marriage of Hyman, 2024 IL App (2d) 230352

The opposing counsel is already on the back foot — they just don't know it yet. If you're litigating fee enforcement in an Illinois dissolution case, In re Marriage of Hyman, 2024 IL App (2d) 230352, just handed you a blueprint for how to win, how to lose, and how the Second District will punish sloppy judicial reasoning on attorney fee awards. Let me walk you through exactly what happened, why it matters, and how you weaponize it.

The Setup: A Judge Who Thought a Gut Check Was Good Enough

Rachel Hyman prevailed on enforcement of a dissolution judgment. Jeffrey failed to comply. No compelling cause. No justification. Under 750 ILCS 5/508(b), that triggers a mandatory fee award — not discretionary, mandatory. The only question left for the trial court was how much.

Rachel's counsel submitted documented fees of $56,755.25. The trial court slashed that number to $10,000. That's an 82% reduction. And the court's explanation for the cut? Virtually nonexistent — supplemented, incredibly, by the judge's private conversations with unnamed attorneys about what fees should look like.

The Second District vacated the award and sent it back. The message was unmistakable: you cannot gut a fee petition without articulating record-based reasons, and you absolutely cannot base your ruling on extrajudicial consultations that no party can cross-examine.

The Legal Architecture: What 508(b) Actually Requires

Here's where most practitioners — and apparently some trial judges — get confused. Section 508(b) is not Section 508(a). The distinction is critical:

• 508(a) governs interim and need-based fee awards. Discretionary. Ability-to-pay analysis. Familiar territory.
• 508(b) governs enforcement fees when a party's noncompliance lacks compelling cause or justification. The award itself is mandatory. The court's discretion extends only to the amount — specifically, whether the fees claimed are reasonable.

The Hyman court reinforced that reasonableness is assessed through conventional factors Illinois courts have long recognized: the nature and importance of the matter, novelty and difficulty of the issues, the skill and responsibility required, customary charges in the community, the benefit to the client, and the nexus between the fees incurred and the amount at stake.

None of those factors involve a judge calling lawyer friends to ask what they think.

The Kill Shot: Extrajudicial Consultations Are Inadmissible and Reversible

This is the part of the opinion that should make every litigator sit up straight. The trial judge acknowledged relying on private conversations with unnamed attorneys to arrive at the reduced fee figure. The appellate court did not mince words: a judge may draw on general experience, but may not conduct private investigations or rely on untested extrajudicial communications to determine fee reasonableness.

Why? Because those inputs are not subject to cross-examination. They are not part of the evidentiary record. They cannot be challenged, rebutted, or even identified. This is foundational due process, and the trial court violated it.

Practice directive: If you ever suspect a judge is freelancing on fee reasonableness — asking around, relying on anecdotal market data that wasn't presented at hearing — object on the record immediately. Cite Hyman. Demand that any basis for reduction be tethered to admitted evidence. If the judge won't engage, you've preserved the issue for appeal and [outcome varies by case] it.

The Reduction Problem: You Must Show Your Work

Even setting aside the extrajudicial issue, the Second District found the trial court's reasoning inadequate. When a court substantially reduces a fee petition, it must explain — on the record — the specific basis for the reduction. A conclusory statement that the fees seem "too high" does not suffice. The court must identify which entries it found unreasonable, which rates it adjusted, or which tasks it deemed unnecessary, and articulate why.

This is not a new principle, but Hyman applies it with teeth. The takeaway for both sides:

• If you're seeking fees: Build your petition like a fortress. Detailed time entries. Task-by-task descriptions. Clear delineation between enforcement work (compensable under 508(b)) and other litigation activity. Supporting affidavits or testimony on customary rates in your jurisdiction. Make it painful for the court to reduce without explanation.
• If you're opposing fees: Attack specific entries. Challenge rates with competing evidence. Argue lack of nexus. Do not rely on the court to do your work for you — because if the court reduces fees without adequate reasoning, the appellate court will vacate and you'll be back at square one, likely facing an even less sympathetic bench.

Appellate Fees and Postjudgment Interest: The Issues Everyone Forgets

Two additional rulings in Hyman deserve attention.

First, appellate fees under 508(b). Rachel sought fees for defending the appeal. The trial court denied them. Jeffrey argued forfeiture. The Second District rejected the forfeiture argument and directed reconsideration on remand. The lesson: if you're enforcing a judgment and the noncompliant party drags you through an appeal, seek your appellate fees explicitly and develop the record on reasonableness and necessity. Do not assume the trial court will address it sua sponte. File the petition. Brief the issue. Make it unavoidable.

Second, statutory postjudgment interest. Rachel raised this on appeal as well. The appellate court remanded for consideration consistent with applicable law. This is a frequently overlooked component of enforcement awards. If you've obtained a monetary judgment — including a fee award — and the opposing party delays payment, postjudgment interest may be running. Brief the statutory framework. Request it. Do not leave money on the table because you forgot to ask.

The Cyber-Discovery Angle: Digital Noncompliance Is Still Noncompliance

Now let me connect this to what I see in practice every week. High-net-worth dissolution cases increasingly involve digital assets, cryptocurrency holdings, cloud-stored financial records, and electronically managed business interests. When a party fails to comply with discovery or judgment terms related to these assets, the enforcement mechanism is the same — and 508(b) applies with equal force.

If your opposing party is hiding behind "technical difficulties" to avoid producing digital records, or claiming they "can't access" crypto wallets, or dragging their feet on court-ordered asset transfers that require electronic execution — that is noncompliance. And if it lacks compelling cause or justification, your fees for enforcing compliance are mandatory under 508(b).

Document everything. Preserve metadata. Use forensic experts where warranted. And when you file your fee petition, make sure every hour spent chasing digital noncompliance is clearly identified and tied to the enforcement effort. Hyman protects your right to recover those fees — but only if you build the record to support them.

Strategic Takeaways for Illinois Practitioners

1. 508(b) fees are mandatory when you prevail on enforcement and noncompliance lacks justification. The only fight is over amount. Frame your petition accordingly.
2. Detail is your armor. Granular time entries, rate affidavits, and clear task-to-issue mapping make arbitrary reductions nearly impossible to sustain on appeal.
3. Object to extrajudicial reasoning. If a judge references outside consultations, private research, or anecdotal rate information not in evidence, put your objection on the record and cite Hyman.
4. Demand articulated reasoning for any reduction. A court that slashes fees without explanation has committed reversible error. Make the record clear that you requested specific findings.
5. Seek appellate fees affirmatively. Do not assume they'll be addressed. File a separate petition. Brief the standard. Develop the record.
6. Request postjudgment interest. It's statutory. It's often substantial. It's routinely forgotten.
7. Digital noncompliance is enforcement territory. Treat failures to produce electronic records or transfer digital assets with the same urgency as any other judgment violation — because the fee recovery mechanism is identical.

The Bottom Line

The Second District just told every trial court in Illinois: if you're going to reduce a mandatory fee award, you'd better have admissible, articulable, record-based reasons — and "I called some lawyers I know" is not one of them. For enforcement litigators, this opinion is a loaded weapon. For noncompliant parties and their counsel, it's a warning shot.

If you're facing a fee dispute, an enforcement action, or a high-asset dissolution where digital noncompliance is in play, the time to act is now — not after the court enters an order you'll spend two years appealing.

Book a consult with our team today. Your opposition is already behind. Let's make sure they stay there.