Illinois Appellate Court

In re Adoption of M.C., 2024 IL App (5th) 240430-U

July 31, 2024
AdoptionGuardianshipProtection Orders
Case Analysis
- Case citation and parties
In re Adoption of M.C., 2024 IL App (5th) 240430‑U (Ill. App. Ct. 5th Dist. July 31, 2024) (Rule 23 order, non‑precedential). Petitioners‑Appellants: Louise and James Bryant. Respondents‑Appellees: Jacqueline Larson (mother), Illinois DCFS, Roche Cain Sr., William Larson, Lisa Larson, and Petitioner‑Appellee Taylor Renee Redeker (foster parent).

- Key legal issues
1) Whether the circuit court erred in denying the Bryants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings.
2) Whether M.C. was “available for adoption” by the Bryants when mother executed a specific, irrevocable consent naming only the foster parent.
3) Whether the court’s best‑interest finding favoring the foster parent was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
4) Whether the court erred in denying the Bryants summary judgment on parental fitness (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)).
5) Whether the court abused its discretion by consolidating competing adoption petitions.

- Holding/outcome
The appellate court affirmed. The trial court did not err in denying judgment on the pleadings; correctly determined M.C. was not available to the Bryants because mother executed a valid specific consent naming only the foster parent; the best‑interest determination was not against the manifest weight of the evidence; denial of summary judgment on fitness was proper; and consolidation of the competing adoption petitions was within the court’s discretion.

- Significant legal reasoning (condensed)
- Jurisdiction/pleadings: The Bryants’ lack of party status in the juvenile case and the complexity of competing claims meant judgment on the pleadings was improper.
- Availability/consent: The court treated mother’s final, irrevocable consent that specifically named the foster parent as dispositive — a valid specific consent can render a child unavailable for adoption by other prospective adoptive parents. Once such a consent is accepted by the juvenile court/DCFS, competing petitions face a substantial barrier.
- Fitness/best interests: Because the child was made unavailable to others by the specific consent, a fitness determination as to the mother was not dispositive of the adoption contest between private petitioners and the foster parent. The trial record supported the foster parent’s fitness and the child’s best interests (stability, attachment to foster parent, child preference), so the appellate court found no manifest‑weight reversal.
- Consolidation: Granting consolidation to resolve competing petitions was not an abuse of discretion.

- Practice implications for practitioners
- Promptly intervene or seek party status in juvenile proceedings when future adoption is a possibility; confidential juvenile records and DCFS/guardian actions can be outcome‑determinative.
- Challenge or seek to enjoin the execution or filing of any parent’s irrevocable specific consent quickly — once accepted by the juvenile court/DCFS, it may foreclose competing adopters.
- Don’t rely solely on statutory time‑period arguments or default pleadings for summary judgment on fitness; develop admissible evidentiary support.
- When multiple adoption petitions exist, move early to consolidate or bifurcate issues (availability/consent vs. best interest) and marshal best‑interest evidence (stability, attachments, child preference).
- Consider discovery aimed at consent circumstances, DCFS recommendations, and the juvenile court’s orders.
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