

2026 IL App (1st) 251916-U
No. 1-25-1916
Order filed September 15, 2026

Second Division

NOTICE: This order was filed under Supreme Court Rule 23 and is not precedent except in the limited circumstances allowed under Rule 23(e)(1).

IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIRST DISTRICT

<i>In re</i> MARRIAGE OF	)	Appeal from the
WILFREDO CAMACHO,	)	Circuit Court of
	)	Cook County.
Petitioner-Appellant,	)	
	)	
and	)	No. 23 D 5707
	)	
LUZ FELICIA CAMACHO,	)	Honorable
	)	William Yu,
Respondent-Appellee.	)	Judge, presiding.

JUSTICE VAN TINE delivered the judgment of the court.
Justices McBride and Reyes concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

- ¶ 1 *Held:* We dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction because petitioner (1) did not timely challenge the final and appealable dissolution judgment and (2) attempts, without a Supreme Court Rule 304(a) finding, to appeal one postdissolution ruling while other postdissolution matters are pending.
- ¶ 2 Petitioner Wilfredo Camacho attempts to appeal a September 13, 2024 judgment of dissolution of marriage, and a postdissolution order the circuit court purportedly entered on September 7, 2025. We dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

¶ 3

I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 The record on appeal consists only of the common law record; there are no reports of proceedings. Wilfredo was a self-represented litigant for most proceedings in the circuit court and is self-represented in this appeal.

¶ 5 Wilfredo and respondent Luz Camacho were married in 1996 and have one child who is emancipated. In 2023, Wilfredo filed a petition for dissolution of marriage citing irreconcilable differences.

¶ 6 On September 13, 2024, the court entered a dissolution judgment that incorporated the parties' marital settlement agreement and required Wilfredo to pay Luz \$1,062 per month in maintenance. Neither party filed a postjudgment motion or a notice of appeal within 30 days of the dissolution judgment. The court struck the case from the call on both September 13 and October 1, 2024.

¶ 7 On October 25, 2024, Wilfredo filed a motion to terminate or modify maintenance, the first of several postdissolution motions which started lengthy postdissolution litigation that continues to this day. He voluntarily withdrew that motion on December 4, 2024. On January 17, 2025, Wilfredo filed another motion to terminate or modify maintenance. In response, on May 22, 2025, Luz petitioned for a rule to show cause seeking a contempt finding against Wilfredo for failing to pay maintenance. On August 14, 2025, the court denied Wilfredo's motion, granted Luz's petition, and held Wilfredo in contempt. The court found that Wilfredo owed \$9,558 in back maintenance and set a contempt purge of \$955.80. On August 18, 2025, Wilfredo filed a motion to "vacate order," which apparently challenged the August 14, 2025, order.

¶ 8 On September 22, 2025, Wilfredo filed a notice of appeal challenging the dissolution judgment and an unidentified order purportedly entered on Sunday, September 7, 2025.

¶ 9 On October 31, 2025, the court denied Wilfredo's motion to vacate. That order is the last document in the record on appeal. The circuit court's electronic docket indicates that postdissolution litigation is ongoing, and the next court date is September 18, 2026. See *TCF National Bank v. Richards*, 2016 IL App (1st) 152083, ¶ 50 (we take judicial notice of the trial court's electronic docket).

¶ 10 Luz has not participated in this appeal. We took this appeal on only the record and Wilfredo's brief. See *First Capitol Mortgage Corp. v. Talandis Construction Corp.*, 63 Ill. 2d 128, 133 (1976).

¶ 11 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 12 We must consider whether we have jurisdiction over this appeal. See *In re Marriage of Duggan*, 376 Ill. App. 3d 725, 727 (2007). Neither Wilfredo's notice of appeal nor his brief identifies an Illinois Supreme Court Rule under which he invokes our jurisdiction.

¶ 13 A. Dissolution Judgment

¶ 14 The September 13, 2024, dissolution judgment resolved all issues before the circuit court and did not reserve any issues for later determination, so it was a final and appealable judgment. See 750 ILCS 5/413(a) (West 2024) ("A judgment of dissolution of marriage or of legal separation or of declaration of invalidity of marriage is final when entered, subject to the right of appeal."); *In re Marriage of Susman*, 2012 IL App (1st) 112068, ¶ 13 (a dissolution "judgment that does not reserve any issues for later determination is final and appealable."). To appeal a final judgment, a party must file a notice of appeal "within 30 days after the entry of the final judgment appealed from, or, if a timely posttrial motion directed against the judgment is filed, *** within 30 days

after the entry of the order disposing of the last pending postjudgment motion directed against that judgment.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(a)(1) (eff. July 1, 2017).

¶ 15 Wilfredo did not file a notice of appeal or a postjudgment motion directed against the dissolution judgment within 30 days of September 13, 2024. Therefore, Wilfredo’s attempt to appeal the dissolution judgment is untimely and we do not have jurisdiction under Rule 303(a)(1). See *In re Marriage of Singel*, 373 Ill. App. 3d 554, 556 (2007).

¶ 16 We also have to consider whether we have jurisdiction under any other provision such as Supreme Court Rule 304 (eff. Mar. 8, 2016). Although the dissolution judgment was a final order, the parties raised postdissolution matters in the circuit court. That was proper because in a dissolution of marriage case, the circuit court “retains extraordinary continuing jurisdiction not applicable to civil cases generally.” *In re Marriage of Adamson and Cosner*, 308 Ill. App. 3d 759, 764 (1999). A party may appeal a ruling on one postdissolution matter while other, unrelated postdissolution matters are pending, but only if the party obtains a Rule 304(a) finding as to the postdissolution ruling the party seeks to appeal. *In re Marriage of Crecos*, 2021 IL 126192, ¶ 45.

¶ 17 Here, Wilfredo attempted to appeal the dissolution judgment *itself* while a postdissolution matter (his motion to vacate) was pending. *Crecos* does not authorize such an approach, we have found no authority that does, and the circuit court did not make any Rule 304(a) findings in any event. We do not have jurisdiction over Wilfredo’s attempt to appeal the dissolution judgment.

¶ 18 B. Postdissolution Order

¶ 19 Wilfredo also attempts to appeal a postdissolution order that he claims the circuit court entered on September 7, 2025. The record contains no such order, and the docket indicates that the circuit court did not enter any order on that date.

¶ 20 Rule 303(b)(2) requires a notice of appeal to “specify the judgment or part thereof or other orders appealed from and the relief sought from the reviewing court.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 303(b)(2) (eff. July 1, 2017). We have jurisdiction to review only the orders specified in the notice. *Village of Kirkland v. Kirkland Properties Holdings Co., LLC I*, 2023 IL 128612, ¶ 38. That said, we construe notices of appeal liberally. *Id.* We consider the notice of appeal as a whole, and if it “fairly and adequately sets out the judgment complained of and the relief sought, thus advising the successful litigant of the nature of the appeal,” then it is sufficient to confer appellate jurisdiction. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) *Id.* ¶ 39.

¶ 21 Wilfredo’s notice of appeal seeks the following relief: “Cohabiting therefore no alimony.” In other words, Wilfredo alleges that he should not have to pay Luz maintenance because she is cohabitating with someone else. That may be a basis for terminating or modifying maintenance. See 750 ILCS 5/510(c) (West 2024) (“the obligation to pay future maintenance is terminated *** if the party receiving maintenance cohabits with another person on a resident, continuing conjugal basis.”). The purpose of this provision “is to remedy the inequity created when the recipient spouse becomes involved in a husband-wife relationship but does not formalize the relationship, so that he or she can continue to receive maintenance from his or her ex-spouse.” *In re Marriage of Sunday*, 354 Ill. App. 3d 184, 189 (2004).

¶ 22 Wilfredo filed three postdissolution motions seeking to terminate or modify maintenance on this basis on October 25, 2024, January 17, 2025, and August 18, 2025. Wilfredo withdrew the first motion on December 4, 2024, and the circuit court denied the other two motions on August 14 and October 31, 2025, respectively. The only one of those three outcomes that Wilfredo’s September 22, 2025, notice of appeal could have challenged was the August 14, 2025, order. So,

we liberally construe Wilfredo's notice of appeal as challenging the circuit court's August 14, 2025 order denying his January 17, 2025 motion to terminate or modify maintenance.

¶ 23 When Wilfredo filed his notice of appeal, there was at least one other postdissolution matter pending: his motion to vacate the August 14, 2025, order. The electronic docket indicates that since October 31, 2025, there has been even more postdissolution litigation and that it continues to this day, although we do not know exactly what it concerns. Regardless, Wilfredo attempts to appeal a ruling on one postdissolution motion while other postdissolution matters remain pending. He cannot do so without a Rule 304(a) finding (see *Crecos*, 2021 IL 126192, ¶ 45), and there is no indication the circuit court has made any Rule 304(a) findings in this case. The court's written order of August 14, 2025, certainly does not include a Rule 304(a) finding. Therefore, we do not have jurisdiction over this aspect of Wilfredo's appeal either.

¶ 24 Because we do not have jurisdiction over any part of this appeal, we must dismiss it. See *Susman*, 2012 IL App (1st) 112068, ¶ 11.

¶ 25 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 26 For the foregoing reasons, we dismiss this appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

¶ 27 Appeal dismissed.