In re Parentage of E.S., No. 1-18-2681 (Ill. App. Ct. 1st Dist. June 28, 2019) (Rule 23)

Parties
- Petitioner-Appellant: Annetta Stella (biological mother)
- Respondent-Appellee: Christopher Ridgeway (biological father)
- Subject: minor child E.S.

Key legal issues
- Whether the trial court erred in granting a minor’s surname change where the statutory standard (735 ILCS 5/21‑101) requires proof by clear and convincing evidence that the change is “necessary to serve the best interest of the child.”
- What evidence suffices under the clear-and-convincing standard and the statutory best‑interest factors (parents’ wishes; child’s wishes; interactions/relationships; child’s adjustment to home/school/community).

Holding / outcome
- The appellate court reversed the trial court’s order changing E.S.’s surname from “Stella” to “Ridgeway” and reversed the denial of the mother’s motion to reconsider. The respondent failed to present clear and convincing evidence that the name change was necessary for the child’s best interest.

Significant legal reasoning
- Statutory framework: 735 ILCS 5/21‑101 mandates a clear-and-convincing showing that a name change is necessary to serve the child’s best interest; courts may consider the four enumerated factors (parents’ wishes; child’s wishes; relationships; adjustment).
- The appellate court reiterated that “clear and convincing” means the evidence must leave no reasonable doubt (citing Bazydlo); a parent’s mere desire for a name change (or a father’s testimony about his reasons) is insufficient. In re Tate Oliver B., relied on by the opinion, cautions that one parent’s preference alone will not satisfy the standard.
- Record facts: child is young, non‑verbal with severe cognitive impairments and autism; has used the surname “Stella” since birth (birth certificate signed as such); lives with mother and siblings who share “Stella”; receives intensive in‑home therapies; father’s proof primarily showed financial support and personal preference for family-name unity.
- Although the trial court later recited the statutory factors, the appellate court concluded the evidence did not unmistakably support that the change was necessary for the child’s best interest.

Practice implications (concise)
- For name-change petitions concerning minors, present clear-and-convincing evidence tied to each statutory factor (medical/therapy disruption, sibling unity, child’s expressed preference where possible, community/school usage).
- Documentary proof is critical (school/therapy records, evidence of community identity, testimony about likely harm or benefit from change); a parent’s preference and financial support alone are weak.
- Ensure trial court makes explicit best-interest findings on the record tying facts to each relevant factor.
- Note: this is a Rule 23 (non‑precedential) disposition and may be cited only in limited circumstances.