Attorney’s Fees Under 750 ILCS 5/508(b) for Frivolous or Bad-Faith Litigation

Attorney’s Fees Under 750 ILCS 5/508(b) for Frivolous or Bad-Faith Litigation

Attorney’s Fees Under 750 ILCS 5/508(b) for Frivolous or Bad-Faith Litigation

Statutory Overview: Section 508(b) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act mandates fee-shifting when one party’s improper conduct forces needless litigation. In relevant part, it provides that if a party’s failure to comply with a court order was “without compelling cause or justification,” the court shall order that party to pay the other side’s reasonable attorney fees (In re Marriage of Patel, 2013 IL App (1st) 112571). It further states that “[i]f at any time a court finds that a hearing under this Act was precipitated or conducted for any improper purpose,” the court “shall allocate fees and costs of all parties for the hearing to the party or counsel found to have acted improperly.” Improper purposes explicitly include “harassment, unnecessary delay, or other acts needlessly increasing the cost of litigation.” (Defending A Petition For Attorney's Fees In An Illinois Divorce) In other words, fees are mandatory under §508(b) when a litigant engages in frivolous or bad-faith tactics that violate court orders or needlessly drive up litigation costs (In re Marriage of Gildersleeve). Notably, a contempt finding is not a prerequisite to relief – a party can be made to pay under §508(b) even without a formal contempt, so long as their lack of justification is shown (case reference).

Illinois Supreme Court Guidance

Illinois courts recognize §508(b) fee awards as a form of sanction for litigation abuse, distinct from need-based fee contributions. The Illinois Supreme Court has emphasized that unlike ordinary fee petitions (which consider each spouse’s financial ability), §508(b) imposes fees without regard to ability to pay when its criteria are met (In re Marriage of Gildersleeve). For example, in In re Marriage of Schneider, the Court reaffirmed that a party who unjustifiably disobeys a dissolution judgment effectively triggers a mandatory fee award under §508(b) (to relieve the innocent spouse of the financial burden of enforcement) (In re Marriage of Patel). Likewise, in Blum v. Koster, the Supreme Court noted that §508(b) applies fully in post-decree proceedings, underscoring that a court must order the offending party to pay all reasonable fees caused by hearings brought for “an improper purpose” such as “harassment [or] unnecessary delay.” (Illinois Attorney's Fees and the Leveling the Playing Field Act) Although Blum primarily dealt with other issues, it confirmed that §508(b) fee-shifting is available as a remedy for post-decree litigation misconduct. In sum, the high court recognizes that §508(b) is a “dead serious” fee-shifting provision, intended to deter litigants from flouting court orders or abusing the judicial process (reference).

First District Appellate Cases

In re Marriage of Galati, 2021 IL App (3d) 200361 (Third District case, cited for persuasive value) – Galati involved post-decree enforcement where the ex-wife repeatedly failed to obey the divorce judgment (missing payments, neglecting a court-ordered insurance obligation, etc.) and stonewalled discovery. She was held in contempt for various violations. The trial court awarded the ex-husband over $22,000 in attorney fees under §508(b). In affirming, the appellate court highlighted that §508(b) fees are not limited to the exact contempt findings – any failure to comply without cause can justify fees for related proceedings. The court explicitly invoked the “improper purpose” clause: it noted that the wife’s “reluctance or delay in complying with the court’s orders and [husband’s] discovery requests increased the cost of the proceedings and required [him] to seek assistance from the court.” This conduct fell under “improper purpose” as defined by §508(b) (i.e. needless increase in litigation costs). All fees incurred to compel her compliance were therefore chargeable to her. The Galati opinion echoed that a party is “entitled to have [the opposing party] pay for her conduct” when that conduct forces emergency motions and court intervention. Although Galati is a Third District decision, its reasoning aligns with First District precedent and §508(b)’s plain language: harassing delays or noncompliance will boomerang back as fee awards to the injured spouse.

In re Marriage of Berto, 344 Ill. App. 3d 705 (2d Dist. 2003) (Second District, frequently cited by First District courts) – Berto involved an ex-husband who unilaterally reduced his support payments and then tried to voluntarily dismiss his modification petition once arrearages piled up. The trial court declined to hold him in contempt after he paid the overdue support, but still denied the ex-wife’s fee request. The appellate court reversed, stressing that contempt is not a prerequisite for §508(b) fees. “No finding of contempt is required” to impose fees under the statute. What matters is that the violation of the court’s order was “without compelling cause or justification.” The Second District noted that “the party that fails to comply with an order bears the burden of proving” a compelling justification – a burden the ex-husband in Berto did not meet. Accordingly, the ex-wife was entitled to all reasonable enforcement-related fees despite the absence of a contempt finding. First District decisions have cited Berto with approval on this point (for example, Harrison and Patel both reiterate that intentionality or contempt is not required). The takeaway is that a spouse who forces an unnecessary enforcement proceeding—even if they belatedly comply under pressure—must reimburse the other party’s fees under §508(b).

Frivolous or Vexatious Post-Decree Filings

Illinois courts also use §508(b) to curb meritless post-decree motions designed to harass or delay. The statute’s “improper purpose” clause has been applied to award fees when a party pursues baseless litigation tactics in bad faith. For instance, courts have upheld fee awards where a party sought a modification with no compelling grounds—effectively a frivolous motion that wasted everyone’s time and money. In one case, an ex-husband petitioned to reduce maintenance based on an “intentional manipulation of assets” (he orchestrated his finances to create a false pretext for reduction); the court found the petition was brought without cause and “needlessly increas[ed] the cost of litigation,” warranting fees under §508(b). Likewise, in In re Marriage of Santi (Ill. App. 2022), fees were affirmed against a spouse whose serial post-decree motions lacked merit – the court deemed the filings “vexatious and harassing,” triggering §508(b) sanctions (citing Harrison and the “improper purpose” standard). The First District in Harrison itself noted that vexatious custody litigation can justify fee awards when a parent’s actions “constitute harassment.” This dovetails with §508(b)’s broad mandate to penalize any tactic in dissolution proceedings that is intended to burden the other side. As the statute says, when a hearing is brought for an “improper purpose,” the offending party or attorney “shall” pay all parties’ costs for that hearing.

Key Takeaways from the Case Law

Illustrative Excerpts Supporting Fee Awards

Courts apply this with near-automatic force when a party disobeys discovery or other court orders. In Patel, the First District found the ex-wife’s “past dilatory conduct” belied any claim she tried to comply, thus upholding a large fee award. The court was unmoved by her assertion of “technical violations,” noting that lack of intentionality is no defense; “technical or not,” the violations added expense and delay, meeting the “improper purpose” and “no compelling justification” thresholds.

“Section 508(b) does not depend on a party’s inability to pay…it must be reasonable based on…the nature of the case, the difficulty of issues, and the time involved.” (In re Marriage of Gildersleeve) The offending party’s financial status does not diminish liability; the question is whether the fees sought are reasonable for the work performed to counteract the misconduct.

Summary and Conclusion

In summary, Illinois Supreme Court and First District authority establish that frivolous post-decree litigation, discovery abuses, and other bad-faith tactics will prompt a fee award under 750 ILCS 5/508(b). Courts interpret this provision as a powerful tool to compensate the victim of improper litigation conduct and to deter would-be abusers. Whether it’s a baseless motion filed to harass an ex-spouse or a willful discovery violation causing unnecessary delay, Illinois courts have consistently enforced §508(b)’s directive by awarding attorney’s fees to the injured party in such circumstances. The case law is replete with examples of judges not only granting fees, but also explicitly calling out the offending party’s “improper purpose”—be it hostility, delay, or provocation—to justify shifting the financial burden. As the First District summed up, “Section 508(b) is mandatory” once the threshold showing is made, ensuring that those who litigate in bad faith ultimately bear the costs of their own improper conduct rather than foisting that expense onto the innocent opponent.

Sources

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